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vABSTRACT
The first chapter of this thesis studies the role of angel finance in the early-stage capital
market. Despite anecdotal evidence connecting angel and venture capital (VC) financ-
ing, there is little systematic evidence on how the two early-stage capital sources interact.
To study this topic, I assemble the first comprehensive dataset on angel financing and
characterize its size, scope, and role in the early-stage capital market. I use the popula-
tion of newly incorporated startups located in California, the largest VC financing state
in the United States. Here, the angel capital market is large: approximately 4% of all
startups receive angel financing within three years of incorporation. At least five times
as many startups receive financing from angels as from VCs in the VC-active industries.
Using local individual income as an instrument for angel financing at the zip code level,
I show that angels play both supportive and competitive roles in relation to VCs. Angel
financing leads to more VC follow-on financing over firms’ life cycles (complement),
while it crowds out VC financing from the initial financing round (substitute). My
results demonstrate the explicit role of angel financing in the early-stage capital market.
In the second chapter, I develop a game-theoretic model to study information
asymmetries in the evolving equity crowdfunding market. I assume (1) there are two
types of investors: informed (“insiders”) and uninformed (“outsiders”); (2) the insiders
invest first; and (3) the outsiders observe the aggregate of insiders’ actions and then
decide whether to invest. Under these assumptions, I prove that there does not exist a
crowdfunding market equilibrium in which the insiders’ information is aggregated and
high quality startups are funded with higher chances. I then use data from Regulation
crowdfunding (Title III equity crowdfunding), and provide evidence that is consistent
vi
with the model implications. My results suggest that adverse selection is a primary
barrier to equity crowdfunding, and new market designs are required to better develop
this market.
The third chapter is joint work with Matt Elliott. We model firms as sets of scarce
capabilities, where each capability provides a source of competitive advantage in some
markets. Each market is also associated with a set of capabilities that are valued by
it. Firm and market hypergraphs represent this information. Our approach provides a
new perspective on several industrial organization literatures including merger analysis,
strategic alliances and industry dynamics. We argue that merger analysis should be
more holistic and that profitable joint ventures increase consumer surplus even when
they reduce competition. We also provide formal foundations for a prominent theory of
competitive advantage in the management literature.
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1C h a p t e r 1
WHAT ROLE DOES ANGEL FINANCE PLAY IN THE EARLY-STAGE CAPITAL
MARKET?
1.1 Introduction
A well-developed early-stage capital market has long been recognized as crucial in
supporting high-growth entrepreneurship and innovation.1 Among early-stage investors,
financial intermediaries venture capitalists (VCs) attract most of the attention. Yet Puri
and Zarutskie [84] show that as few as 0.11% of all new firms raise money from VCs.
Their work raises a puzzle: how are the rest of startups funded? Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the angel capital market plays an important role in financing startups [e.g.,
82, 90]. Famous angel investing examples run as far back as Henry Ford, and as recently
as Google and Facebook, further suggesting an important role for non-intermediated
early-stage capital in funding innovative startups. A lack of systematic data, however,
has severely limited our ability to study non-VC early-stage finance. In particular,
little is known about the exact role of non-VC early-stage finance: how does it fit into
the early-stage capital market? To study this question, using a combination of state
and federal government filings, PCRI2, and Pitchbook, I assemble a comprehensive
dataset on private non-VC security3 issues by incorporated firms less than three years
1For example, see Schumpeter [88], Evans and Jovanovic [28], King and Levine [59], Brown et al. [15], and Kerr and
Nanda [56].
2PCRI is a private capital database, built by academic researchers such as Josh Lerner, with a primary goal to
provide a comprehensive and centralized private capital database for academic use. See more at: http://www.
privatecapitalresearchinstitute.org/index.php
3In this paper, I focus on equity financing or, more generally, security financing. In the United States, the definition of
security is broad, and security includes any type of investment contracts. However, it does not include formal debt financing
such as bank loans. Robb and Robinson [85] use Kauffmann survey data and find that newly founded firms also frequently use
formal debt financing.
2old (henceforth “startups”) in California (CA), which I will refer to as angel financing.4
With this dataset, I quantify the size and scope of angel financing, and characterize its
role in the early-stage capital market through its interaction with VC financing.
I start by quantifying the size of the angel capital market. Consistent with current
survey-based estimates of the size of the U.S. angel market, I find that the angel market
is large. In California, angels invest about four billion dollars each year in the initial
financing for young corporations. About 4% of all incorporated CA firms receive angel
financing within three years of their founding. This fraction of firms supported by
angels is ten times greater than the 0.37% of firms funded by VCs among California
corporations. Even if one focuses on the industries where VCs are active, angels also
fund over 90% of initial security issues. Using the VC market as a benchmark, the
estimates of the angel capital market using CA data is likely to be a lower bound for
the U.S. angel market, because CA is the largest VC financing state in the United States
[e.g., 81].
Although the angel capital market is large, it may not support the high-growth,
innovative startups that comprise most VC portfolios [see e.g., 35]. For example,
survey data show that angels tend to invest in industries that they know, which are
not necessarily high-growth, or high-tech industries [89]. To examine whether angels
invest in high-growth startups, I calculate the fraction of VC investments preceded by
angel capital. For firms that receive VC financing following an angel round, I refer to
them as receiving VC follow-on financing. I find that firms receiving VC follow-on
4Due to the difficulty in observing social relationships, it is usually hard to distinguish different types of individual investors
by social relationship. For example, a professional individual investor could have known the entrepreneur before investing, in
which case the boundary between friend investor and so-called business angel investor blurs. So, similar to previous literature
(Hellmann, Schure, and Vo, 2013; Kauffman Firm Survey), angel investors in this paper are any non-founder individual
investors.
3financing account for at least 30% of VC funded firms. So a large fraction of VC funded
firms actually start with angel capital. This rejects the idea that angels do not invest in
high-growth startups.
Given the large fraction of VC follow-on financing, a natural question arises about
the dynamic interaction between the angel and VC markets. Scholars have long argued
over the positive impact of angel financing on VC financing over firms’ life cycles.5
Angel investorsmay play an important role in pre-screening and adding value to startups.
So a well-developed angel market may lead to a large number of high quality pre-
screened startups for VCs, and thus increase VCs’ investment opportunities and deal
flows. Therefore, a larger angel capital market should produce a larger complementary
VCmarket. I formalize this argument as the “VC follow-on hypothesis”: a larger number
of startups financed by angels lead to more VC follow-on financing. The alternative
view to the follow-on hypothesis is that angels may not play any complementary role
for VCs. For example, angels may invest in startups with limited growth or innovation
potential [49]. In this scenario, angels and VCs would operate in separate markets,
and we would thus not observe a positive link between them over firms’ life cycles.
To decide between the two views, I exploit market-level variations, and carry out my
analysis at the zip×sector×year level. Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
framework, I find that a higher level of angel financing at the initial round is associated
with a higher level of VC follow-on financing. This finding provides evidence consistent
with the VC follow-on hypothesis, suggesting a positive role angels play in supporting
VCs.
VCs also fund initial capital infusion: 70% of first VC investments are not preceded
5See e.g., Freear and Wetzel [33], Harrison and Mason [43], and Hellmann and Thiele [44].
4by an angel round. This environment creates another angle through which to investigate
the interaction between angels and VCs: at the initial financing round, angels and VCs
may compete. In this competition, VCs have both advantages and disadvantages over
angels. For example, as shown by Hsu [48], startups value VCs’ certification and value-
adding roles beyond the financial capital provided. So professional VCs could provide
better certification and value-adding services than angels. On the other hand, VCs likely
face higher transaction costs. For example, as argued by Lerner [69], VCs rarely invest
small amounts of money in startups. To investigate the competition between angels
and VCs, I formalize a second hypothesis in my paper, the “VC crowd-out hypothesis”:
angel financing crowds out VC financing at the initial financing round. The alternative
view to the crowd-out hypothesis is that angels cannot compete with VCs, and are only
able to fund VCs’ rejected deals. Were this the case, we would not see a crowd-out
effect. Again, to evaluate the crowd-out hypothesis, I conduct a market level analysis at
the zip×sector×year level. Consistent with the crowd-out hypothesis, I find that at the
initial financing round, a higher level of angel investing is associated with a lower level
of VC investing.
The OLS regressions provide evidence consistent with both the VC follow-on and
crowd-out hypotheses, yet we cannot draw causal inferences from them. In particular,
it is challenging to investigate the causal impact of angel financing on VC financing
because angel financing is endogenous. To overcome this difficulty, an ideal experiment
would be to randomly select some zip codes, locate additional angel investors there
to increase angel financing, and then compare VC financing in the treated zip codes
with the control zip codes. Doing so could eliminate any confounding issue (e.g., from
the startup capital demand side), and isolate the causal effects of angel financing. In
5the absence of such variation, I instrument angel financing by a measure of local high
income: the fraction of households with annual income greater than $100,000 at each
zip code and year (henceforth “share rich”).6
The main advantage of this instrument is that it is directly related to the supply
of angel capital, which is very local. It is also unlikely to be correlated with the
capital supply of VCs because VCs’ supply mainly comes from geographically dispersed
institutional investors such as pension funds [37]. This advantage ensures that the
instrument is likely to be valid. In particular, it should satisfy the exclusion restriction:
the share rich links to VC financing only through angel financing, and not through either
VC supply or demand. As discussed, the supply side is not an issue. The condition that
the share rich does not link to VC demand also holds because I examine the geographic
proximity of VC investments and find that the demand for VC financing and local
economic factors, such as income and wealth, are not positively correlated at the zip
code level (see a detailed discussion in Section 1.3.4).
Using this instrumental variables (IV) approach, I find that six additional initial angel
financings lead to one additional VC follow-on financing in the next two years. This
economic magnitude is even more meaningful when translating into percentages: a 10%
increase in angel financing leads to a 13% increase in VC follow-on financing in the next
two years. At the same time, I also find that at the initial financing round, angel financing
crowds out VC financing: an increase of three initial angel financings leads to a decrease
6The “share rich” measure is derived from the IRS individual income tax reports, and $100,000 is the only threshold
(cutoff) consistently used by the IRS to report aggregate data in brackets during my data period. According to the 2013 Survey
of Consumer Finances (https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm), $100,000 roughly corresponds
to the 80th percentile of family income distribution in the United States. The survey also provides statistics that 36.3% of
families within the top 10% income hold business equities, in contrast to less than 5% of families in the bottom 50% doing
so. These statistics justify the use of $100,000 as an effective threshold to capture the households with a high likelihood of
investing in startups.
6of one initial VC financing at the market level. Overall, my IV results confirm those
obtained in theOLS regressions, demonstrating that angel financing has causal impact on
VC financing. My findings about the VC follow-on and crowd-out hypotheses together
suggest that an increase in angel financing generates two simultaneous responses from
VCs: VCs increase their follow-on financing of angel-backed startups, while reducing
their direct investing in brand new startups. In short, faced with more angel financing,
VCs shift to fund the later stages of startups. This shift could improve the efficiency of
the whole early-stage financing market, because each source of capital can specialize in
segments of the early-stage financing market where they have competitive advantages.
As a result, this improved efficiency of the early-stage financing market could benefit
the whole entrepreneurial and innovative ecosystem.
To uncover the channels driving the VC follow-on hypothesis, I examine the survival
of the startups that raise their initial financing from angels, and the survival of the startups
that start with angel financing and then receive VC follow-on financing. I find that the
startups raising their initial financing from angels fail more quickly than those that raise
their initial financing directly from VCs. On the other hand, the angel-backed startups
that receive VC follow-on financing actually survive longer than the startups that raise
their initial financing from VCs. This evidence implies that angels invest in riskier
startups with a higher failure rate for the initial financing, and then supply a set of less
risky startups to VCs for follow-on investing. So angels reduce the risk of startups for
VCs.
To provide further confirmation of the VC crowd-out hypothesis, I study how the
distribution of angel investments responds to the overall angel investing activity at the
zip×year level. I find that as the volume of angel investments increases, the frequency
7of sophisticated securities (preferred stock and convertible note) being used in angel
investments falls, while angels fund older startups with larger amounts of capital. This
finding suggests that an increase in the supply of angel capital can lower the cost of
angel capital for startups, reduce angels’ relative disadvantage to VCs in providing large
amounts of capital, and then induce startups to switch funding from VCs to angels at
the initial round.
This paper is related to several strands in the literature. First, there is a small
literature focusing on the interaction between angels and VCs. The paper closest to
mine is Hellmann et al. [45], who use a sample of Canadian firms and show that VCs
and angels are dynamic substitutes across financing rounds. My paper differs from
theirs by focusing on the early period financing where the role angels play is very
different. Hellmann and Thiele [44] also study the interaction between angels and VCs
by building a theoretical model. They derive several important market characteristics
such as deal flows and market sizes across the two markets. Consistent with their paper,
my paper provides empirical evidence that the size of the angel market has a positive
impact on the size of the VC market. Goldfarb et al. [34] use a dataset from a bankrupt
law firm and show that VCs obtain more aggressive control rights, and startups with
both angel and VC investors at the Series A round perform worse than startups with
just VCs for Series A funding. Related to their paper, I show that in terms of survival
rate, startups starting with angel and then receiving VC funding (at different financing
rounds) actually perform better than startups starting with VCs. Second, this paper is
also connected to studies on the impact of angel investing. In particular, Kerr et al. [57]
and Lerner et al. [68] show that angel groups have a positive impact on the growth and
survival of startups. Lindsey and Stein [71] exploit the change of investor accreditation
8rules in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act to study the impact of angel financing, and they find
that a large reduction in the pool of qualified angel investors negatively affects firm entry
and employment levels for small entrants. Unlike these papers, I study the causal impact
of angel financing on VCs. Third, this paper also broadly relates to a few other recent
papers on angel financing.7 For example, Bernstein et al. [10] run random experiments
on AngelList (an electronic investment platform) and find that the founding team is
causally important for access to angel funding.
The crowd-out hypothesis in this paper reveals that, compared with VCs, angels
may have certain advantages in investing in startups, e.g., providing smaller amounts
of capital better fitting startups’ demand. In this regard, the paper is also related to
papers that have suggested that the size of VC investments may be too large for startups.
For example, Ewens et al. [29] show that it takes less capital to start and run startups
in IT sectors.8 Lerner [69] argues that VCs rarely invest small amounts of money in
startups, and VCs’ large investment size problem may be a consequence of VC firms’
organization and can get worse over time. Finally, this paper also relates to a broad VC
literature (see survey papers such as Da Rin et al. [22] and Metrick and Yasuda [74] for
a comprehensive coverage of that literature).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 describes the
data. Section 1.3 characterizes the angel capital market. Section 1.4 shows that angel
financing leads to VC follow-on financing. Section 1.5 shows that angel financing
crowds out VCs from initial stages. Section 1.6 concludes.
7See Morrissette [77] for a good coverage of some older literature on angel financing.
8Outside the academia, the well-known angel investor Paul Graham argues that “because starting a startup is so cheap,
VCs now often want to give startups more money than the startups want to take. VCs like to invest several million at a time...”
-http://paulgraham.com/vcsqueeze.html
91.2 Data
To study the angel capital market, I assemble a dataset that covers angel and VC
investments from2004 to 2014 for startups that are located inCalifornia (CA). Collecting
a comprehensive dataset on angel investing is challenging because these investments
are often made on an individual basis, thus they are not subject to either state or federal
disclosure requirements. I take advantage of California’s blanket requirement that all
securities issues be reported.
The firm-level dataset is assembled from three main data sources, and then matched
with additional information about local capital market conditions. I start with CA incor-
poration records, which provide firm-level information for the universe of corporations
located in CA.9 Next I collect all CA firms’ security exemption filings. These filings
provide information about CA corporations’ early-stage securities issues. I then use
VC databases (PCRI and Pitchbook) to identify these securities issues as angel- or VC-
backed. Finally, I match these data with zip code level IRS tax reports. In the following
section, I review each data source with more details.
1.2.1 CA business registration records: firm founding and industry
I start with the corporation registrations filed with the CA secretary of state10. By
law, all corporations and LLCs doing business (either generating income or maintaining
tangible property) in CA have to register with the California Secretary of State and
report their company address, founding date, and entity type in the registration.
I also use a complementary data source of the “statement of information” filings
9VCs rarely invest in unincorporated firms. Moreover, Levine and Rubinstein [70] show that entrepreneurs owning
incorporated businesses tend to be more educated and earn more, and starting incorporated businesses is a good proxy for
entrepreneurship.
10See more at https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/. Guzman and Stern [40] use the same data source to study the
founding and growth of entrepreneurial firms.
10
(also from the CA Secretary of State) to obtain CA firms’ sector information. Together,
these two sources allow me to characterize all new corporations founded between 2001
and 2014, including both those that raise private capital (fromangels andVCs) from2004
to 2014, and those that do not. The initial dataset contains 1.27 million corporations.
1.2.2 Security exemption notices: form D filings
Under the federal Securities Act of 1933:
“In general, all securities offered in the United States must be registered with
the SEC or must qualify for an exemption from the registration requirements.”
(-SEC:https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html)
Young firms almost always rely on exemption rules to avoid the cost of registration
with the SEC.11 The commonly used federal exemption rules include so-called “private
placement offering” (Section 4(2)) and “intrastate offerings” (Section 3(a)(11))12. Under
both federal rules, the SEC does not impose any filing requirements on the issuers and
instead leaves each state to decide their own regulation and filing rules.
In California, however, the state securities law states:
“It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell in this state (CA) any security in
an issuer transaction, whether or not by or through underwriters, unless such
sale has been qualified, or unless such security or transaction is exempted.”
(California Corporations Code Section 25110)
11Registering securities with the SEC requires firms to provide financial statements “certified by independent accountants”,
and the registration files become public shortly after the companies file them. So registering securities is both financially and
informationally costly.
12For example, if a CA-registered firm sells securities only to CA investors, the offering does not fall under the jurisdiction
of the SEC and is automatically exempt from SEC regulations.
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SoCA regulatory requirement triggers the state’s own exemption rule: Section 25102(f).13
This rule requires firms to file security offering exemption notices (also called “limited
offering exemption notice”) with the Department of Business Oversight (DBO) in CA.
Since most of early-stage security offerings are small and local, they naturally satisfy
the federal conditions for private placement or intrastate offering exemptions, and thus
do not need to file at the federal level. Without a state requirement, exempt firms would
file nothing at all and thus not be observable. CA security exemption notice filings,
thus, constitute my core source for private equity placements, and they are abundant.
According to the DBO, Section 25102(f) exemption notices are the most popular filing
forms with the department across all types of filings (250,460 filings from 2004 to
2014).
Despite their abundance, 25102(f) filings are still a subset of CA firms’ security
exemption notices. Because it is difficult to classify one offering as either “private”
or “public”, the SEC adopted Reg D (Rules 504, 505, 506) to provide safe harbor for
private placements. Firms that fall under these rules must file a Form D notice on the
SEC’s Edgar website.14 Reg D issues are called covered securities, and they are not
necessarily subject to state regulations. For this reason, I also collect CA firms’ SEC
form D filings (41,725 SEC form D filings between 2004 and 2014).
For California firms, CA 25102(f) and Reg D (mainly Rule 506) are the only two
major exemption rules used for private securities offerings (see Table C.1 in the Ap-
pendix for an exhaustive list of exemption rules available for private securities offerings
in the United States). Overall, CA 25102(f) and Rule 506 are very similar: they both
prohibit public advertising, and set an upper limit (35) for the number of non-accredited
13http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Codes/25102f.asp
14https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html
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investors allowed in each offering. Because of their similarities, henceforth, I will refer
to the CA 25102(f) filings as CA form D, and the two pieces CA form D and SEC form
D together simply as form D filings.
The formD filings provide rich and comprehensive information on California firms’
early-stage financing. However, there is also a limitation: non-compliance. Because
filing form D entails some costs and there are no serious legal consequences for firms
that fail to file, some firms may not comply with filing requirements. On the other
hand, the extent of the non-compliance issue may be also limited because of the benefits
associated with filings. In particular, filings reduce complexity when conflicts arise
between investors and entrepreneurs. Late filings could be subject to an increased filing
fee in CA. To check for non-compliance and related sample selection issues, I compare
Pitchbook’s VC financing data with form D filings, and find that VC compliers have
raised slightly more money and have more rounds of financing than non-compliers (see
Table C.2 in the Appendix). If compliance choices are similar between VCs and angels,
we will more likely observe angel financing in startups that raise more money with more
financing rounds. In any case, the compliance issue will produce a downward bias on
the estimates of the size of the angel market.
Taken together, the data provide the most comprehensive information on non-VC
early-stage financing available to the literature. In particular, my dataset has at least
four advantages compared to other sources. First, the dataset comes from government’s
filings, and thus is more accurate than self-reported data such as Crunchbase.15 Second,
the dataset dates back to the early 2000s and thus covers a longer time span than other
sources. For example, Crunchbase starts coverage of angel financing only from 2013.
15Crunchbase is a popular database on angel financing: https://www.crunchbase.com/
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Third, the dataset has a particularly wide range of coverage across almost all locations
in a large region (CA). Commercial VC databases such as Pitchbook also collect some
data on angel financing, but they mainly do so for firms that later receive VC funding.
Clearly, these data are selected to be in VC active areas and industries. Fourth, the
dataset covers the most active U.S. state in equity financing. In terms of VC activity,
CA accounts for almost half of total VC activity in the United States [81]. Using the
same ratio of CA VC activity accounting for the U.S. VC activity, the angel investments
of CA firms in the dataset could account for half of overall angel activity in the United
States during the data period.
1.2.3 VC data: PCRI and Pitchbook
I use two important VC databases (PCRI and Pitchbook16) to identify the investor
type of a certain financing in the security exemption notices. I use both VC data sources
to maximize existing data’s coverage on VC financing, and minimize the number of
false positives in identifying angel financing.
1.2.4 Zip code level aggregate data: IRS and Zillow
My sources for the zip code level data are from IRS and Zillow. These data sources
provide several key zip code level economic statistics. The individual income tax data
from the IRS (2004-2014) provide information about aggregated income statistics in
different adjusted gross income (AGI) brackets. This special structure of tax data (in
brackets) is particularly valuable in measuring the income distribution within zip codes,
and it allowsme to investigate the links between the angelmarket and income distribution
within and across zip codes. The Zillow data provide an alternative estimate of wealth:
16PitchBook, founded in 2007, is one of the industry’s leading sources for information on private capital markets, including
venture capital and private equity.
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the zip code level median estimated home value17.
1.2.5 Define angel vs. VC
The procedure for integrating corporate registrations, form D filings, and the VC
data is detailed in the Appendix. In this paper, I assume that the two VC databases
combined (PCRI and Pitchbook) have a relatively complete coverage of VC funded
firms in California,18 and then I rely on the VC information to identify each firm in the
form D dataset as either angel- or VC-backed. Specifically, my identification proceeds
for three sets of firms. First, for the set of firms that file form D but do not appear in the
VC data, they raised money from non-VCs, so I identify them as angel-backed. Second,
for the set of firms that appear in both form D and VC data, I identify them as either
angel- or VC-backed according to the financing dates indicated in form D filings and
VC databases. Specifically, if a firm filed a form D 180 days earlier than the financing
date of their first VC financing, then I assume that the firm has raised an angel round
before its first VC round, and thus identify this firm as angel-backed. Since the firm
also receives a VC financing after its angel round, I also say that this firm has a VC
follow-on financing. For the rest of the firms in the second set that are not angel-backed,
I classify them as VC-backed. According to the security laws, firms have to file security
exemption notices within 15 days of their first sale. Therefore, 180 days is enough time
to separate different financing rounds in the data. I also used other thresholds to make
robustness checks, and the analysis is not sensitive to this threshold. Third, for the set of
firms that appear in the VC but not form D data, they are VC non-compliers of security
17The statistics are estimated by Zillow for all home types, including single-family, condominium, and co-operative homes
within a zip code.
18Indeed, the total number of VC funded firms is not large, commercial VC databases usually have many resources to
collect data, and PCRI and Pitchbook are among the major VC data sources. See more discussion about VC data in Kaplan
and Lerner [54].
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exemption rules. To make compliance consistent across investor type (VC and angel), I
exclude the VC non-compliers from my analysis in this paper, and focus on the sample
conditioning on compliance.19 Figure 1.1 illustrates how a firm is classified as angel-
vs. VC-backed according to its financing trajectory.
Figure 1.1: CLASSIFICATION OF STARTUPS AS ANGEL- VS. VC-BACKED
Notes: This figure depicts how a startup is classified as angel- vs. VC-backed according to its possible financing trajectory
in multiple rounds of financing. If a startup raises its initial financing (“initial financing round”) from at least one VC
investor, it is classified as VC-backed. Otherwise, if it raises its first security financing from non-VC investors, it is classified
as angel-backed. Additionally, if an angel-backed startup raises its second round of financing from at least one VC investor,
it is referred to as receiving a VC follow-on financing.
Initial
Financing Round
Second
Financing Round
startup
angel
VC
non-VC
VC
angel-backed
VC-backed VC follow-on
1.2.6 Sample cleaning
Having classified all form D firms, I take several further steps to clean the sample
at the financing level. In particular, I drop financings that occur within 15 days of
incorporation to avoid possible stock issuance among founders. To focus on the study
of early-stage finance (financing of startups), I also drop financings that occur three
years after incorporation. The first two steps drop 31,336 financings from my sample.
19At the firm level, the VC non-compliance rate is around 40%. Another reason for dropping VC non-compliers from my
sample is that I cannot use security exemption filings to identify whether they have raised angel capital prior to VCs or not.
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In addition, I drop all offerings smaller than $10,00020 because small offerings may
not represent a serious financing from outside investors. Nevertheless, small offerings
account for a large fraction of all filings, and 87,596 such financings are dropped from
my sample. Robustness checks verify that my results are not sensitive to the choice
of $10,000 for defining small offerings. Finally, I drop financings that are larger than
$50m, because they are not likely to be early-stage, e.g., the 99th percentile of first
VC investments is only $38m (see Table C.3 in the Appendix). The cleaning process
reduces my sample from 178,838 to 43,912 financings.
1.2.7 Industry classification
I also need to classify CA firms by industries. In the statements of information
filings, firms describe their type of business in their own wording. To make this industry
information useful, I map these descriptions into a consistent industry categorization.
Specifically, I map them into SEC form D industries, a set of predetermined industries
by the SEC on the electronic SEC form D filings (from 2009 on). My dataset already
includes a set of firms that have filed electronic SEC formDswith their industry reported
in the filings, and then I use this subsample to extend their industry categorizations to
the other firms in my sample. In particular, if a firm in my dataset does not have
industry categorization but shares a common key phrase in its business description with
another firm already being categorized, then it gets the same industry categorization.
The key phrases are either one or two words, constructed out of all the firms’ business
descriptions according to their occurrence frequency. See Table C.4 in the appendix for
a correspondence between key phrases and industry categorizations.
20The choice of $10,000 as the threshold of small offerings is consistent with conventional wisdom. For example, the
well-known angel investor Paul Graham suggests that “the lower bound [of angel investments] is 5-10% of the total [amount
the founders want to raise] or $10,000, whichever is greater.”
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In this paper, I refer to incorporated firms less than three years old as “startups”.
Figure 1.2 shows the number of angel-backed startups in my sample by industry classi-
fication. Clearly, angels invest in a wide variety of industries, including both high-tech
sectors, such as telecommunications and computers, and some traditional sectors, such
as restaurants and construction. As is standard in the finance literature, to study the
effect of angel investing on the real economy and ease the comparison between angels
and VCs, I will drop financial and several other local sectors frommy sample, restricting
my sample of analysis to the set of industries where VCs are active: retailing, biotech-
nology, business services, computers, energy, manufacturing, general business, health
care, general technology, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and financial services.
I call these industries “VC-industries”. I also conduct some of my analysis over a
subsample of technology sectors including computers, general technology, telecommu-
nications, health care, pharmaceuticals, and energy. I do not include biotechnology
in the technology sectors because biotechnology is a capital intensive sector and the
fraction of angels investing is low.
1.2.8 Final sample
My sample for statistical analysis contains 18,351 angel-backed startups in CA that
raised their first financing between 2004 and 2014. Among these, 16,539 startups were
collected from CA form D filings and 1,812 startups from SEC form D filings. The
angel-backed startups in my sample on average raise $665,895 for their initial financing
and have 1.15 rounds of financing. Summary statistics at the startup and zip×year level
are reported in Panel A and B of Table 2.1, respectively. This sample is considerably
larger than existing databases on angel financing. For example, Pitchbook details some
angel financing for mainly VC funded firms, and they only documented 440 angel
18
Figure 1.2: SECTORS INVESTED BY ANGEL INVESTORS
Notes: This figure reports the total number of angel-backed startups by sector, and also highlights the set of sectors kept for
analysis.
financings between 2004 and 2014 for CA startups.
1.3 The angel capital market
I characterize the angel capital market using the sample of angel-backed startups’ initial
financing, which I also refer to as “initial angel financing”.21 I focus on initial financing
because it allows a convenient startup-level analysis. Moreover, initial financing itself
is important in a startup’s life cycle because it provides the earliest signal about how
21Equivalently, initial angel financings are startups’ initial financings where angels are the only outside investors. Similarly,
initial VC financings are startups’ initial financings where (at least one) VCs are the outside investors.
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Table 1.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Notes: Panel A reports the summary statistics of my sample at the startup level. Panel B summarizes variables at the
zip×year level for the sample of zip codes with at least one angel investment during the sample period 2004-2014. Panel
C summarizes market variables at the zip×sector×year level for the sample of zip×sector×year cells from 2004 to 2012
conditioned on each zip×sector in the sample having at least one VC investment during the data period.
Panel A: startup level variables
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max count
Number rounds 1.16 0.58 1 1 1 1 10 18351
CA Incorporated 0.82 0.39 0 1 1 1 1 18351
DE Incorporated 0.16 0.36 0 0 0 0 1 18351
First capital raised (m) 0.67 2.78 0.010 0.013 0.050 0.22 50 18351
Incorporation year 2008.3 3.30 2001 2005 2008 2011 2014 18351
Year first angel 2008.8 3.23 2004 2006 2009 2012 2014 18351
Age first angel 0.51 0.64 0.041 0.11 0.22 0.64 3 18351
Biotech 0.014 0.12 0 0 0 0 1 18351
Computers 0.075 0.26 0 0 0 0 1 18351
Panel B: market variables at the zip×year level
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max count
Population 29896.8 18364.1 131 16480 27540.5 40360 135791 11490
# of Corporations 76.3 74.7 0 26 56 102 1072 11490
Housing_log 12.9 0.60 11.0 12.6 13.0 13.3 15.3 11490
Income p.c. 38888.7 40601.9 6988.1 19970.4 28836.6 42461.8 789556.3 11490
Salary Share 0.64 0.14 0 0.56 0.66 0.75 0.94 11490
Salary Households Share 0.80 0.26 0 0.82 0.88 0.92 1 11490
Panel C: market variables at the zip×sector×year level
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max count
Angel Financing 1.27 1.03 0 1 1 2 9 2344
VC Financing 0.35 0.63 0 0 0 1 6 2344
VC-year 1 0.093 0.31 0 0 0 0 3 2344
VC-year 2 0.15 0.39 0 0 0 0 3 2344
outside investors view the startup. A positive signal could lead to further investments
that critically enhance the startup’s chance of survival and growth.
1.3.1 How big is the angel capital market?
Using the VC market as a benchmark, the angel capital market is quite large. To
make the comparison to VC investments fair, I focus on angel investments in VC-
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industries (see Figure 1.2) that removes about half of all angel deals in California. I
first compare the angel and VC markets in terms of the number of startups funded. For
the angel market, I calculate the number of angel-backed startups. For the VC market,
I use data combined from both PCRI and Pitchbook, and compute the total number
of VC financed startups (see definition of “VC financed startup” in Table A.1 in the
Appendix). In the count of VC financed startups, I included those that are non-compliers
to the security exemption rules and those that have raised capital from angels before
getting VC financing. Even with this conservative approach, I find that angels funded
five times as many startups (18,351) as VCs (3,702) (see Figure 1.3 for a comparison
by financing year).22 I further estimate the size of the angel capital market in terms of
ratios. In VC-industries, angels fund about 94% of initial security issues of California
startups. If one counts angel investments in all industries, 3.77% of all corporations
receive angel financing within three years of incorporation. This fraction contrasts to the
0.37% of CA corporations that receive VC financing within three years of founding.23
Using the VC market as a benchmark, the estimate of the angel capital market using
California data is likely to be a lower bound for the U.S. angel market. The reason is
that California is the most VC-active state in the United States, and the VC benchmark
estimated using CA data is probably an upper bound for the U.S. market. Indeed, using
the census data, Puri and Zarutskie [84] derive a similar but slightly lower estimate of
the U.S. VC market: 0.11% of all newly created firms in the United States receive VC
financing.
Next, I compare the size of angel and VC markets in terms of the total amount
22The Kauffman Firm Survey (including all individual investors other than family members) indicates that 4.5 times as
many new firms received equity from angels in their first year of operation as received money from VCs [7].
23If counting LLC firms, on average 0.19% of all CA incorporated and LLC firms founded between 2004-2011 receive VC
financing within three years of their founding.
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Figure 1.3: ANGEL AND VC MARKETS BY NUMBER OF STARTUPS FUNDED
Notes: The figure reports the number of angel-backed startups (startups receiving their first financing from angels) and VC
financed startups (startups ever funded by VCs) by financing year.
of capital raised in startups’ initial angel financing and first VC financing (the first
financing round having VC investors, but perhaps being preceded by an angel round).
Since angel financing on average occurs at earlier stages of startups than VC financing,
this comparison again provides a conservative estimate for angel financing. With this
conservative estimate, I find that the angel market’s funding in VC-industries is over
60% of VC funding (see Figure 1.4 for a comparison by financing year).24 Including all
industries, the angel market is over 90% of the VC market.25
24I only have financing size data for VC deals in Pitchbook. For VC deals with missing financing size, I assume the size is
the year average of deal size according to Pitchbook.
25If I count angel investments in both incorporated and LLC firms, the angel market is 2.45 times as large as the VCmarket.
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Figure 1.4: ANGEL AND VC MARKETS BY CAPITAL RAISED
Notes: The figure reports the total amount of capital raised in initial angel financing and first VC financing by financing
year.
1.3.2 What do angel investments look like?
In the absence of systematic data on angel financing, the literature has relied on
surveys or small samples to produce estimates of angel investments [34, 89, 98]. My
dataset provides more accurate estimates of angel investments’ basic characteristics:
size, startup age at financing, and location.
The median size of initial angel investments is $50,000 and the mean size is
$665,895, demonstrating that the size of angel investments is highly skewed. Figure 1.5
illustrates the size distribution of initial angel financing.
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Figure 1.5: FINANCING SIZE DISTRIBUTION
Notes: This figure reports the size distribution of initial angel financing. The size is truncated at two million dollars.
It is widely believed that angel financing occurs early, and plays an important role
in helping startups survive the “valley of death”. The idea is that nascent firms are
unable to access formal financial intermediaries, such as banks and VCs, so they are
particularly vulnerable if capital runs out, and only informal investors such as angels
can fill their funding gaps. My data support this view. When receiving their initial angel
financing, startups are on average six months old, while they are fourteen months old
when receiving their first VC financing. So angels invest early, and they invest earlier
than VCs (see Figure 1.6 for the startup age distribution at their initial angel financing
and first VC financing).
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Figure 1.6: STARTUP AGE DISTRIBUTION
Notes: This figure reports the startup age distribution at initial angel financing and first VC financing.
In terms of location, unlike VCs, angel financing is much less geographically
concentrated. For example, during 2004-2014, 54% of California zip codes with tax
returns have at least one angel financing (see Figure 1.7 for the top cities in angel
financing in CA). This figure is in contrast to the 11% of zip codes with at least one
VC financing. If counting angel investments in all industries and in both incorporated
and LLC firms, the fraction of zip codes with at least one angel financing rises to 66%.
This wide geographic distribution of angel investments provides evidence that angel
financing may help fill startups’ funding gaps in areas not covered by VCs.26
26For example, the literature has shown that VCs are geographically clustered [e.g., 20].
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Figure 1.7: TOP CITIES OF ANGEL FINANCING
Notes: This figure reports the top CA cities in angel financing measured by the number of angel-backed startups.
1.3.3 Angel investment contracts by security type
I now turn to the security types of initial angel financings. I find that debt issues
play almost no role, and instead equity (both common and preferred stock) is the
overwhelming form of financing.
Moreover, common stock, rather thanmore sophisticated securities such as preferred
stock and convertible notes, is the overwhelming security type in angel deals (see Figure
1.8). Anecdotal evidence suggests that angel investors are like VCs,27 and they often
use sophisticated securities in their investment contracts [e.g., 98]. However, I show
27For example, Kaplan and Strömberg [55] show that almost all VC contracts use sophisticated securities.
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that this is not the case. In initial angel financing, common stock accounts for about
80% of all securities.28 Although more complex securities provide benefits such as
downward protection to investors, their transaction costs may not be worth incurring
for the small investments that most angels make. Indeed, my finding is consistent with
the theoretical predictions of Casamatta [16], who shows that common stock is best for
smaller investments such as angel investments.
Figure 1.8: SECURITY TYPE OF ANGEL FINANCING
Notes: This figure reports the security type of initial angel financing. There are a small number of angel deals in SEC form
D filings reporting “equity” as their security type, in which case I assume them as “preferred stock”.
28Wong et al. [98] use a hand-collected sample and show that common stock accounts for 34% of the angel investments.
Since the hand-collected sample is likely to over-represent sophisticated angels, more typical angels would probably be more
likely to use common stock than the study suggests.
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1.3.4 Localness of the supply of angel capital
Early-stage financing faces high information asymmetries. In particular, the po-
tential for agency conflicts between entrepreneurs and investors is severe. As a result,
early-stage investors are frequently involved in their portfolio companies’ management
[see e.g., 67]. This involvement likely makes investors sensitive to geographic distance.
Studies have shown that geographic proximity plays an important role in shaping the
interaction between startups and early-stage investors. For example, Chen et al. [20]
show that 43% of VC investments are made by VCs within their home combined sta-
tistical area (CSA), and Bernstein et al. [8] show that introducing new direct flights
reduces the travel time between VCs and their portfolio companies and increases VCs’
monitoring. So geographic distance constrains VC investing. Less well understood,
however, is at what exact distance VCs are constrained? As financial intermediaries,
VCs are supposed to overcome major market frictions in the early-stage market, so
VCs may be constrained only when the geographic distance is relatively large, e.g.,
beyond a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) range. Indeed, Bernstein et al. [8] show
that the median distance between a portfolio company and its lead VC is approximately
200 miles.29 This distance is greater than the distance between Los Angeles and San
Diego, two large cities located in different MSAs of California. The Los Angeles MSA
alone has a population of over 10 million people and 57 cities with populations larger
than 50,000 each, according to the 2010 U.S. Census. By this standard, a typical VC
investment is actually far. Taken together, the evidence from VC investments suggest
that VCs are constrained by geographic distance, but only to a limited extent.
Studying the role of geographic proximity in early-stage financing, the literature has
29The identification strategy of Bernstein et al. [8] also relies on the relatively large distance between VCs and their portfolio
companies, so that introducing new airlines could generate enough variations for the treatment.
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mainly focused on VCs. As argued by Amit et al. [6], the very existence of VCs relies
on their ability to reduce the information asymmetry costs. So if professional VCs are
still constrained by geographic distance, non-intermediated early-stage investors such
as angels should be more constrained. Notably, angel investors also invest at even
earlier stages of startups and may face higher uncertainty and information asymmetry.
Then, relative to VCs, do angels invest more locally? Could the angel capital market be
integrated at the MSA level? If it is integrated at the MSA level, then the geographic
barriers to angel investing within MSAs are negligible, and startups demanding angel
capital can raise it from anywhere within the same MSA. If we look at smaller areas,
e.g., cities within a MSA, all else equal, we should see no correlation between angel
investment activity and the availability of local angel capital at the smaller area level.
To evaluate the extent of angel market integration, I take an extreme version of
locality, the zip code,30 and study the link between a focal zip code’s angel investment
activity and the income and wealth levels of its neighboring zip codes at different
distances. For example, for the zip code 94025, where Facebook is located, I look at
the relationship between the number of angel investments in zip 94025 and the income
per capita of all zip codes falling within a distance of between 5 and 10 miles. In a
regression framework, I explore the following:
Yit = δ0 + δ1In(i)t + δ2Xit + αMSA(i) × αt + it . (1.1)
Here Yit is the number of initial angel financings per capita in zip code i and year t. In(i)t
is income per capita or median housing price of zip i’s neighboring zip codes within a
30Goldfarb et al. [34] shows that 18% of all deals in their sample occur within the same zip code, and “investors are closer
to the firm in smaller deals, and most likely to be in the same zip code for angel-only deals.”
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certain distance ring in year t. In(i)t is a proxy for capital availability in angel investing.
Xit is a vector of controls for zip i and year t. αMSA(i)×αt are MSA by year fixed effects.
Zip codes are indeed very small areas, with an average population of only about
26,000 in CA. If the angel capital market were sufficiently integrated well beyond the
zip code level, then all else equal, we should see zero correlation between a zip code’s
angel investments activity and the availability of local capital. Moreover, we should
see no correlation between a zip code’s angel investments and the availability of local
capital in the focal zip code’s neighborhood. Translating into (1.1), the coefficient δ1
should remain zero for any choice of n(i) either as a focal zip code i, or zip i’s any
neighborhood. Alternatively, if the angel capital market is not well integrated beyond
the zip codes’ border, then we should see a positive δ1 for n(i) close to a focal zip code
i. Furthermore, we should also see that the positive coefficients decrease as we examine
neighborhoods farther away from the focal zip code.
Table 1.2 reports the regression results of equation (1.1) with income per capita of
neighborhoods at different distances as the explanatory variables. The results verify two
key predictions: angel investing in a zip code is positively correlated with the zip code’s
own capital availability measured by income, and this correlation rapidly decreases to
zero as we move the neighborhood away from the focal zip. Particularly, at the five
miles, the correlation becomes insignificant. This suggests that angel investments are
as local as within five miles’ distance. I repeat the exercise in Table 1.3 using housing
price as a different proxy for capital availability and find the same pattern. The results
in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 suggest that angels invest locally.
However, one concern about the regression results may be that the correlation
between angel investments and income (or wealth) might be driven by the capital
30
Table 1.2: ANGEL FINANCING AND INCOME BY DISTANCE
Notes: This table reports regression results of (1.1). A unit of observation is (zip, year). The dependent variable is “Angel
Financing p.c.”, the number of initial angel financings per thousand population in zip i and year t. The explanatory variable
is “Income_log (x ∼ y)”, the log of income per capita of all zip codes falling in a distance between x and y miles of a focal
zip code in year t. Standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Angel Financing p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Income_log 0.098∗∗∗
(0.021)
Income_log (0 ∼ 5m) 0.063∗∗∗
(0.014)
Income_log (5 ∼ 10m) 0.031
(0.027)
Income_log (10 ∼ 15m) -0.005
(0.009)
Income_log (15 ∼ 20m) -0.060
(0.037)
Income_log (20 ∼ 25m) -0.040∗∗
(0.019)
Income_log (25 ∼ 30m) -0.000
(0.041)
Income_log (30 ∼ 35m) 0.000
(0.010)
Income_log (35 ∼ 40m) -0.008
(0.012)
Income_log (40 ∼ 50m) 0.052
(0.040)
Income_log (50 ∼ 60m) 0.072∗
(0.037)
Income_log (60 ∼ 70m) -0.068∗
(0.033)
Income_log (70 ∼ 80m) -0.050
(0.033)
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.031 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.007
MSA×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452
demand of startups. In particular, richer areas may simply have more startups seeking
angel capital. So although angels do not invest locally, we would still see a positive
correlation between angel investments and local income or wealth levels. I take two
approaches to deal with this concern. First, I add the number of newly incorporated firms
per capita each year in equation (1.1) as a control of overall demand. This mitigates
the influence of the capital demand of startups on the estimation of δ1 in equation
(1.1). The results are reported in Table 1.4, and the central findings do not change.
Second, if the localness result is driven by demand, replacing angel investments by VC
investments as the dependent variable in (1.1), we should see a similar pattern. However,
the results in Table 1.5 show the opposite: VC financing is not significantly correlated
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Table 1.3: ANGEL-BACKED STARTUPS AND HOUSING PRICE BY DISTANCE
Notes: This table reports regression results of (1.1). A unit of observation is (zip, year). The dependent variable is “Angel
Financing p.c.”, the number of initial angel financings per thousand population in zip i and year t. The explanatory variable
is “Housing_log (x ∼ y)”, the log of the median housing price among the zip codes falling in a distance between x and y
miles of a focal zip code in year t. Standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Angel Financing p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Housing_log 0.077∗∗∗
(0.005)
Housing_log (0 ∼ 5m) 0.104∗∗∗
(0.018)
Housing_log (5 ∼ 10m) 0.047∗∗
(0.021)
Housing_log (10 ∼ 15m) 0.034
(0.031)
Housing_log (15 ∼ 20m) -0.045
(0.030)
Housing_log (20 ∼ 25m) -0.029
(0.040)
Housing_log (25 ∼ 30m) -0.046∗
(0.026)
Housing_log (30 ∼ 35m) -0.029
(0.022)
Housing_log (35 ∼ 40m) -0.019
(0.024)
Housing_log (40 ∼ 50m) 0.001
(0.032)
Housing_log (50 ∼ 60m) 0.039
(0.038)
Housing_log (60 ∼ 70m) -0.039
(0.029)
Housing_log (70 ∼ 80m) -0.045
(0.026)
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.039 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.011
MSA×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031 5031
with local income. Indeed, the results in Table 1.5 have significant implications for
the supply of and demand for early-stage capital. Since VCs invest in relatively large
areas [8], the zero correlation between VC investments and local economic factors, such
as income and wealth, implies that the demand for early-stage capital is not positively
correlated with such factors. Given the elastic supply of VC capital, if the demand for
early-stage capital (the demand for VC capital particularly) was correlated with local
economic factors, then we would see a positive correlation between VC investments
(the VC market equilibrium) and local economic factors. Furthermore, if the demand
for early-stage capital is not correlated with local economic factors, then the positive
correlation between angel investments and local capital availability implies that local
32
conditions constrain the supply of angel capital.
Table 1.4: ANGEL FINANCING AND INCOME BY DISTANCE WITH DEMAND CONTROL
Notes: This table reports regression results of (1.1). A unit of observation is (zip, year). The dependent variable is “Angel
Financing p.c.”, the number of initial angel financings per thousand population in zip i and year t. The explanatory variable
is “Income_log (x ∼ y)”, the log of income per capita of all zip codes falling in a distance between x and y miles of a focal
zip code in year t. Standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Angel Financing p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Income_log 0.049∗∗
(0.020)
Income_log (0 ∼ 5m) 0.029∗∗
(0.013)
Income_log (5 ∼ 10m) -0.004
(0.014)
Income_log (10 ∼ 15m) -0.011
(0.010)
Income_log (15 ∼ 20m) -0.034
(0.024)
Income_log (20 ∼ 25m) -0.028∗
(0.016)
Income_log (25 ∼ 30m) 0.025
(0.030)
Income_log (30 ∼ 35m) 0.020∗
(0.010)
Income_log (35 ∼ 40m) -0.005
(0.009)
Income_log (40 ∼ 50m) 0.019
(0.022)
Income_log (50 ∼ 60m) 0.029
(0.024)
Income_log (60 ∼ 70m) -0.041∗∗
(0.019)
Income_log (70 ∼ 80m) -0.023
(0.020)
# of Corporations p.c. 0.101∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Adjusted R2 0.452 0.432 0.427 0.427 0.428 0.428 0.427 0.427 0.427 0.427 0.427 0.428 0.427
MSA×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452
In sum, the results in this section suggest that there may be substantial geography-
related market frictions in startup financing. Then unlike VC financing that depends on
the general partners’ ability to raise money, angel financing relies on local communities’
income (wealth) levels. So local capital matters for startups’ access to angel financing.
This finding supports the popular argument that local wealth plays an important role
in funding startups and helps create technology hubs such as Silicon Valley.31 The
31For example, the famous angel investor Paul Graham argues: “I think you only need two kinds of people to create a
technology hub: rich people and nerds. They’re the limiting reagents in the reaction that produces startups, because they’re
the only ones present when startups get started.” -http://www.paulgraham.com/siliconvalley.html
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Table 1.5: VC FINANCING AND INCOME BY DISTANCE
Notes: This table reports regression results of (1.1). A unit of observation is (zip, year). The dependent variable is “VC
Financing p.c.”, the number of initial VC financings (first financing of VC-backed startups) per thousand population in zip
i and year t. The explanatory variable is “Income_log (x ∼ y)”, the log of income per capita of all zip codes falling in a
distance between x and y miles of a focal zip code in year t. Standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, are reported in
parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
VC Financing p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Income_log 0.010
(0.008)
Income_log (0 ∼ 5m) 0.008
(0.005)
Income_log (5 ∼ 10m) -0.001
(0.004)
Income_log (10 ∼ 15m) 0.000
(0.002)
Income_log (15 ∼ 20m) -0.002∗
(0.001)
Income_log (20 ∼ 25m) 0.002
(0.004)
Income_log (25 ∼ 30m) 0.012
(0.011)
Income_log (30 ∼ 35m) 0.004
(0.005)
Income_log (35 ∼ 40m) -0.001
(0.001)
Income_log (40 ∼ 50m) 0.012
(0.008)
Income_log (50 ∼ 60m) 0.013
(0.011)
Income_log (60 ∼ 70m) -0.009
(0.009)
Income_log (70 ∼ 80m) -0.011
(0.010)
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.043 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.039 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039
MSA×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452 5452
localness of angel financing has important policy implications as well. For example,
attracting wealthy people into a local area could benefit the early-stage financing market
and encourage entrepreneurship.
Importantly, the localness result also motivates my further aggregate analysis at the
zip code level, and informs my choice of instrumental variable later in this paper.
1.3.5 Are rich households more likely to be angel investors?
Investing in startups is risky. If we believe that richer people have a higher level
of risk tolerance, then richer people should be more likely to be angel investors. For
this reason, the share of high income households or the share of income earned by high
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income households should be good proxies for the pool of potential angel investors.
Following this intuition, I explore two new measures of local availability of angel
capital. The first is “share rich”, the share of households with annual income greater
than $100,000 (also termed as “rich households”), and the second is “income share of
rich”, the share of income earned by rich households. I still use the regression model
(1.1), but replace the independent variable In(i)t by these two new measures I define
above.
Table 1.6: ANGEL FINANCING AND CAPITAL AVAILABILITY
Notes: This table reports regression results of (1.1). A unit of observation is (zip, year). The two dependent variables
are “Angel Financing p.c.”, the number of initial angel financings per thousand population in zip i and year t, and “Angel
Financing in Tech p.c.”, the number of initial angel financings in technology sectors per thousand population in zip i and
year t. The two explanatory variables are “Share Rich”, the share of rich households, and “Income Share of Rich”, the share
of income earned by rich households in zip i and year t. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Angel Financing p.c. Angel Financing in Tech p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share Rich 0.331∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.006) (0.007)
Income Share of Rich 0.195∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003)
# of Corporations p.c. 0.126∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004)
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.394 0.065 0.392 0.039 0.115 0.041 0.112
MSA×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11367 11367 11367 11367 11367 11367 11367 11367
Table 1.6 reports the regression results. Column (1) shows that the share of rich
households is strongly positively correlated with angel investment activity. In particular,
a 1% increase (100 basis points) in the share rich is associated with a 5% increase in
the number of initial angel financings from the mean. This magnitude is economically
meaningful. To control the influence of high income on angel activity through the
capital demand side, I include the number of all newly incorporated firms as a control,
and Column (2) reports the result. The coefficient decreases, but remains statistically
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and economically significant. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the exercise using the income
share of rich as an independent variable, and the results deliver the same message.
Finally, I repeat the exercise over a subsample of technology sectors, and the results
change little. The results in the section suggest that rich households are more likely to be
angel investors, and confirm that local capital availability matters for angel investment
activity.
1.3.6 Are high salary earners more likely to be angel investors?
I further investigate angel investors’ demographics. Some studies have argued that
angel investors are mainly former entrepreneurs, or retirees [see e.g., 77]. These people
have already accumulated enough wealth, so they can afford to invest in risky startups.
Alternatively, angel investors can be a broad set of people who mirror the distribution
of the whole population [89]. Knowing angel investors’ demographics is important for
understanding several key dimensions of the angel capital market, e.g., what determines
angel capital supply, and how it is connected to other sectors of the economy. To
open the black box of angel investors’ demographics, I examine the links between the
salary income of rich households and the level of angel investing activities at the market
level. Since rich households are more likely to be angel investors as suggested above
(see details in Section 1.3.5), examining the links between the salary income of rich
households and the level of angel investing activities will reveal information about the
average angel investor’s occupational and economic status.
Specifically, I explore two measures of salary income of rich households: “salary
share”, the income share of salary for rich households, and “salary households share”,
the share of households with salaries among all rich households.32 I still use the
32Among the rich households, some earn salaries and wages, and others do not. “Salary households share” is the fraction
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regression model (1.1), but replace the explanatory variable with the two new salary
income measures. If most angel investors are rich and do not hold regular salary
jobs, then angel investments should negatively correlate with the salary income of rich
households. Alternatively, we should not see a significant correlation.
Table 1.7: ANGEL FINANCING AND SALARY INCOME OF RICH HOUSEHOLDS
Notes: This table reports regression results of (1.1). A unit of observation is (zip, year). The two dependent variables
are “Angel Financing p.c.”, the number of initial angel financings per thousand population in zip i and year t, and “Angel
Financing in Tech p.c.”, the number of initial angel financings in technology sectors per thousand population in zip i and
year t. The two explanatory variables are “Salary Share”, the income share of salary for rich households, and “Salary
Households Share”, the share of households with salaries among all rich households in zip i and year t. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Angel Financing p.c. Angel Financing in Tech p.c.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Salary Share -0.316∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006)
Salary Households Share -0.263∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.043∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.038) (0.032) (0.009) (0.009)
# of Corporations p.c. 0.126∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004)
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.391 0.020 0.383 0.034 0.109 0.016 0.102
MSA×Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11365 11365 11365 11365 11365 11365 11365 11365
Table 1.7 reports the regression results. Column (1) shows that the salary share is
strongly negatively correlated with angel investment activity. Column (2) reports esti-
mation from the same regression, but with a capital demand control, and the result does
not change much. Columns (3) and (4) report estimation using the salary households
share as the explanatory variable. I repeat the exercise over a subsample of technology
sectors (Columns (5)-(8)). In all cases, the results remain similar.
The results in this section show that angel investing activity is negatively correlated
with the salary income of rich households, which suggests that the rich households that
do not earn regular salary and wages are more likely to be angel investors. Therefore,
of households that earn salaries and wages among all rich households.
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this finding supports the argument that a large proportion of angel investors may indeed
be former entrepreneurs or retirees who earn their income mainly from capital income
sources. These people being angel investors has implications for the role angel investors
play in early-stage financing. For example, former entrepreneurs may be able to provide
better value-adding services to their portfolio companies than other types of investors,
because they are more experienced in managing and growing startups.
1.3.7 Angel investing and startup survival
A large body of literature studies the relationship between startups’ financing and
their outcomes [see e.g., 13, 56]. However, prior studies havemostly focused on financial
intermediaries such as banks andVCs. In this paper, I investigate the connection between
angel financing and startups’ survival. To study this question, my sample has at least
two advantages. First, it includes both startups receiving angel capital and those that did
not receive any private capital. Second, the sample is large. In general, it is challenging
to collect a large set of startups with their outcomes, because most startups fail quickly
after their founding, and they could have disappeared before even being observed. In
my case, I am able to exploit the nature of government filings, and infer all firms’
survival time for the universe of California corporations. In CA, corporations have
to file a statement of information each year as long as they remain active.33 So the
latest statement of information filing year indicates a startup’s last year of operation
before it exited the market. Using this information, I infer startups’ survival time and
indicate startups’ survival outcomes by a set of dummy variables on whether a startup
has survived longer than a certain number of years.
33Corporations have their initial filing due 90 days from the entity’s registration date, and they update their filing each year.
See more at http://bpd.cdn.sos.ca.gov/corp/pdf/so/corp_so550.pdf.
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To study the relation between startups’ angel financing and their survival, I explore
the following regression model at the startup-level:
Yi = ψ0 + ψ1Ai + ψ2Xi + αMSA(i) + αYear(i) + i . (1.2)
Here Yi is a dummy variable on whether startup i has survived longer than a certain
number of years. Ai is a dummy variable on whether startup i received angel financing.
Xi are startup-level controls such as the state where it is incorporated. αMSA(i) are MSA
fixed effects with respect to the MSA of startup i’s location, and αYear(i) are year fixed
effects with respect to the incorporation year of startup i.
Table 1.8: ANGEL FINANCING AND STARTUP SURVIVAL
Notes: This table reports regression results of (1.2). The regression is at the startup level. The dependent variable is “x
Years”, a dummy variable indicating whether a startup has survived more than x years. The explanatory variable is “Angel-
backed?”, a dummy variable indicating whether a startup is angel-backed or not. The full sample includes CA startups
incorporated between 2004 and 2011, but excludes VC-backed startups. Then I run regressions based on 3 subsamples,
defined by “Survival > k & Financing < k” (k = 1, 2, 3). “Survival > k & Financing < k” is a set of startups conditioning
on that they survived longer than k years, and they either received angel funding within k years’ founding or never received
angel financing. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Survival>1 & Financing<1 Survival>2 & Financing<2 Survival>3 & Financing<3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 3 Years 4 Years 4 Years
Angel-backed? 0.026∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
CA Incorporated 0.047∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
DE Incorporated 0.031∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Housing_log 0.025∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.015 0.023
Incorporation Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 449144 449144 449144 383438 383438 327172
Table 1.8 reports the regression results. Conditioned on startups surviving longer
than one year and receiving angel financing within one year’s incorporation, Columns
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(1)-(3) showangel financing is positively correlatedwith startups’ survival ratemeasured
over different time windows. In particular, Column (1) shows that relative to startups
that did not receive any capital, angel-backed startups have a 2.6% higher rate of survival
longer than two years, which is about 4% of the average rate of surviving longer than
two years. The remaining columns report estimations based on different subsamples,
and deliver similar results. As robustness checks, I also run hazards models and have
similar findings.
The results in this section show that angel investing is associated with startups’
higher survival rate. These results highlight a potentially important role of angel
financing, and suggest that angels are able to invest in a set of high quality startups.34 In
particular, the results suggest that family and friends (F&F) financing cannot comprise
the bulk of my data, because startups that are funded by F&F investors do not appear to
be of higher quality than the average [see e.g., 66].
1.4 Does initial angel financing lead to VC follow-on financing?
1.4.1 VC follow-on hypothesis
As noted above, scholars have long argued that angels and VCs have complemen-
tarities over firms’ life cycles [e.g., 33]. A well-developed angel market may lead to
a large number of high quality pre-screened startups for VCs, and thus increases VCs’
investment opportunities and deal flows. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that startups
often first raise money from angels, and then move on to VCs for later rounds.35 How-
ever, no systematic evidence has been provided about whether angel financing enhances
34In unreported regressions with the same model specification as equation (1.2), I find that angel-backed startups have a
significantly higher rate of patenting than the average startup.
35https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/technology/for-startups-how-many-angels-is-too-
many.html
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VC financing. If the angel capital market plays an important role in pre-screening,
adding value to startups, or providing deal flows for VCs, then a larger angel capital
market should produce a larger complementary VC market. To be more specific, a
larger number of initial angel financings should lead to more VC follow-on financings
(for short, the “VC follow-on hypothesis”).
Contrary to this hypothesis, angels may not play any positive role for VCs. For
example, it could be that angels just invest in a different set of startups that do not
want to grow and never get big [49]. It could also be that angels invest in startups VCs
would like to follow on, but angels and VCs are different types of investors, and they do
not mix well over firms’ life cycles. In these cases, angels and VCs would operate as
segmented or competitive markets, and we would not observe a positive link between
the two markets over firms’ life cycles.
To decide between these two views, I examine angel and VC activities at the market
level. Indeed, the two views are statements about markets, so they can be best addressed
using market-level variation. As I showed above, the angel capital market is local
at the zip code level, so I explore the variations of initial angel investments at the
zip×sector×year level, and use the following regression model to tie the angel capital
market to VC outcomes:
VCi jt = β0 + β1Ai jt + β2Xit + αL(i) + γ j + ζt + i jt . (1.3)
Here the dependent variable VCi jt measures the number of VC follow-on financings. In
particular, I explore two measures of VC follow-on financing: “VC-year 1”, the number
of initial angel financings in zip code i, industry j, and year t that are followed by VC
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financing within a year; and “VC-year 2”, the number of initial angel financings in
zip code i, industry j and year t that are followed by VC financing within two years.
The variable Ai jt is the total number of initial angel financings in zip code i, industry
j, and year t. Xit contains zip level controls such as population and total number of
new corporations. αL(i) are location fixed effects, either at the zip or MSA level, γ j
are industry fixed effects, and ζt are financing year fixed effects. I use the sample of
zip×sector×year cells from 2004 to 2012 conditioned on each zip×sector in the sample
having at least one VC investment during the sample period. I stop the sample at 2012
in order to observe the VC outcomes occurring within two years of angel financing
(summary statistics of the variables are in Panel C of Table 2.1).
Table 1.9: VC FOLLOW-ON HYPOTHESIS: OLS
Notes: This table reports results from the OLS regression (1.3) with zip code fixed effects. I consider two VC dependent
variables. The first one is “VC-year 1”, the number of initial angel financings in zip code i, industry j, and year t that are
followed by VC financing within a year. The second one is “VC-year 2”, the number of initial angel financings in zip code
i, industry j and year t that are followed by VC financing within two years. The explanatory variable is “Angel Financing”,
the number of initial angel financings in zip code i, industry j, and year t. The first two columns are regression results on the
full set of industries, the last two columns are on a subsample of technology sectors. The sample includes zip×sector×year
cells from 2004 to 2012 conditioned on each zip×sector in the sample having at least one VC investment during the sample
period. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Full Sample Sub Sample: technology sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VC-year 1 VC-year 2 VC-year 1 VC-year 2
Angel Financing 0.076∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.028)
Population -0.008 -0.041 0.069 0.106
(0.050) (0.063) (0.073) (0.104)
# of Corporations 0.134 0.518 0.531 1.219∗
(0.297) (0.365) (0.581) (0.682)
Size Quartile 0.038∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.158 0.126 0.141
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2344 2344 731 731
Table 1.9 reports the estimation of equation (1.3). Columns (1) and (2) show that
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there is a strong positive correlation between initial angel investments and VC follow-on
financing, measured over either one or two years’ windows. These OLS results provide
the first systematic evidence for the hypothesis that there are positive complementarities
between the angel and VC markets over firms’ life cycles. In particular, the findings
imply that likeVCs, angels also invest in a set of high-growth and innovative startups, and
angels do not just provide “dumb” money for entrepreneurs.36 Otherwise, professional
VCs would not follow angels’ investments.
The last two columns repeat the exercises on the subsample of technology sectors,
showing a stronger relationship. Since the results using either “VC-year 1” or “VC-year
2” are similar, I will use the latter as the dependent variable for measuring VC follow-on
financing in later sections.
1.4.2 Instrumental variable estimation
The results in Table 1.9 are consistent with the follow-on hypothesis that an increase
of angel financing leads to more VC follow-on financing. Yet we cannot draw causal
inferences from Table 1.9 because angel financing (Ai jt) is endogenous.
Endogeneity
One concern from the OLS regression (1.3) is that entrepreneurs may expect they have
a higher chance of receiving future VC financing in zip codes with a higher level of
VC activity, and thus locate their startups there. Then these startups may raise money
first from angels, and then from VCs. In this case, VC activity in the past leads to
entrepreneurs’ higher expectation of future VC financing, then this higher expectation
leads to more angel financing. Because VC activity is usually persistent in local areas,
36For example, angels are often referred to as “fool” investors by observers. See e.g., Shane [89].
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the naive regression may suffer from reverse causality. Unfortunately, we cannot assign
the direction on how reverse causality affects the OLS regression coefficient [see e.g.,
86].
Another concern is that the positive correlation between angel investing and VC
follow-on financing may be driven by startup side factors, e.g., local labor markets
shocks lead to more high quality entrepreneurs, so that the demand for initial angel
financing and VC follow-on financing both increase. In this case, although the naive
OLS regression result is still interesting, the reasons driving the result are not the supply
of angel capital per se, but instead demand side factors that are omitted from the model.
These omitted variables produce upward bias for the OLS estimation. Since we are
really interested in the causal impact of angel financing from the capital supply side, the
demand side omitted variable problems make it difficult to interpret the OLS estimation.
Instrumental variable
To overcome the endogeneity issues of angel financing (Ai jt), I instrument it by a proxy
of angel capital supply: “share rich”, the share of households with annual income
greater than $100,000 within a zip and year. Note that $100,000 is not a particularly
high threshold, for example, on average 26% of households in my sample have income
greater than this number. As a result, my instrumental variable defined by this threshold
is able to proxy the angel capital supply from a broad set of potential individual investors.
For “share rich” to be a valid instrument of angel financing, it has to satisfy two
critical conditions: relevance and the exclusion restriction. The first condition seems
straightforward. As the first stage regression (reported below) shows, the share rich
is highly correlated with angel investment activity. This is also consistent with the
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notion that richer households are more likely to invest in risky assets, and thus to be
angel investors. The second condition needs more careful examination. To satisfy
the exclusion condition, the share rich must link to VC financing only through angel
financing. In particular, the share rich cannot directly link to VC financing through
either VC supply or demand.
On the supply side, it does not seem likely that the share rich is directly linked to
the supply of VC financing at the zip code level. In particular, as discussed in Section
1.3.4, VCs invest in relatively large areas. In addition, institutional investors, such as
pension funds, contribute most of VC capital,37 and the geographic distance between
VC firms and their own institutional investors is not necessarily small.
A direct (positive) link between the share rich and the demand for VC financing does
not seem likely, either. Indeed, the results in Table 1.5 show that VC financing is not
correlated with local economic factors such as income and housing price at the zip code
level, and this suggests that the demand for VC financing is not correlated with local
economic factors. Moreover, we know that it is usually more expensive to start and run
businesses for entrepreneurs in areas with a higher share of rich households. We also
know that VCs select startups over a relatively large area to fund [8], and particularly
within an MSA (MSA fixed effects are included in regression models), the distance
between startups and VC firms is not a major factor in startups’ chances of raising VC
money. Therefore, for two neighboring zip codes within an MSA, one is cheaper than
the other, it does not seem likely that financially constrained startups would prefer to
locate in the more expensive zip code while their chances of raising money from VCs
in both zip codes are the same. Thus, this further mitigates the concern that a direct
37For example, Gompers et al. [37] show that by 1994, individuals contribute less than 12% of VC firms’ capital.
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link exists between the share rich and the demand for VC financing. As an additional
measure to confront this issue, I include overall entrepreneurship defined by the total
number of all newly incorporated firms as a control in all regressions.
Identification assumption
One key identification assumption of my IV strategy is that angels indeed invest locally,
and particularly, there is a strong home bias of investments at the zip code level.
If this assumption holds, my instrument “share rich” is a good predictor of angel
financing activity. Without direct information on angel investors, it is hard to verify this
assumption, but the results in Tables 1.2-1.4 provide consistent evidence with it.
Empirical model and results
Let the variable Sit denote the share rich. The first stage regression is
Ai jt = ρ0 + ρ1Sit + ρ2Xit + αMSA(i) + γ j + ζt + ui jt . (1.4)
Ai jt is the number of initial angel financings in zip code i, industry j, and year t. Xit
contains zip level controls, such as population and the total number of new corporations.
αMSA(i) are MSA fixed effects, γ j are industry fixed effects, and ζt are financing year
fixed effects. The estimate of ρ1 reveals whether there is a reduced form correlation
between the share rich and the number of initial angel financing. I predict that an
increase in the fraction of rich households should lead to a larger number of initial angel
financing.
The second stage is now
46
VCi jt = δ0 + δ1Ai jt + δ2Xit + αMSA(i) + γ j + ζt + i jt, (1.5)
where Ai jt is instrumented from equation (1.4).
Table 1.10 contains the results of my instrumental variable regression. Column
(1) presents estimates of (1.4). The estimate of the coefficient (ρ1) on initial angel
investments is economically and statistically significant, with the predicted positive
sign. The weak instruments F-statistics [e.g., 92] is over 10. The results suggest that
angel investing is indeed sensitive to the capital availability at the zip code level.
Column (3) of Table 1.10 presents the second stage estimation for the dependent
variable “VC-year 2”. The IV regression confirms the finding of the OLS regression.
The IV regression produces a slightly larger coefficient than the OLS, suggesting a
downward bias by the OLS. This likely results from the existence of a mild measurement
error of angel financing. The economicmagnitude of the IV estimate is that six additional
initial angel financings can lead to one additional VC follow-on financing in the next two
years. In the remaining columns of Table 1.10, I repeat the exercises over a subsample
of technology sectors. The findings are similar. Thus, I conclude that there is a causal
link between initial angel financing and VC follow-on financing.
1.4.3 Mechanisms
The regressions reported in Table 1.10 show a positive causal effect of initial angel
financing on subsequent VC follow-on financing. Then what role do angels play so that
VCs invest in a set of startups only after angels have invested? There are at least three
possible explanations. First, angels help VCs reduce the risk of (“de-risk”) startups.
For example, information asymmetry may be high enough for early-stage financing,
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Table 1.10: VC FOLLOW-ON HYPOTHESIS: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE
Notes: This table reports results from IV regressions (1.4) and (1.5). The dependent variable is “VC-year 2”, the number
of initial angel financings in zip code i, industry j and year t that are followed by VC financing within two years. The first
three columns are regression results on the full set of VC-industries, the last three columns are on technology sectors. The
sample includes zip×sector×year cells from 2004 to 2012 conditioned on each zip×sector in the sample having at least
one VC investment during the sample period. Standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, are reported in parentheses.
Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Full Sample Sub Sample: technology sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage OLS IV First Stage OLS IV
Angel Financing 0.124∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.210∗
(0.021) (0.063) (0.044) (0.122)
Share Rich 0.845∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗
(0.155) (0.320)
Population -0.096∗∗∗ -0.000 0.003 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.001 0.004
(0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.007) (0.010)
# of Corporations 3.651∗∗∗ -0.236∗ -0.341 2.832∗∗ -0.079 -0.259
(1.044) (0.118) (0.323) (1.038) (0.105) (0.529)
Size Quartile 0.003 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ -0.029 0.061∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009)
Housing_log -0.173∗∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.037∗ -0.242∗∗ 0.010 0.012
(0.032) (0.021) (0.021) (0.093) (0.044) (0.047)
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.147 0.142 0.144 0.144 0.129
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st-Stage F Stat. 29.664 9.279
Observations 2234 2234 2234 695 695 695
so that even sophisticated VCs cannot select and fund the best startups. In this case,
many high-quality startups instead have to raise money from angels for the first round
financing. Then VCs are willing to invest after angels only when startups grow older and
information asymmetry is reduced. It is worth noting that facing brand new startups,
angels and VCs could be equally badly informed. The reason that angels are willing
to be the first investors but VCs are not could simply be that non-intermediated angel
capital is cheaper and angels have a lower expectation of returns. Second, angels may
have their own information and networks to access high quality deals, so they pre-screen
and certify startups for VCs. For example, angel investors may know the entrepreneurs
before investing, or angels may have related industry experience. So compared with
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VCs, angels actually have better knowledge of startups. In this case, VCs could use
angels’ investments as a signal of startups’ quality, and follow angels’ investing. Third, it
could be that at the time of angel financing, startups may not look good enough to meet
VCs’ investing standards. Startups are made better by angels’ value-adding services
and then attract VC follow-on financing. Indeed, Kerr et al. [57] show that angel group
investors can add value to their invested startups. Obviously, my data do not allow me
to test the third possibility, so I test the first two in this paper.
To test the first possibility, I measure startups’ risk by their survival rate. Then I
study two questions. First, I investigate whether angel-backed startups are on average
riskier than VC-backed startups. Second, I investigate whether angel-backed startups
that receiveVC follow-on financing are still riskier thanVC-backed startups. To examine
these two questions, I run regressions at the startup level. Table 1.11 reports regression
results for answering the first question. The results show that on average, angel-backed
startups do not survive as long as VC-backed startups regardless of time windows.
Thus, in terms of survival rate, angel-backed startups are riskier than those VC-backed
ones. Table 1.12 reports regression results answering the second question. The results
show that angel-backed startups receiving VC follow-ons actually survive longer than
VC-backed startups. Importantly, as measured in a longer time window, the result is
stronger. Taken together, the two results (Tables 1.11 and 1.12) suggest that angels start
with riskier startups on average, and then supply VCs with less risky ones for follow-on
financing. So in the high-risk early-stage investing environment, angel investors may
help VCs de-risk startups.
To investigate whether angels pre-screen and certify startups for VCs, I use the
sample of all first VC financings of CA firms, and study the link between the likelihood
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Table 1.11: VC FOLLOW-ON MECHANISMS OF DE-RISK: ANGEL- VS. VC-BACKED
Notes: The regression is at the startup level. The dependent variable is “x Year(s)”, a dummy variable indicating whether
a startup has survived more than x year(s). The explanatory variable is “Angel-backed?”, a dummy variable indicating
whether a startup is angel-backed or not. The sample includes CA corporations which have raised money from either angels
or VCs during 2004-2011. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Startup Survival Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years
Angel-backed? -0.035∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020)
CA Incorporated -0.095∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗ -0.036 -0.009
(0.024) (0.038) (0.047) (0.050)
DE Incorporated -0.016 0.002 0.044 0.062
(0.025) (0.039) (0.048) (0.051)
Housing_log 0.004 -0.010 -0.019∗ -0.022∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.023
Incorporation Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12991 12991 12991 12991
of a VC investment being preceded by angels and the level of prior VC investing
activities at the focal VC investment’s zip code. To measure the level of VC activity,
I count the total number of firms funded by VCs from the year 199538 until the focal
VC investment’s financing month. The rationale behind my test is that if angels certify
startups’ quality for VCs, then their certification should bemost valuable in places where
VCs have not invested a lot before and are perhaps not familiar with the local market.
In other words, prior VC investment activity in a zip code should negatively predict the
likelihood of a local VC financing being preceded by angels. The regression results are
reported in Table 1.13. I use three model specifications: OLS, probit, and logit. All
three coefficients have the same negative sign, but they are not statistically significant.
Therefore, these results provide little support for the hypothesis that angel investors play
certification/pre-screening roles for VCs.
38I count VC investments from the year 1995 because the VC data are of higher quality since the 1990s.
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Table 1.12: VC FOLLOW-ON MECHANISMS OF DE-RISK: VC FOLLOW-ON VS. VC-BACKED
Notes: The regression is at the startup level. The dependent variable is “x Year(s)”, a dummy variable indicating whether a
startup has survived more than x year(s). The explanatory variable is “Raised Angel Before?”, a dummy variable indicating
whether a VC funded startup has raised money from angels prior to VC financing. The sample includes CA corporations
which have raised money from VCs during 2005-2011. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Startup Survival Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years
Raised Angel Before? 0.015 0.036 0.068∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.033) (0.038)
CA Incorporated -0.066 -0.136∗∗ -0.197∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.067) (0.077) (0.135)
DE Incorporated -0.040 -0.075 -0.124∗∗ -0.271∗∗
(0.033) (0.055) (0.048) (0.121)
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.084 0.076 0.048
First VC Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Zip FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 929 929 929 929
Table 1.13: VC FOLLOW-ON MECHANISMS: CERTIFICATION
Notes: The regression is at the startup level. There are three model specifications: OLS, probit and logit. The dependent
variable is “Raised Angel Before?”, a dummy variable indicating whether a VC funded startup has raised money from
angels prior to VC financing. The explanatory variable is “Prior VCs”, the total number of VC financed firms in a startup’s
home zip code counting from 1995 until the financing month of the focal startup’s first VC financing. I normalize “Prior
VCs” by dividing it by 1000 in the regression. The sample includes CA corporations which have raised money from VCs
during 2005-2014. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Raised Angel Before?
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Probit Logit
Prior VCs -0.155 -0.444 -0.728
(0.111) (0.314) (0.524)
Adjusted R2 0.004
First VC Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1497 1497 1497
1.5 Does angel financing crowd out VC financing from initial stages?
1.5.1 VC crowd-out hypothesis
Section 1.4 shows that initial investments by angels create additional VC follow-on
investments. That brings up a separate question: do angels compete with VCs at the
initial financing round? This question is relevant because VCs often fund a startup’s
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initial capital infusion: 70% of first VC investments are not preceded by an angel
round. This suggests that angels and VCs may compete to invest in startups. In this
competition, VCs have both advantages and disadvantages. For example, as shown by
Hsu [48], startups value VCs’ certification and value-adding roles beyond the financial
capital provided. So VCs could provide better certification and value-adding services
than angels. On the other hand, VCs likely face higher transaction costs. For example,
as argued by Lerner [69], VCs are usually unwilling to invest small amounts of money
in startups. If VCs compete with angels for early-stage deals, we should observe that a
higher level of angel financing crowds out VC financing at the initial financing round
(for short, the “VC crowd-out hypothesis”).
The crowd-out hypothesis is a market-level question, so I also exploit market level
variations to test it. I regress the number of initial VC financings (startups’ initial
financings where VCs are the outside investors) on the number of initial angel financings
(startups’ initial financingswhere angels are the outside investors) at a unit of observation
zip×sector×year. The model specification is the same as equation (1.3) except that the
dependent variable is replaced by the number of initial VC financings. I use the sample
of zip×sector×year cells from 2004 to 2012 conditioned on each zip×sector in the
sample having at least one VC investment during the data period (see summary statistics
in Panel C of Table 2.1).
Table 1.14 reports the estimation of equation (1.3). Column (1) shows that there is a
strong negative correlation between initial angel investments and initial VC investments.
The correlation does not change for the subsample of technology sectors (Column (2)).
Both results are consistent with the crowd-out hypothesis that angels play a competitive
role with VCs at the initial financing round. Yet again, we cannot draw causal inferences
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Table 1.14: VC CROWD-OUT HYPOTHESIS: OLS
Notes: This table reports results from the OLS regression (1.3) with zip code fixed effects. The dependent variable is
“VC Financing”, the number of initial VC financings in zip code i, industry j, and year t. The explanatory variable is
“Angel Financing”, the number of initial angel financings in zip code i, industry j, and year t. The first column is on the
sample of the full set of VC-industries, the second column is on a subsample of technology sectors. The sample includes
zip×sector×year cells from 2004 to 2012 conditioned on each zip×sector in the sample having at least one VC investment
during the sample period. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Full Sample Sub Sample: technology sector
(1) (2)
VC Financing VC Financing
Angel Financing -0.078∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.045)
Population -0.071 -0.310∗∗
(0.078) (0.134)
# of Corporations 1.854∗∗∗ 2.095∗∗
(0.582) (0.975)
Size Quartile 0.198∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.021)
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.170
Year FE Yes Yes
Zip FE Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Observations 2344 731
from Table 1.14 because the number of initial angel investments is endogenous.
1.5.2 Instrumental variable estimation
Endogeneity
The endogeneity problems mainly come from two sources. First, we may worry about a
reverse causality problem. For example, when VCs face more investment opportunities
in later stages, they may intentionally choose not to be the first equity investors in
startups. Then the decrease of early stage VC funding leads to a higher demand for the
alternative: angel financing.
Second, we may face omitted variable problems. Because angel and VC financing
are equilibrium outcomes in the market for capital, it is useful to consider the issues in
a supply and demand framework.
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Figure 1.9: ANGEL AND VC COMPETITION
Notes: This figure illustrates how angels and VCs may operate as segmented markets, and compete for deals. The x-axis
is represented by some startup characteristic variable µ, such as startup quality and size. The “Demand for Capital” curve
is the frequency of startups according to µ. The early-stage financing market segments into two parts according to µ: the
angel market on the left, and the VC market on the right. Then the competition between the angel and VC markets shifts
the market equilibrium µ∗ along the x-axis.
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To start, suppose that startups’ demand for capital is distributed according to some
startup characteristics variable µ (e.g., startup quality or capital demand size). Angels
and VCs select startups to finance according to µ so that it reaches an equilibrium at µ∗:
startups with characteristics µ > µ∗ get funded by VCs, and startups with characteristics
µ ≤ µ∗ get funded by angels (Figure 1.9). Now suppose there are some positive
economic shocks on the local entrepreneurial ecosystem, e.g., lower housing prices
attract more young entrepreneurs to move to an area. Then these positive shocks would
increase demand for early-stage capital for all values of µ, even though the incremental
amounts for different µ’s could vary. More generally, any shock on demand for early-
stage capital is likely to shift the whole demand curve in Figure 1.9 in one direction,
either up or down. In this scenario, the demand side shocksmay leave the equilibrium µ∗
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unchanged, but it would always change the number of initial angel and VC investments
in the same direction, either up or down. Therefore, omitted capital demand side shocks
would create an upward bias for the coefficient β1 that I estimate in the OLS regression.
On the capital supply side, the omitted variables are less of a concern because
sources of angel and VC capital differ. Angel capital is provided by individuals, while
VC capital is provided by institutional investors, such as pension funds and university
endowments. Also, as suggested by results in Section 1.3.4, zip code level economic
factors, such as individual income, matters for angel capital supply, but not for VC
capital supply. Therefore, capital supply side omitted variables should not be a major
problem.
Results
Again, I use the share of rich households (share rich) as my instrument for angel
financing. The instrument captures the cross-section variation in angel investments that
is due to variation in local angel capital supply. Then I estimate two stage models. At
the first stage, I regress the number of initial angel financings on the share rich at a unit
of zip×sector×year. At the second stage, I regress the number of initial VC financings
on the instrumented number of initial angel financings from the first stage. The first
stage model specification is the same as equation (1.4), and the second stage is the same
as equation (1.5) with the number of initial VC financings as the dependent variable.
Column (1) of Table 1.15 presents the first stage estimates (it is identical to Column
(1) of Table 1.10). Column (3) of Table 1.15 presents the second stage estimation. The
IV coefficient has the same sign as the OLS coefficient, but it is much smaller. The
reason that the IV coefficient is smaller likely stems from the existence of demand side
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omitted variables, as discussed above. The economic magnitude of the IV estimate is
that an increase in three initial angel financings crowds out one initial VC financing at
the market level. In the remaining columns of Table 1.15, I repeat the exercises over
a subsample of technology sectors. The findings are similar. These results provide
evidence in support of the VC crowd-out hypothesis: angel financing crowds out VC
financing from initial stages.
Table 1.15: VC CROWD-OUT HYPOTHESIS: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE
Notes: This table reports results from IV regressions (1.4) and (1.5). The dependent variable is “VC Financing”, the number
of initial VC financings in zip code i, industry j, and year t. The first three columns are regression results on the full set
of VC-industries, the last three columns are on a subsample of technology sectors.The sample includes zip×sector×year
cells from 2004 to 2012 conditioned on each zip×sector in the sample having at least one VC investment during the sample
period. Standard errors, clustered at the MSA level, are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
Full Sample Sub Sample: technology sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage OLS IV First Stage OLS IV
Angel Financing -0.057∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.142) (0.038) (0.124)
Share Rich 0.845∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗
(0.155) (0.320)
Population -0.096∗∗∗ -0.026∗ -0.055∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.049
(0.019) (0.012) (0.028) (0.018) (0.021) (0.034)
# of Corporations 3.651∗∗∗ 0.623 1.684 2.832∗∗ 0.501 1.410
(1.044) (0.424) (1.169) (1.038) (0.429) (1.148)
Size Quartile 0.003 0.215∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ -0.029 0.196∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008)
Housing_log -0.173∗∗∗ -0.072 -0.072∗∗ -0.242∗∗ -0.010 -0.022
(0.032) (0.053) (0.036) (0.093) (0.049) (0.051)
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.216 0.032 0.144 0.175 0.003
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1st-Stage F Stat. 29.664 9.279
Observations 2234 2234 2234 695 695 695
The results in Table 1.15 demonstrate a negative causal effect of angel financing on
VCfinancing at the initial round. Thenwe should ask: whywouldmore angel financings
lead to fewer startups going to VC directly? Intuitively, angel capital may be relatively
cheaper than VC, so that the increase of angel capital allows some entrepreneurs to
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switch from VCs to angels. Figure 1.9 illustrates this switch. When the demand for
capital is fixed, the increase of angel capital supply reduces the cost of angel capital
and switches the market equilibrium from µ∗ to µ′. To verify that this is the case, I
examine how the distribution of angel investments, in terms of security type, startup
age (at financing), and financing size, respond to the volume of angel financing at the
market level.
All else equal, common stock is preferred by entrepreneurs over sophisticated
security (preferred stock and convertible note), so at market equilibrium, the increase
of angel capital supply would lead to a lower likelihood of using sophisticated security
in angel investments. So I regress a typical angel investment’s security type on the
number of initial angel financings at a zip×year level. I control the total demand (all
new corporations), and includeMSA and year fixed effects in the model. The regression
results are reported in Column (1) of Table 1.16. Indeed, a higher level of angel financing
is associated with a lower likelihood that a sophisticated security is used in a typical
angel investment. This finding provides evidence that an increase in angel capital supply
leads to a lower cost of angel funding for entrepreneurs.
Next, I examine how the distribution of angel investments in terms of startup age
and financing size changes relative to the volume of angel financing. Since VCs on
average invest in older startups with more capital, if the increase of angel supply allows
some marginal startups to switch from VC to angel funding, then there should be older
startups demanding larger amounts of capital that receive angel funding after the switch.
This would lead the startup age and financing size distribution of angel investments to
be more skewed to the right. To test these predictions, I regress the 75th and 90th
percentiles of startup age and financing size at a zip×year level on the number of initial
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angel financings. Again, I control the total demand, and include MSA and year fixed
effects in the model. The regression results are reported in Columns (2)-(5) of Table
1.16. All results, as predicted, suggest that the distribution of angel investments in terms
of startup age and financing size are more skewed to the right when facing an increase
of angel funding.
Therefore, the results in Table 1.16 provide evidence that the increase of angel
capital supply reduces the cost of angel capital, and induces startups to switch funding
fromVCs to angels at their initial stages. These findings provide further confirmation for
the VC crowd-out hypothesis: the growth of angel financing crowds out VC financing
at the initial stages.
Table 1.16: CONFIRMATION OF THE VC CROWD-OUT HYPOTHESIS
Notes: A unit of observation is (zip, year). I consider five dependent variables (derived from the collection of initial angel
investments within each zip×year): (1), the median of an indicator that an angel investment uses sophisticated security; (2)
& (3), 75th and 90th percentile of startups’ age distribution at their initial angel financing; and (4) & (5), 75th and 90th
percentile of financing size distribution at startups’ initial angel financing. The explanatory variable is “Angel Financing”,
the number of initial angel financings within a zip×year. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance:
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Sophisticated Security Financing Age Financing Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Median Perc 75 Perc 90 Perc 75 Perc 90
Angel Financing -0.004∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.020 0.319∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.015) (0.033)
# of Corporations 0.033 0.351∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 1.538∗∗∗ 2.995∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.138) (0.168) (0.468) (0.896)
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.057 0.186 0.041 0.121
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6496 6496 6496 6496 6496
1.6 Conclusion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the angel capital market is important for funding
entrepreneurship and innovation. Yet partially due to data scarcity, we have a limited
understanding about the market. In this paper, I build a comprehensive dataset on angel
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financing covering about 18,000 angel-backed startups in California during 2004-2014
by relying on sources of government filings.
Using this novel dataset, I study the size, scope, and role of angel financing. My
findings improve our understanding of the angel capital market and the overall early-
stage financing market in several aspects. First, the angel financing market is large, and
thus is an important segment of the early-stage financing market. Second, the supply
of angel capital is sourced locally, so local capital matters. Wealthy individuals may
be an indispensable contributing factor for a prosperous and innovative entrepreneurial
ecosystem. Third, angel financing has causal impact on VC financing. Specifically,
angels play a supportive role for VCs over firms’ life cycles, while they also play a
competitive role with VCs over the initial financing deals. I also provide evidence that
angels support VCs over firms’ life cycles by reducing the risk of startups and supplying
less risky and more successful startups to VCs.
Overall, my results in the paper demonstrate the explicit role of angel financing,
and how it fits into the early-stage capital market. Because California has the most
developed VC market in the United States, using California data to study the angel
capital market and its interaction with the VC market is likely to attenuate many of
my results. For example, one would expect that the VC follow-on result would be
stronger in areas with less VC activity, because VCs may be less informed about the
local entrepreneurial ecosystem, and angels may thus play a more significant role in
supportingVCs. For future research, I plan to collectmore information about the profiles
of angel investors and the returns of angel investments so that I can evaluate questions
such as the determinants of the angel capital supply and the total social welfare of the
angel market.
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C h a p t e r 2
CROWDFUNDING WITHOUT INTERMEDIATION?
2.1 Introduction
Since crowdfunding first launched in 2008 in the U.S., it has attracted a lot of attention as
a financial innovation to alleviate small businesses and startups’ financial constraints.1
The market has also enjoyed rapid expansion (see Figure 2.1). To further exploit
crowdfunding to increase small businesses and startups’ access to capital, the JOBS
Act of 2012 legalized equity crowdfunding (a special type of crowdfunding): investors
can now invest online to buy equity shares of startups. The legalization of equity
crowdfunding is perceived to be revolutionary for the early-stage financing market
because it allows not just accredited investors2 to buy un-registered securities online
(also referred to as “Title II equity crowdfunding”), but also millions of non-accredited
investors to do so (“Title III equity crowdfunding”). This opening of private business
investment opportunities to a large number of non-accredited investors is the first such
instance since the Security Act of 1933. Distinct from traditional early-stage financing
sources, such as bank loans and venture capital (VC), the key feature of the equity
crowdfunding model is that the capital is directly raised from a large number of investors
in relatively small amounts,3 and no financial intermediation is involved.
1There is a large literature showing that startups and small businesses are financial constrained [e.g., 28, 47], and that
access to capital is key to entrepreneurship and innovation [e.g., 15, 59, 88].
2According to the SEC, an individual will be considered an accredited investor if he or she (1) earned income that exceeded
$200,000 (or $300,000 together with a spouse) in each of the prior two years, and reasonably expects the same for the current
year, or (2) has a net worth over $1 million, either alone or together with a spouse.
3In particular, Title III of the JOBS Act explicitly sets a maximum amount of dollars each investor can annually
invest, which should keep the “big players” away from the market and attract mainly small investors. See more at https:
//www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_crowdfunding-.html
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Figure 2.1: THE GROWTH OF CROWDFUNDING
Notes: the following figure [source: 31] reports the worldwide growth of crowdfunding volume by type.
The absence of financial intermediation in the equity crowdfunding market, how-
ever, raises questions about how information asymmetries between startups and investors
are resolved. In particular, in an environment where the entrepreneurs cannot credibly
communicate with the investors, the resolution of information asymmetries requires that
information be aggregated from the informed market participants and then conveyed to
the uninformed ones. This transmission of information among investors usually relies
on price variation in markets [e.g., 39]. However, in the equity crowdfunding market,
the offering price is fixed by entrepreneurs ex-ante. Therefore, the price cannot adjust
to revealed information. This may thus hinder information aggregation in the equity
crowdfunding market. In this paper, I examine the information aggregation issue, and
study whether the current equity crowdfunding market rules can resolve one major type
of information asymmetry that is common in early-stage financing: adverse selection
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(the “lemons” problem).
Adverse selection, and information asymmetry more generally, has long been a
central issue in economics and finance. For example, Akerlof [4] first addressed how
adverse selection can lead to market failures in automobile and insurance markets. More
specific to the environment of early-stage financing, a large literature has focused on
the study of how financial intermediaries such as VCs solve information asymmetries.4
In the setting of equity crowdfunding, adverse selection is a key concern for academics
[17] and the regulatory authorities. For example, the SEC made this issue clear in the
final implementation rule of Regulation Crowdfunding (Title III)5:
“The statute and the final rules related to entrepreneur disclosures are in-
tended to reduce the information asymmetries that currently exist between
small businesses and investors[...]. These considerations may give rise to ad-
verse selection and moral hazard in offerings in reliance on Section 4(a)(6).”
To study the adverse selection issue in equity crowdfunding, I develop a simple
game-theoretic model. In the model, I assume that there are two types of investors:
informed (“insiders”) and uninformed (“outsiders”). The insiders would include en-
trepreneurs’ family and friends (“F&F”), social network friends, and maybe some local
angel investors. The informational advantage of F&F and social network friends has
beenwell documented in early-stage financing.6 The outsiders inmymodel are investors
4For example, Amit et al. [6] argue that the very existence of VCs relies on their ability to reduce the costs of information
asymmetry. Chan [18] develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as
informed agents in a market with imperfect information. To overcome the information asymmetry problem, the intermediaries
also usually develop some special mechanisms. For example, the VC firms send their representatives to sit on the boards of
the private firms they have invested in [67], and also usually structure their investments in stages [36].
5https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf
6See e.g., Agrawal et al. [3], Cumming and Johan [21], Engelberg et al. [27] and Nanda and Khanna [78].
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who are outside the entrepreneurs’ personal and social circles, and only learn about star-
tups from the crowdfunding platforms. I exogenously fix the order of how insiders and
outsiders take investment actions. In particular, I assume that the insiders take their
investment actions first, and the outsiders observe the aggregate of the insiders’ actions
and then decide whether to invest or not. Empirical evidence supports this assumption.
For example, Agrawal et al. [3] show that F&F accounts for a big proportion of the
early investors. In fact, it has become an important practice for entrepreneurs on the
Kickstarter platform to leverage their own network:
“The first thing they tell you at Kickstarter is to leverage your own network.
But people are like, I came to Kickstarter so they would give me free money!”
-Page 82, Steinberg [91], The Kickstarter Handbook
Then using my model, I investigate whether there is a crowdfunding market equilib-
rium in which an entrepreneur’s expected utility is maximized, the insiders’ information
is effectively aggregated, and the outsiders’ participation constraint is satisfied. At the
crowdfunding market equilibrium, the market would be able to differentiate high quality
startups from low quality ones, and fund high quality ones with a significantly higher
probability, thus alleviating the adverse selection problem. However, my main result in
this paper shows that there does not exist such a crowdfunding market equilibrium. The
primary driver of my result is the incompatibility of aggregating insiders’ information
and satisfying outsiders’ participation constraint when the share price is fixed for all
investors.
The non-existence of a crowdfunding market equilibrium has several implications
for the equity crowdfunding market. First, a decentralized equity crowdfunding market
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may fail to overcome the “lemons” problem that plagues early-stage financing. More
specific to Title III equity crowdfunding in which investment vehicles are prohibited,
the adverse selection problem may be a key factor limiting the growth of that market.
Second, to promote the development of the equity crowdfunding market, both prac-
titioners and policy makers may need to focus on the adverse selection problem, and
develop new market mechanisms to address it. For example, as discussed in Section 2.5
below, mechanisms allowing for varying prices during the offering process solve the
outsiders’ participation constraint problem. Additionally, it may be helpful to encourage
the crowdfunding portals to take more responsibility in screening startups listed in their
platforms.
This paper provides the first rigorous study of the adverse selection issue in the
equity crowdfunding market. In particular, the equity crowdfunding market involves
transactions of equity stakes, and thus is more formal than other types of crowdfunding
models such as reward-based crowdfunding. The relatively formal nature of the equity
crowdfunding market allows me to model its market participants as rational agents,
and examine the participants’ interaction from an information aggregation perspective.
With this framework, I find that one of the major early-stage financing market frictions,
adverse selection, persists in the equity crowdfunding market, and may not be solved
by market mechanisms under current market designs. My paper provides insights on
understanding the equity crowdfunding market in a rigorous economic framework, and
also sheds light on policy implications for how to promote the development of the equity
crowdfunding market.
My paper relates to several literatures. First, it directly relates to a small literature
studying information asymmetries in the environment of equity crowdfunding. For
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example, Agrawal et al. [2] use data fromAngelList and argue that syndicates of investors
are effective tools in reducing information asymmetries in equity crowdfunding. My
paper complements theirs by providing a rigorous analysis for the setting in which no
financial intermediation, such as syndicates, are involved. In this regard, my paper
speaks more directly to Title III equity crowdfunding where the law prohibits financial
intermediation such as syndicates.
Second, my paper is broadly related to the literature studying the role of price
in conveying information from the informed market participants to the uninformed.
For example, Grossman and Stiglitz [39] argue that price cannot perfectly reflect the
information that is available in the market, because the price must be such that the
informed participants receive compensation for their cost of acquiring information.
Similar to theirs, my paper shows that when the market price is fixed for all participants
regardless of their information, no market equilibrium exists that can effectively convey
the information from the informed to the uninformed.
Third, my paper is also related to papers investigating the “wisdom of the crowd”
in crowdfunding markets. For example, Hakenes and Schlegel [41] argue that the “all
or nothing” mechanism can be used by (homogenous) household investors to aggregate
information so that at equilibrium they acquire information and the aggregation of
their information enables more good projects to receive funding. The focus of their
paper is on how firms and investors interact to facilitate crowdfunding. Different
from their paper, I focus on the study of information asymmetry/adverse selection and
the interaction between heterogeneous investors. Another related paper is Brown and
Davies [14], who build a one-period model with naive and sophisticated investors. In
their model, identical naive investors have weak information and act on the information,
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and sophisticated investors receive private information and behave strategically. The
main conclusion of their paper is that naive investors rather than sophisticated ones
communicate the “wisdom of the crowd” and improve financing efficiency.
Fourth, my paper also connects to the literature studying quality signaling of online
markets with asymmetric information. For example, Bernstein et al. [9] show that
average investors respond strongly to the founding team. Mollick [75] argues that the
entrepreneurs’ social capital and preparedness are associated with an increased chance
of project success, suggesting that quality signals play a role in project outcomes. These
papers are related to mine in the sense that I assume that even if the entrepreneurs
have information concerning the quality of their startups, they will not have credible
channels to signal this information to the investors. Therefore, the remaining information
asymmetries are still high. Unlike other online markets, a crowdfunding campaign is
usually a one-shot game, which also invalidates many signaling mechanisms, such as
reputation signaling, that are effective in othermarkets (Agrawal, Catalini, andGoldfarb,
2014).
Finally, my paper also speaks to the finance literature on information cascades and
investor herding. A major focus of that literature is to explain the occurrence of herding
and its consequences [see e.g., 12, 96]. In the crowdfunding market, some studies also
show the existence of investors’ herding behavior [see e.g., 3, 99]. In particular, Agrawal
et al. [3] show that investors are much more likely to invest in startups that have reached
a higher percentage of their funding goal. My paper differs from these papers in several
aspects. First, unlike the case in which investors make decisions sequentially in the
information cascade literature, in my model the investors with private information do
not move sequentially, preventing information cascades from happening. Second, in my
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model it is part of the uninformed investors’ investing strategy to invest in those startups
that have already attracted more investors. For the uninformed investors, the number of
existing investors is a public signal from which they infer the quality of startups. In this
sense, the uninformed investors’ behavior cannot be viewed as herding in the classical
case.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I introduce the formal model. In
Section 2.3, I analyze the market equilibrium, and prove the main result. In Section 2.4,
I provide empirical evidence for my model’s implications. In Section 2.5, I suggest an
improving market mechanism. I conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 The model
Consider an equity crowdfunding campaign in which an entrepreneur is raising capital
for her startup. The startup is of high or low quality, denoted by H and L, respectively.
The common prior on the startup’s quality is P(H) = P(L) = 1/2, known to the
entrepreneur and all investors. The entrepreneur wants to sell a fixed number of shares
of her startup. In practice, when issuing equity, the entrepreneur can choose two things
to reflect how much she evaluates her startup: share price and number of shares to sell.
For simplicity, in my model, I fix the number of shares (or the fraction of the equity
placed on the market), and only allow the entrepreneur to choose share price (denoted
by p).
I assume a so-called “all or nothing” rule in my model for determining the final
outcome of an equity crowdfunding campaign: the entrepreneur receives capital from
the crowdfunding campaign if and only if there are enough investors to buy all the
shares offered for sale. This rule is consistent with Title III equity crowdfunding
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implementation rule.7 So the entrepreneur either sells all or none of the shares she
offers. I refer to the former case as “a successful crowdfunding campaign” (denoted by
S). Only upon a successful crowdfunding campaign are the entrepreneur and investors’
payoffs in the crowdfunding market realized.
I assume that the entrepreneur does not know the quality of her startup. This
assumption is technically equivalent to the scenarios in which either the entrepreneur
does not have credible mechanisms to signal her startup’s quality even if she knows
it, or the entrepreneur cannot accurately estimate the market prospects of her startup.
The entrepreneur is an expected utility maximizer with Bernoulli utility u(x) = xγ,
γ ∈ (0, 1]. Because the entrepreneur has a fixed number of shares to sell, as long as she
maximizes her expected utility from selling just one share, she maximizes her utility for
the whole sale. So the entrepreneur solves the following optimization problem:
max
p
P(S) · pγ = max
p
P(S |H) + P(S |L)
2
· pγ . (2.1)
There are two types of investors: n + 1 insiders and infinitely many outsiders. The
two types of investors are first differentiated by their information concerning the quality
of the startup: the insiders are informed, and each of them receives an i.i.d binary signal:
either “Good” (G) or “Bad” (B) with precision P(G |H) = P(B|L) = α for α > 1/2.
The outsiders are not informed, so they receive no signal. Secondly, the two types
of investors are differentiated by when they take investment actions: insiders observe
their private information and the share price p, and then simultaneously take investing
actions. Outsiders observe the aggregate of the insiders’ investing actions, and then
7The Title III final rule states that: “...including a statement that if the sum of the investment commitments does not equal
or exceed the target offering amount at the offering deadline, no securities will be sold in the offering, investment commitments
will be cancelled and committed funds will be returned.”
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simultaneously take their investing actions.8 See Figure 2.2 for the timeline of the
model.
Figure 2.2: THE MODEL TIMELINE
Notes: This figure depicts the timeline of my model.
Stage I
Issuer:
set share price p
& start crowdfunding
campaign
Stage II
Insider investors:
get i.i.d signals
& decide to invest
or not
Stage III
Outsider investors:
observe # of investments
of insiders & decide
to invest or not
All the investors are rational, and the insiders behave strategically. For simplicity, I
assume that each investor can buy at most one share. Then each investor’ strategy boils
down to a pure strategy: either invest or not, or a mixed strategy of investing and not
investing. Individual investors’ investing strategies depend on their information. The
insiders’ investing strategy depends on their private signals and the share price set by
the entrepreneur. The outsiders’ investing strategy depends on the number of insiders
who invest and also the share price. The return of one share is 1 when the startup
quality is “High”, and 0 otherwise. All investors are risk neutral with Bernoulli utility
u(x) = x, and they are expected utility maximizers. The investors are assumed to be
risk neutral, because in the crowdfunding setting, each investor is required to just invest
a small amount of her money into the market, and to be prepared for the possible loss
of all that money.9 Let Y denote the action that an investor invests, and let EI(Y |F, S)
denote the expected utility (payoff) of an insider who receives an F signal (also termed
8Since there are infinitely many identical outsiders, they are determined randomly to invest in a startup if too many of
them want to invest.
9The SEC sets a clear rule on the limit an investor can invest in the equity crowdfunding market each year. The limit
depends on the investors’ income, but the general principle is that an investor can absorb the risk of losing all the money she
invests.
69
as an “F-signal insider”) (F = G, B). So for F = G or B,
EI(Y |F, S) = P(H |F, S) × 1 + P(L |F, S) × 0 − p
= P(H |F, S) − p. (2.2)
Let nI denote the number of insiders who invest. The outsiders’ expected utility (payoff)
is
EO(Y |nI, S) = P(H |nI, S) × 1 + P(L |nI, S) × 0 − p
= P(H |nI, S) − p. (2.3)
2.3 The crowdfunding market equilibrium
2.3.1 Main result
In this section, I analyze the formal model and prove mymain result. I focus on sym-
metric strategies equilibria. By playing symmetric strategies, the same type of investors
(insiders and outsiders) use identical strategies if they have the same information set.
Then I define a market equilibrium that is desired for a well-functioning crowdfunding
market:
Definition 1. A crowdfunding market equilibrium is an equilibrium where
1. the entrepreneur chooses share price p to maximize her expected utility,
2. the insiders with bad (B) signals do not invest, and
3. the outsiders’ participation constraint is satisfied.
I require that the B-signal insiders do not invest, because only when not all insiders
invest can the insiders’ information be effectively aggregated, and high quality startups
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can achieve significantly higher success rates of raising capital than low quality ones.
Also, only in this case can the adverse selection problem in the crowdfunding market be
overcome. As Lemma 3 below shows, as the insiders’ likelihood of investing increases
(e.g., more and more B-signal insiders start to invest), high quality startups’ chances of
crowdfunding success fall relative to low quality ones’.
It has long been recognized that adverse selection could lead to markets failure
[4], which also makes overcoming this issue essential for the crowdfunding market.
However, my main result shows that in the absence of a financial intermediary, the
decentralized crowdfunding market may not be able to do so.
Theorem 1. There does not exist a crowdfunding market equilibrium.
It has been widely expected that crowdfunding democratizes the investing oppor-
tunities to all investors, and reduces geography-related frictions in early-stage investing
[e.g., 58]. However, my result in Theorem 1 shows that the crowdfunding market could
fall short of people’s expectations. In the rest of this section, I analyze the formal model
and present the main steps to prove Theorem 1.
2.3.2 Outsiders’ equilibrium strategies
I first characterize outsiders’ equilibrium strategies. I say that the outsiders play
cutoff strategies if there exists a threshold number n0 + 1 such that outsiders invest in
a startup if and only if they observe that at least n0 + 1 insiders have invested. Then I
prove the following result.
Proposition 1. At equilibrium, outsiders play cutoff strategies.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix B.1. The key to proving Proposition
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1 is to first narrow down insiders’ strategy space, and then show that, conditioning
on the insiders’ strategy space, the outsiders play cutoff strategies. To narrow down
insiders’ strategy space, I show that insiders always receive a higher expected payoff
from investing if the private signal is more positive.
Lemma 1. EI(Y |G, S) > EI(Y |B, S).
The proof of Lemma 1 follows from the Bayes’ rule and the independence of
private information among insiders. Lemma 1 separates theG-signal insiders’ investing
behavior from the B-signal ones’, and it restricts the insiders’ strategy space to five
cases.
1. Case I: no insider invests.
2. Case II: G-signal insiders use mixed strategy to invest, B-signal insiders do not
invest.
3. Case III: G-signal insiders invest, B-signal insiders do not invest.
4. Case IV: G-signal insiders invest, B-signal insiders use mixed strategy to invest.
5. Case V: all insiders invest.
Once the insiders’ strategy space is specified, it suffices to prove that the outsiders play
a cutoff strategy conditioning on each possibility of insiders’ strategy. See details in the
proof of Proposition 1.
2.3.3 Insiders’ equilibrium strategies
Next I analyze insiders’ equilibrium investing strategy. I show that conditioning
on the outsiders’ cutoff strategies n0 + 1 and a fixed share price p, the insiders have
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unique symmetric equilibrium strategies. Furthermore, I compute insiders’ equilibrium
strategies in terms of share price p.
Proposition 2. Conditioning on the outsiders’ cutoff strategies n0 + 1 and a fixed share
price p, there exist unique insiders’ symmetric equilibrium strategies. Moreover, for
fixed parameters α, n, and n0, the equilibrium strategies can be characterized according
to the share price p. Denote e(n, n0, α) =
∑
k≥n0 (nk)(1−α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0 (nk)αk(1−α)n−k . The insiders’ equilibrium
strategies have the following forms:
I. If p ≥ 1
1+( 1−αα )n0+1
, then at the equilibrium, no insider invests (referred to as Equi-
librium I).
II. If 11+ 1−αα ·e(n,n0,α)
< p < 1
1+( 1−αα )n0+1
, then at the equilibrium, the insiders with G
signals use a mixed strategy to invest and those with B signals do not invest
(referred to as Equilibrium II).
III. If 11+ α1−α ·e(n,n0,α) ≤ p ≤
1
1+ 1−αα ·e(n,n0,α)
, then at the equilibrium, all insiders with G
signals invest and those with B signals do not (referred to as Equilibrium III).
IV. If 1 − α < p < 11+ α1−α ·e(n,n0,α) , then at the equilibrium, the insiders with G signals
invest and those with B signals use a mixed strategy to invest (referred to as
Equilibrium IV).
V. If p ≤ 1 − α, then at the equilibrium, all the insiders invest regardless of their
private signals (referred to as Equilibrium V).
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix B.1. Because Cases I and V can be
considered special cases of Cases II and IV, respectively, and Case III is an intermediate
case, I just need to prove Proposition 2 for Cases II and IV. At equilibrium, when the
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insiders play mixed strategies, they are indifferent between investing and not investing.
So at Case II, a G-signal insider receives zero expected payoff from investing, i.e.,
EI(Y |G, S) = P(H |G, S) − p = 0. (2.4)
Similarly, at Case IV, a B-signal insider receives zero expected payoff from investing,
i.e.,
EI(Y |B, S) = P(H |B, S) − p = 0. (2.5)
Then conditioning on the outsiders’ cutoff strategies n0 + 1 and a fixed share price p,
to prove the uniqueness of insiders’ equilibrium strategies, I just need to prove that
there is a unique solution of insiders’ strategies to the equilibrium conditions (2.4) and
(2.5). Equivalently, I just need to prove that one insider’s gross payoff (P(H |G, S) and
P(H |B, S)) is monotone in her mixed probability of investing when assuming all other
investors (both insiders and outsiders) play equilibrium strategies. For Case II, let rG
denote the mixed probability that a G-signal insider invests. Similarly, for Case IV,
let rB denote the mixed probability that a B-signal insider invests. Then I prove the
following result.
Lemma 2. 1. At Equilibrium II, one G-signal insider’s gross payoff P(H |G, S) is
strictly decreasing in rG ∈ (0, 1].
2. At Equilibrium IV, one B-signal insider’s gross payoff P(H |B, S) is strictly decreas-
ing in rB ∈ [0, 1].
The proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix B.1. Although the proof of Lemma 2 is a
bit involved, the intuition is simple. For example, at Equilibrium II, when the insiders
with good signals increase their investing probability, the probability that at least n0 + 1
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insiders invest in a low quality startup increases relatively more than that probability in
a high quality startup. Therefore, a low quality startup has relatively higher probability
of being successfully funded when the G-signal insiders invest more aggressively, thus
reducing G-signal insiders’ gross expected payoff at equilibrium.
2.3.4 Effective screening
As argued before, whether the crowdfunding market can avoid market failure relies
on its ability to solve the adverse selection problem. More specifically, it depends
on whether the informed investors’ information can be aggregated effectively. In this
section, I show that the effectiveness of insiders’ information aggregation decreases in
insiders’ likelihood of investing.
Definition 2. Define the effectiveness of insiders’ information aggregation as the ratio
of the probability that a high quality startup gets funded over the probability that a low
quality one does so:
I A =
P(S |H)
P(S |L) .
Lemma 3. The effectiveness of insiders’ information aggregation I A is decreasing in
insiders’ likelihood of investing. In particular, I A is decreasing in rG at Equilibrium II
and decreasing in rB at Equilibrium IV.
The proof of Lemma 3 is in the Appendix. Lemma 3 demonstrates that as insid-
ers become more likely to invest, the crowdfunding market’s relative ability to fund
high quality startups weakens, and the crowdfunding market becomes less effective in
screening startups. This also motivates the second condition in the definition of crowd-
funding market equilibrium that B-signal insiders do not invest. Under the condition
that B-signal insiders do not invest, I just need to focus on the first three cases of insid-
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ers’ equilibrium strategies (Equilibrium I, II, III) when investigating the existence of a
crowdfunding market equilibrium and solving the entrepreneur’s problem.
2.3.5 The entrepreneur’s equilibrium strategy
From the standpoint of the entrepreneur, when conditioning on the outsiders’ equi-
librium strategies, the event S (a successful crowdfunding campaign) is equivalent to
that at least n0 + 1 insiders invest. So the entrepreneur’s problem becomes
max
p
P(nI ≥ n0 + 1|H) + P(nI ≥ n0 + 1|L)
2
· pγ .
Let ni = nI − 1. Fix one insider’s investing decision. Then from this insider’s point of
view, the event nI ≥ n0 + 1 is also equivalent to the event that at least n0 other insiders
invest, i.e. ni ≥ n0. Because the share price p is a function of P(ni ≥ n0 |H) and
P(ni ≥ n0 |L) at equilibrium (see details in the proof of Proposition 2), it is convenient
to solve an equivalent problem of the entrepreneur:
max
p
P(ni ≥ n0 |H) + P(ni ≥ n0 |L)
2
· pγ . (2.6)
Because the expressions of P(ni ≥ n0 |H), P(ni ≥ n0 |L) and p vary across different
insiders’ equilibrium strategy cases, to solve the entrepreneur’s problem, it is useful
to take a two-step procedure: (1) find an optimal price at each insiders’ equilibrium
strategy case, and (2) look for the global maximum across all insiders’ equilibrium
strategy cases. As discussed before, it suffices to focus on the first three cases of
insiders’ equilibrium strategies (Equilibrium I, II, III). Therefore, (2.6) is equivalent to
the following problem:
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Equilibrium I, II, III
max
p
P(ni ≥ n0 |H) + P(ni ≥ n0 |L)
2
· pγ .
I can further simplify the above problem. In the first case of the insiders’ equilibrium
strategies, no insider invests, thus the entrepreneur’s expected utility is zero. In the third
case, the insiders who invest are those with G signals. Because the number of G signals
does not depend on the price p, P(ni ≥ n0 |H) and P(ni ≥ n0 |L) do not depend on p.
Thus, in the third case, the entrepreneur’s expected utility is maximized at the highest
price possible p∗ = 11+ 1−αα ·e(n,n0,α)
. At p∗, the insiders’ equilibrium strategies can also be
considered a special case of Equilibrium II at rG = 1. Therefore, I just need to solve
the entrepreneur’s problem at the insiders’ equilibrium strategy at Equilibrium II. Then
I prove the following result.
Proposition 3. For any γ ∈ (0, 1], at insiders’ equilibrium strategies II (Equilibrium II),
the entrepreneur’s expected utility is maximized at the share price p∗ = 11+ 1−αα ·e(n,n0,α)
,
which corresponds to the insiders’ equilibrium strategy rG = 1.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix B.1. Proposition 3 implies that condi-
tioning on insiders’ equilibrium strategy at Equilibrium II and outsiders’ equilibrium
strategies at n0+1, the entrepreneur’s expected utility is maximized at p∗ = 11+ 1−αα ·e(n,n0,α)
.
At p∗, G-signal insiders invest for sure and B-signal insiders do not. Then taking all
three cases (Equilibrium I, II, III) together, we have that when B-signal insiders do not
invest and all investors play equilibrium strategies, the entrepreneur will set the share
price at p∗ to maximize her expected utility.
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2.3.6 Violation of outsiders’ participation constraint
At a market equilibrium, the outsiders’ participation constraint has to be satisfied.
In other words, the outsiders’ expected payoff has to be non-negative at equilibrium.
Because the outsiders play a cutoff strategy at equilibrium, it suffices to guarantee that
the outsiders receive a non-negative expected payoff at the threshold n0 + 1. However,
I show that if the entrepreneur sets the share price at p∗, the outsiders have a strictly
negative expected payoff at the threshold of any equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 4. For fixed parameters n, n0, and α, if the entrepreneur sets the share price
at p∗ = 11+ 1−αα ·e(n,n0,α)
, then the outsiders’ expected payoff at the threshold n0 + 1 of any
equilibrium strategy is strictly negative.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in Appendix B.1. Proposition 4 implies that for a given
funding threshold n0 + 1 of the outsiders, when the entrepreneur chooses the optimal
price and insiders play equilibrium strategies, it is not profitable for the outsiders to
actually participate right at the threshold. Proposition 4 leads to the proof of the main
result of Theorem 1.
2.4 Empirical evidence
In this section, I use data from Regulation Crowdfunding (Regulation CF, or Title
III equity crowdfunding), and provide evidence that is consistent with my model’s
implications. The data period is between the start of Title III equity crowdfunding inMay
2016 until September 2017. My final sample includes 461 firms’ crowdfunding filings10
and 133 successful crowdfunding offerings. See Table 2.1 for summary statistics of the
data.
10The data are collected from the SEC edgar website: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.
html. A few firms have multiple crowdfunding campaigns, in which case I only include the first one.
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Analyzing the data, I find several pieces of evidence that are consistent with my
model’s implications. First, I find that the total number of Title III crowdfunding
offerings is small. In contrast to Regulation CF, Regulation D, the current dominant
private offering regulation, attracted 27,725 firms to use it during the same period
(05/16/2016-9/3/2017). So in terms of number of firms using each regulation, the
Regulation D market is currently 60 times larger than the Regulation CF market. In this
regard, after being legal more than one year, the Regulation CF market has grown much
more slowly than expected. We can also look at the Regulation CF market in terms
of sectors. The sector with the greatest number of successful crowdfunding offerings
is the food and beverage industry, especially small breweries and restaurants.11 Upon
launching crowdfunding offerings, the firms from the food and beverage industries also
have higher success rates of completing their offering than the technology sectors.12
Therefore, the overall development of the Regulation CF market suggests that the
market size is small, and the market has favored the industries that potentially have
lower information asymmetries, such as restaurants. This pattern is consistent with my
model’s implication that the Regulation CF market is not able to solve the “lemons”
problem, and thus performs worse in industries with higher information asymmetries.
Second, in terms of financials, the Regulation CF market does not appear to fund
high quality firms with higher probability. To examine whether the current Regulation
CF market is able to fund high quality firms, I investigate the link between firms’
financials and their rate of succeeding in their crowdfunding offerings. In particular, all
11Using the first six months of data, 28.13% of all funded campaigns are from food and beverage companies, see
https://blog.vcexperts.com/2016/12/20/regulation-crowdfunding-a-six-month-update/
12In the first six months, the food and beverage sector accounts for 17.5% of all launched campaigns, and 28.13% of all
funded campaigns, in contrast to the technology sector which accounts for 25% of all launched campaigns, and 12.5% of
all funded campaigns, see https://blog.vcexperts.com/2016/12/20/regulation-crowdfunding-a-six-month-
update/
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Table 2.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics of Regulation Crowdfunding filings up to September 3, 2017. The sample
includes each firm’s first crowdfunding campaign. The variables include: “Compensation %”, the percentage of offering
size charged by funding portals upon a successful offering; “Total asset”, the total asset of a firm in the most recent fiscal
year; “Cash”, the total cash and cash equivalents in the most recent fiscal year; “Corporation”, a dummy variable indicating
whether a firm is incorporated; “Campaign Success”, a dummy variable whether a crowdfunding offering is successful.
The units of some variables are in million dollars (M).
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max count
Age at financing 2.48 3.55 0.01 0.36 1.38 3.28 45.07 459
Compensation % 5.36 1.86 0.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 12.00 459
Offering amount (M) 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.10 1.00 459
Number of employees 5.24 8.85 0.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 100.00 459
Total asset (M) 0.38 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.23 21.28 459
Cash (M) 0.07 0.19 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 2.32 459
Revenue (M) 0.30 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 7.45 459
Net income (M) -0.22 0.61 -5.78 -0.15 -0.01 0.00 0.39 459
Common stock 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 459
Debt 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 459
Corporation 0.71 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 459
Incorporated in CA 0.14 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 459
Incorporated in DE 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 459
Campaign Success 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 459
else equal, firms with better financials, e.g., higher profitability, should have a higher
rate of completing their crowdfunding offerings. To test this, I use firms’ net income
in the most recent fiscal year to measure firms’ profitabiltiy, and explore the following
regression framework:
Yi = δ0 + δ1Ii + δ2Xi + αp + αL + i . (2.7)
Here, Yi is a dummy variable indicating whether firm i has successfully completed its
crowdfunding offering. The variable of interest Ii is the net income of firm i in the most
recent fiscal year. Xi includes firm level controls such as age at crowdfunding, number
of employees, and so on. These controls take care of firms’ heterogeneity effects in the
corresponding dimensions that relate to firms’ success rate of crowdfunding offerings.
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Importantly, equation (2.7) also allows me to control crowdfunding portal fixed effects
(αp). Different crowdfunding portals appeal to different sets of investors, and also have
different volumes of active investors, so launching crowdfunding campaigns in different
portals could significantly impact firms’ chances of success. Therefore, controlling
portal fixed effects is important in the regression. I also include several other fixed
effects, such as firms’ residence and incorporation location (αL) in the regression.
Table 2.2: FIRMS’ FINANCIALS AND SUCCESS OF CROWDFUNDING
Notes: This table reports results from OLS regressions of (2.7). The dependent variables are “Success”: a dummy variable
indicating whether a firm has successfully completed its crowdfunding offering, and “Big Success”, a dummy variable
indicating whether a firm has successfully completed its crowdfunding offering with capital raised greater than $500000.
The main explanatory variable is “Net income”, the net income of a firm in the most recent fiscal year. Several controls
are “Revenue”, the revenue of a firm in the most recent fiscal year, “Total asset”, total assets of a firm in the most recent
fiscal year, “Cash”, cash and cash equivalents in the most recent fiscal year. For some of the explanatory variables, the units
are in million dollars (M). The sample includes firms’ first crowdfunding campaign between 05/16/2016-9/3/2017. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Success Big Success
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net income (M) 0.064∗ 0.063 0.005 -0.008
(0.038) (0.039) (0.033) (0.032)
Revenue (M) 0.005 0.079∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.025)
Total asset (M) -0.002 -0.003 0.014 0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
Cash (M) 0.326∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗
(0.108) (0.118) (0.088) (0.076)
Number of employees 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Age at financing 0.004 0.004 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.231 0.228 0.325 0.374
Entity Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incorporation State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intermediary FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 461 461 461 461
Table 2.2 reports regression results of (2.7). Although Column (1) shows a sig-
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nificant correlation between firms’ net income and their success rate of crowdfunding,
the significance disappears once I control for revenue (Column (2)). Moreover, if we
focus on successful crowdfunding that raised more than 0.5 million dollars in Columns
(3) and (4), the positive correlation completely disappears. These results suggest that
firms’ profitability does not predict firms’ success in crowdfunding. In other words, the
crowdfunding market does not seem to be financing high quality startups. This evidence
is consistent with the main implication of my model that the Regulation CF market in
current design may not be able to overcome the lemons problem and fund high quality
startups.
2.5 Discussion
In Proposition 1, I proved that outsiders play cutoff strategies conditioning on insid-
ers’ strategy space. One direct implication of this result is that if a startup achieves early
success by attracting enough insiders at the beginning of its crowdfunding campaign,
then it should eventually succeed with high probability. To test this, I collected funding
dynamics data from a Title III equity crowdfunding portal called Wefunder (the most
popular Title III crowdfunding portal) (October 2017-April 2018). Figure 2.3 plots
the fraction of capital raised over minimum funding goal at exit against the fraction of
capital raised at Day 7. It shows that crowdfunding campaigns that are able to raise more
than 20% of minimum funding goal within 7 days will succeed with 75% probability.
In contrast, crowdfunding campaigns that raise less than 20% of minimum funding
goal within 7 days will succeed with only less than 10% probability. This evidence is
consistent with the implication of Proposition 1.
Figure 2.4 shows a more complete picture of the funding dynamics of crowdfunding
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Figure 2.3: EARLY SUCCESS AND FINAL SUCCESS
Notes: The x-axis represents the fraction of capital raised over the minimum funding goal at the end of Day 7 since the
beginning of a crowdfunding campaign, and the y-axis represents the fraction of capital raised over the minimum funding
goal when a crowdfunding campaign ended (was taken down from the funding portal).
campaigns. Three patterns are salient in Figure 2.4: (1) most funding activities occurred
within the first month of the crowdfunding campaigns; (2) the campaigns that eventually
succeeded (the capital raised exceeds the minimum funding goal) raised capital quickly
at the beginning; and (3) the campaigns that eventually failed raised little capital till the
end. These patterns are again consistent with the implication of Proposition 1: outsiders’
investment decisions depend on how insiders react positively towards a crowdfunding
campaign at the beginning, and campaigns achieving early success will have high
probability to succeed in the end.13
13Figure 2.4 can be also consistent with investors’ herding behavior [see e.g., 3, 99]. To possibly disentangle the information
aggregation story studied in this paper and investor herding story, it would be useful to observe the long-term outcomes of
crowdfunding startups and to learn whether the startups succeeding in crowdfunding campaigns are indeed of higher quality,
e.g. being able to achieve high survival and growth rate. Clearly, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 2.4: FUNDING DYNAMICS
Notes: The x-axis represents the number of days since a crowdfunding campaign is posted on the crowdfunding portal,
and the y-axis represents the fraction of capital raised over the minimum funding goal (set by the entrepreneur). The y-axis
is truncated at 1. For simplicity, the sample includes only observations at Day 7n + 1 (n = 0, 1, 2, . . .) since the start of
crowdfunding campaigns.
One particularly interesting pattern emerging from Figure 2.4 is that there is a wide
wedge between campaigns that eventually succeeded and those failed in terms of capital
raised at the time of exit. In other words, there are very few crowdfunding campaigns
that almost reached the (minimum) funding goal but did not. The pattern can also be
observed in a density plot (Figure 2.5).
2.5.1 Improving market mechanisms
Theorem 1 proves that there does not exist a crowdfunding market equilibrium.
Here, I suggest an improving market mechanism that would support a crowdfunding
market equilibrium.
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Figure 2.5: OUTCOME AT THE END OF MONTH 2
Notes: The figure plots the kernel density estimation of the fraction of capital raised over minimum funding goal at the end
of month 2 for all crowdfunding campaigns.
The main reason for the non-existence of a crowdfunding market equilibrium is
that the outsiders’ participation constraint cannot be satisfied. At a crowdfunding
market equilibrium, because only the insiders with good signals invest, the outsiders
can essentially observe the aggregate of all the insiders’ private signals by observing the
aggregate of all the insiders’ actions. As a result, the outsiders have more information
than any single insider, thus giving the outsiders information advantage in inferring
the quality of the startup, and thus requiring a stronger participation constraint. As
studied in the IPO literature [87], underpricing is an effective method for solving the
uninformed investors’ participation constraint problem. However, in the crowdfunding
market, underpricingmay not be so feasible. As argued before, the crowdfundingmarket
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needs to aggregate the insiders’ information to overcome the adverse selection problem.
When underpricing, on one hand, could solve outsiders’ participation constraint, on
the other hand, it could also destroy the insiders’ information aggregation. Indeed, the
insiders can collectively aggregate information only when insiders with different private
information make different investment decisions (G-signal insiders invest and B-signal
insiders do not). But because the information difference betweenG-signal and B-signal
insiders is small if they are strategic, very little room exists for the share price to be set
so that insiders with different levels of information invest differently. This limits the
practicality of underpricing in the crowdfunding market: lowering the share price by
any significant amount will make it worthwhile for B-signal investors to deviate, leading
insiders’ information aggregation to fail.
To remedy the non-existence of a crowdfunding market equilibrium, one simple
mechanism is to set different prices for the insiders and outsiders. More specifically,
the entrepreneur can set a state-contingent share price for the outsiders. Consider nI ,
the number of insiders who invest, as the states. Then a state-contingent price for the
outsiders is a price function p(nI) with n0 + 1 ≤ nI ≤ n + 1. The entrepreneur solves a
new optimization problem:
max
p(nI )
pγ(nI) s.t. P(H |nI, S) − p(nI) ≥ 0,
where P(H |nI, S) − p(nI) ≥ 0 is the outsiders’ participation constraint conditioning on
nI insiders invest. The entrepreneur’s optimization problem can be easily solved.
Proposition 5. If the entrepreneur were allowed to set a state-contingent price for the
outsiders, the entrepreneur would optimally set the share price p′(nI) = 11+( α1−α)n+1−2nI
(n0 + 1 ≤ nI ≤ n + 1) for the outsiders. When the entrepreneur sets the optimal price
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p∗ for the insiders, and p′(nI) for the outsiders, there exists a crowdfunding market
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 implies that were the entrepreneur allowed to set a state-contingent
price for the outsiders, she can offer a discount on the share price for the outsiders if
the realized nI is low, and charging a premium if the realized nI is high. Clearly, the
state-contingent price in Proposition 5 satisfies the outsiders’ participation constraint.
Under the state-contingent price scheme, the insiders’ information can be conveyed to
the outsiders at a market equilibrium, and high quality startups end up with higher
probability of being funded.
2.6 Conclusion
Equity crowdfunding is a new evolving market for startups to raise capital. Like
other early-stage financing models, equity crowdfunding also faces high information
asymmetries. In this paper, I provide a rigorous analysis for onemain type of information
asymmetries: adverse selection. I find that no simple market equilibrium exists that
could solve the adverse selection problem. Under the current fixed offering price rule,
the equity crowdfunding market does not seem able to screen high quality projects.
Using Regulation CF filings, I also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with
my theoretical findings. The inability to overcome the lemons problem could lead to
market failure [4]. My finding suggests that to promote the development of the equity
crowdfunding market, introducing newmarket mechanisms that can remove the adverse
selection barrier may be necessary.
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C h a p t e r 3
FIRM CAPABILITIES AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
3.1 Introduction
There are two predominant and competing theories of competitive advantage in the
management literature. With strong economic and industrial organization foundations,
Porter [2008] argues that the industrial environment drives competitive advantage and
that firms must exploit and manipulate this to make profits. In contrast, the resource-
based view of the firm pioneered by Wernerfelt [1984] argues that firms should be
viewed as sets of immutable and scarce resources and that firms derive their competitive
advantage from these resources, broadly defined. This idea is simple and intuitive but
does not have the mathematical and formal foundations of Porter [2008]. As a result
it suffers from critiques of tautology. Resources are defined to include everything that
can generate a competitive advantage, while its objective is to provide a theory of
competitive advantage (see Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010).
In this paper we provide formal foundations for the resource-based view of the
firm. This resolves the tautology and builds a framework that ties firms’ capabilities to
their relative competitiveness within markets. Our approach utilizes similar industrial
organization foundations to Porter [2008], and so provides a framework that can accom-
modate the two theories of competitive advantage. It also delivers practical economic
insights. We argue that merger analysis and regulations should be more holistic, consid-
ering markets beyond those in which the merging firms compete and find that strategic
alliances are welfare enhancing even though they can reduce competition. We also
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explain industry consolidation as a profitable and possibly consumer surplus increasing
change in equilibrium industry structure.
Our model is simple. Each firm has a finite set of capabilities and each market
values a finite set of capabilities. The firms’ capabilities are their potential sources of
competitive advantage, while markets’ capabilities reflect which sources of competitive
advantage are useful in which markets. Firm and market capabilities are fixed in the
short run, reflecting their scarcity. If one firm hasmore relevant capabilities than another
for a given market, then it is a stronger competitor in that market. Stronger competitors
have higher price-cost margins. We model this through reduced marginal costs, but it
could instead be modeled through consumers’ higher willingness to pay without much
changing. Firms choose how much to produce in each market. Thus we model Cournot
competition market by market, where the marginal cost of a firm is determined by the
intersection of that firm’s capabilities and that market’s capabilities.
As firms are associated with sets of capabilities and markets are also associated with
sets of capabilities, we let a firm hypergraph describe firms and a market hypergraph
describe markets. In both hypergraphs the nodes of the graph are attributes/capabilities.
In the firm hypergraph each firm is then represented by an edge which comprises of a
subset of the available capabilities. Similarly, in the market hypergraph each market is
represented by an edge, which is a subset of the available capabilities. See for example
Figure 3.1 below.
In this example there are four underlying attributes. There are two markets shown
in Panel (A) of Figure 3.1. In market M1 attributes a1 and a2 are valued. In market M2
attributes a1, a3 and a4 are valued. There are four firms. Their capabilities are shown in
Panel (B) of Figure 3.1. In the first market firms 1 and 4 have all the useful attributes
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a1 a2
a3a4
M1
M2
(a) The market hypergraph
a1 a2
a3a4
F1
F2
F3
F4
(b) The firm hypergraph
Figure 3.1: REPRESENTATION OF FIRMS AND MARKETS BY HYPERGRAPHS.
and are strong competitors. Firm 2 is a weaker competitor with just one attribute and
firm 3 is the weakest competitor with none of the useful attributes. In the second market
firms 2, 3, and 4 all have (a different) two of the three useful capabilities and will be
strong competitors. Firm 1 has only one of the three useful capabilities and is a weaker
competitor.
We apply our model to address a couple of different, but related questions. First
we use our model to reevaluate merger guidelines and analysis. We assume that a
merged firm inherits the combined capabilities of merging firms but that it is costly to
maintain additional capabilities and more costly per capability the more capabilities a
firm has. This limits the profitability of mergers, particularly those that do not generate
any relevant synergies by enhancing the competitiveness of the merged firm in some
market. These costs might, for example, be associated with limitations on management
time and expertise.
Our capability centric approach allows us to formalize (production) synergies.
While this formalization is valuable in itself when considering the benefits of a merger
within a market in which the merging firms compete, it also emphasizes the efficiency
benefits mergers can have in other markets. If only one of the merging firms competes
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in a given market prior to the merger, the merger may create a stronger competitor in
that market. We show that in equilibrium this always increases consumer surplus. The
merged firm may also enter new markets, thereby increasing consumer surplus. Alto-
gether these benefits can be substantial. Blocking a merger based on anticompetitive
effects in overlapping markets (or prescribing remedies that render the merger unprof-
itable) can be socially inefficient. Indeed, we find that a decision which maximizes
consumer surplus in overlapping markets by blocking a merger can lead to an arbitrarily
high loss of consumer surplus in comparison to the counterfactual in which the merger
is permitted. Moreover, in contrast to the holistic approach our model suggests, merger
guidelines prescribe a market-by-market analysis:1
“The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of
a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticom-
petitive in any relevant market. To make the requisite determination, the
Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient
to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market,
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”
(Horizontal Merger Guidelines, US department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission, 2010.)
We also note that if merger guidelines achieve their objective of making the merger
review process transparent, then mergers that would reduce consumer surplus in over-
lapping markets will not get to the review stage, even if they would also substantially
1See Farrell and Shapiro [2001] for an excellent discussion of the treatment of synergies in the merger guidelines within
a market.
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increase consumer surplus in non-overlapping markets.2 This makes it hard to estimate
the efficiency gains that could be obtained by a more holistic merger review approach.
Strategic alliances are an alternative means through which firms can combine their
capabilities to better compete in a market. We relate the profitability of joint ventures
to the current competitiveness of the parent firms in the market being targeted, and
the capabilities the joint venture is endowed with. While not all joint ventures will be
profitable, those that are reduce the market price and increase consumer surplus even
when the parent firms compete less intensively or exit the market as a result.
Finally, we show that a market structure with many low capability firms can be
stable, while an alternative market structure in which firms with different capabilities
have merged to create fewer more competitive firms is also stable. We provide an
example in which the equilibrium with fewer but more competitive firms generates
higher consumer surplus as well as higher profits. We can therefore explain waves of
industry consolidation as an efficiency and profitability enhancing change in equilibrium,
in which firms become more capable within the market through their acquisitions.
A change in beliefs that others will merge is sufficient to trigger such a change in
equilibrium, but exogenous events that reduce profitability can cause the fragmented
market structure to no longer be an equilibrium and also trigger the consolidation.
3.1.1 Related Literature
Beyond the management literature we discuss above, which does not provide for-
mal mathematical foundations, we are unaware of any economic paper that proposes
modeling firms as sets of capabilities or formulates a hypergraph representation of firms
2 Nevertheless, a possible example of a merger that was blocked but might have had substantial efficiency benefits outside
of overlapping markets is the proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell which was blocked by the European
antitrust authorities in 2001.
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or markets. There is one exception.3 Malamud and Rostek [2015] model financial
exchanges, and competition across them, as a hypergraph. In their setting the set of
nodes are the exchanges and the edges represent which traders are active on which of
these exchanges. This is fundamentally different from the hypergraphs we consider
where the nodes are attributes/capabilties.
There is a huge industrial organization literature that considers mergers and different
aspects of the merger review process. We do not attempt a comprehensive review here
and instead only mention a couple of papers we consider more relevant. Like us
Nocke and Whinston [79] and Nocke and Whinston [80] evaluate the merger review
process, although they focus on a different aspect—they reconsider merger review
policy in the context of endogenous merger choices. Perhaps most closely related to
us are papers that focus on synergies. Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) argue that the
success of a merger depends on the degree of synergies that are realized, and that
not only the similarities across firms matter, but also their production and marketing
complementarities. Chatterjee [2002] provides a framework for categorizing different
types of synergies. Nevertheless, our formulation of synergies in capabilties/attributes
space is novel to the best of our knowledge. Also, as argued by Jensen and Ruback
(1983), mergers in general have been demonstrated to create value, and the gains created
do not appear to come from the creation of market power. By explicitly modeling firms
as sets of capabilities we are able to formally capture synergies which can be achieved
through combining firms’ key sources of competitive advantage.
There is a large amount of literature in management that studies joint ventures. A
main focus of this literature is to better understand the motivation for creating joint ven-
3 Dziubinski and Goyal [2013] also use hypergraphs, but in the very different setting of attack and defence networks.
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tures (see Kogut, 1988). Hennart (1988), for example, argues that equity joint ventures
can be explained by the presence of transactions costs. In contrast, Kogut (1991) argues
that joint ventures are developed by their parent firms for strategic motivations, and are
created as options to expand in response to future technological and market develop-
ments. Tsang (2000) argues that the formation of joint ventures can be explained using
a resource-based perspective of firms, and that this complements the transaction cost
approach. This resource-based view of joint ventures is closest to us. Our formalization
permits us to prove results about profitability and consumer surplus. In the economics
literature the focus has been somewhat different. For example, Kamien et al. (1992)
analyze the effects of research motivated joint ventures on the set of firms that compete
in the relevant product market. Perhaps the closest paper to ours in the economics
literature is Goyal et al. (2008). They develop a model of R&D collaboration in which
firms undertake joint projects on non-core activities with other firms.
On industry consolidation, the literature most related to our paper is the work of
Sutton (1991, 2001).4 Sutton shows that exogenous changes in production technology
or consumers’ willingness to pay, can trigger a period of industry consolidation. En-
dogenous investments in sunk costs reduce marginal costs and the number of firms the
market can support, causing some to exit. A classic example of such a change in market
structure is the tire industry (Klepper and Simons, 2000). We offer a complementary
but related mechanism through which consolidation can occur. Firms acquire scarce
capabilities through mergers, thereby reducing marginal costs. This directly models
consolidation as being achieved through mergers and further explains how marginal
cost reductions are obtained. It also demonstrates that efficient consolidation can be
4See also Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980].
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triggered simply by changing expectations and the resulting change in the equilibrium
being played. Conceptually, our results on stable industry structures are also related to
the networks literature (Jackson and Watts, 2001).
The organization of our paper is as follows: in Section 3.2, we introduce our model
and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium given a fixed set of firms. In Section 3.3, we
apply our framework to study merger guidelines. Section 3.4 considers joint ventures
as an alternative means by which firms might combine their capabilities. In Section 3.5
we define and analyze stable industry structures. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Firms as sets of capabilities
There is a finite set of attributes A, a finite set of firms {1, . . . , n} and a finite set
of markets {1, . . . ,m}. Each firm i is associated with a set of capabilities Fi ⊆ A.
This represents the sources of competitive advantage for firm i. Each market j is also
associated with a finite set of capabilities Mj ⊆ A. This represents the attributes that
are useful in market j.
We sometimes represent this information in a hypergraph. A hypergraph is defined
by a set of nodes, in this case the set of attributes A, and a set of edges, each of which
constitutes a subset of the nodes. The firm hypergraph is HF = (A, {F1, F2, . . . , Fn}).
Abusing notation, we sometimes write HF = {F1, F2, . . . , Fn}. The market hypergraph
is HM = (A, {M1,M2, . . . ,Mm}) and similarly we abuse notation by writing HM =
{M1,M2, . . . ,Mm}. We letH(A) be the set of all possible hypergraphs fixing attributes
A.
Firms that havemore relevant capabilities for a givenmarket are stronger competitors
in that market. We assume that each firm’s marginal cost in a given market is constant
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and does not depend on the firm’s output in that market. This constant marginal cost of
firm i in market j does depends on how well i’s capabilities, Fi, match the capabilities
associated with market j, Mj . For simplicity we define the variable θi j ≡ |Fi ∩ Mj | and
assume that i’s marginal cost in market j is a decreasing function of θi j . We denote
i’s marginal cost in market j by c(θi j), but abusing notation will sometimes write ci j
instead.5
All firms simultaneously decide how much to produce in all markets. We take a
zero output decision of firm i in market j to mean that the firm i does not enter market
j. The output choice of firm i in market j is given by qi j ≥ 0 and the vector qi ∈ <m+
represents i’s entry and output choices in all markets.
We let Q j =
∑n
i=1 qi j be the total output of all firms in market j, and let Pj(Q j) be
the inverse demand function for market j. For simplicity we consider a linear inverse
demand curve and set Pj(Q j) = α j − β jQ j with α j, β j > 0. Firm i’s profits in market j
are
pii j(qi j) =
(
α j − β jQ j − c(θi j)
)
qi j .
Let Q−i j = Q j − qi j be the output of firms other than i in market j. Firm i’s overall
profitability is given by
pii(qi) ≡
m∑
j=1
pii j(qi j) − κ(|Fi |),
5 Although we assume that the match of a firm’s capabilities with a market affects the firm’s profitability by reducing
their marginal costs, our results would not change if the match instead increases consumers willingness to pay for i’s product.
Specifically, we could let the demand parameter βj , defined below, instead be a function βj(θi j) that is strictly decreasing in
θi j . The price obtained by firm i in market j would then be Pi j(Q j, θi j) = αj − βj(θi j)Q j .
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where we assume that κ is a weakly increasing and convex function. This captures
the conglomeration costs associated with maintaining many unrelated capabilities. It
may reflect the scarcity of management time or inability of the firm to tailor their
corporate culture towards maintaining a broad set of capabilities. The firm therefore
solves the problem:
max
qi∈<m+
pii(qi).
Each firm’s overall profitability is the sum of its profitability over all markets, less
a penalty for the number of capabilities it maintains. Thus, fixing capabilities, a firm’s
output decision in each market can be made in isolation. Taking the output decisions
of the other firms as given, firm i therefore maximizes its profits by selecting in each
market j, an output
q∗i j = max
{
α j − β j ∑k,i qk j − c(θi j)
2β j
, 0
}
.
3.2.1 Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Standard results apply to our setting and, fixing the capabilities of firms, there is a
unique equilibrium output decision for all firms in all markets.
Proposition 6. There is a unique Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium firms who are more
capable in a given market produce more: If q∗i j > q
∗
k j then θi j > θk j .
The proof is in Appendix C.1. It is a standard result that in the m = 1 case there
is a unique equilibrium. This result is easily extended to our setting because firms’
profitability in each market is independent of decisions in other markets. It is also
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intuitive that more capable firms in a given market have higher output because they have
lower marginal cost. An immediate implication is that the x firms who enter a given
market are the x most capable with the x lowest marginal costs for that market.
3.2.2 Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, there are no other papers in the economics literature
that represent firms and markets as sets of capabilities. Doing so enables us to analyze
competition across many markets in which different firms are better suited to compete in
different markets.6 Firm acquisitions and joint ventures can then be viewed in this light,
providing a new perspective on corporate strategy. It also provides valuable foundations
for modeling the dynamic evolution of markets and undertaking empirical work. We
explore some of these applications in the subsequent sections.
While the economics literature has not previously taken a capability centric view
towards markets and firms, the management literature has long viewed firms in this
way. Indeed, the resource based view of the firm is one of the preeminent theories of
strategic competition. In relation to this literature our model provides simple formal
foundations. In doing so it is able to address a long standing critique of tautology—
while key competencies or capabilities are broadly defined to include anything that
yields a competitive advantage, they are also the determinants of competitive advantage.
Moreover, the set of capabilities might include the ability to use other capabilities
creating the potential for an infinite hierarchy of capabilities. Modeling capabilities as
a fixed set allows the separation of capabilities and the actions of the firm in bringing
these capabilities to bear in a given market.
6 It does not, nor is it intended to, provide a theory of the firm. We do not explain what is made within a firm and what is
bought in through the market from suppliers.
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Our view of capabilities is a slightly narrower view than that originally envisaged,
but one that provides a separate role for managers in terms of capability acquisition and
the decisions of which markets to enter. Moreover, by putting the resource based view
of the firm into a standard industrial organization (IO) setting, it can be combined with
the IO foundations underlying Porter.
3.3 Mergers guidelines
In this section we consider mergers as a way in which firms can combine their
capabilities. We compare the combined profits of two firms pre-merger with their
profits post merger, assuming that all other firms’ capabilities remain fixed. We also
consider market prices pre-merger and post-merger, again assuming that all other firms’
capabilities remain fixed. In Section 3.5 we extend our focus to include the equilibrium
response of other firms and look for stable industry structures in which no two firms
want to merge and no firm wants to demerge by spinning-off another firm.
If firms i and k merge then these firms cease existing individually and a new firm l
is created with attributes Fl = Fi ∪ Fk . On the hypergraph, it is equivalent to the union
of the two edges representing i and k. We refer to the set of firms present in a given
market as the market structure and collectively to these market structures across all
markets as the industry structure. Several factors determine whether a merger between
two firms i and k is profitable, and how it affects consumer surplus in various markets.
We separate these changes into six effects. As an intermediate step it is helpful to
differentiate between: (i) overlapping markets in which both i and k compete (such that
pre-merger q∗i j > 0 and q
∗
k j > 0); (ii) non-overlapping markets in which either i or k
compete, but not both (such that pre-merger max{q∗i j, q∗k j} > 0 but min{q∗i j, q∗k j} = 0);
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and (iii) newly entered markets in which neither i nor k compete pre-merger (such that
q∗i j = q
∗
k j = 0). We then have the following effects of the merger:
1. Concentration in overlapping markets: In an overlapping market j, firms i and
k no longer compete against each other reducing competition but capturing an
overall smaller market share.
2. Synergies in overlapping markets: In an overlapping market j, if
(
Fi ∩ Mj
) ⊂(
Fl ∩ Mj
)
and
(
Fk ∩ Mj
) ⊂ (Fl ∩ Mj ) then firm l is a stronger competitor in
market j than either i or k was alone and we say that the merger has synergies in
market j.
3. Synergies in non-overlapping markets: In a non-overlapping market j with q∗i j > 0
and q∗k j = 0 pre-merger, if Fi ∩ Mj ⊂ Fl ∩ Mj such that l is a stronger competitor
in market j than i was alone, then we say that the merger has synergies in market
j.
4. Synergies in new markets: There are synergies generated whenever the merged
firm enters new markets. As post-merger q∗l j > 0 but pre-merger q
∗
i j = q
∗
k j = 0,
by Proposition 6 we must have that
(
Fi ∩ Mj
) ⊂ (Fl ∩ Mj ) and (Fk ∩ Mj ) ⊂(
Fl ∩ Mj
)
.
5. Economies of Scale: If capabilities overlap sufficiently, the combined cost of
maintaining capabilities can decrease. In particular, if Fi = Fk then combined
maintenance costs will decrease from 2κ(|Fi |) to κ(|Fi |) post merger.
6. Diseconomies of Scope: If capabilities do not overlap sufficiently, the combined
cost of maintaining capabilities can increase. In particular, if Fi ∩ Fk = ∅ then by
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the convexity of κ, combined maintenance costs will increase from κ(|Fi |)+ κ(|Fk |)
to κ(|Fi | + |Fk |) post merger.
This list is exhaustive and mutually exclusive—we can decompose the profitability
of a merger between firm i and k to create l into these effects. To do so, we denote the
sets of overlapping markets, non-overlapping markets in which i but not k competes,
non-overlapping markets in which k but not i competes and newly entered markets by
Jo, Ji, Jk and Je respectively. To separate market concentration and synergy effects in
overlapping markets, let pˆii j and pˆik j be the profits i and k would get in market j were
they to both reduce their marginal cost to the post merger level, but without actually
merging so that they both still compete against each other. By definition
pil − (pii + pik) =
m∑
j=1
pil j − (pii j + pik j) − [κ(|Fl |) − (κ(|Fi |) + κ(|Fk |))]. (3.1)
The right hand side of equation (3.1) can be decomposed into the following terms:
∑
j∈J0
pil j − (pˆii j + pˆik j)︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
(1)
+
∑
j∈J0
(pˆii j + pˆik j) − (pii j + pik j)︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
(2)
+
∑
j∈Ji
(
pil j − pii j
)
︸           ︷︷           ︸
(3a)
+
∑
j∈Jk
(
pil j − pik j
)
︸            ︷︷            ︸
(3b)
+
∑
j∈Je
pil j︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)
+ κ(|Fi | + |Fk |) − κ(|Fi ∪ Fk |)︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
(5)
− [κ(|Fi | + |Fk |) − κ(|Fi |) − κ(|Fk |)]︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
(6)
,
where the number below each term refers to the enumerated list of effects above
and the synergies in non-overlapping markets are split into those occurring in markets
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in which i competes pre-merger (3a), and those in which k competes pre-merger (3b).
Having decomposed the effects of a merger we can identify markets in which consumer
surplus always increases.
Proposition 7. Following a merger the equilibrium market price weakly decreases
and consumer surplus weakly increases in all non-overlapping and all newly entered
markets.
The proof is in Appendix C.1. Consider competition in a non-overlapping market
in which a merger has synergies. After the merger the merged firm will be a stronger
competitor and other firms may optimally exit the market reducing competition. Nev-
ertheless consumer surplus always increases. The intuition is that for consumer surplus
to be reduced the market price needs to increase following the merger, but in this case
no firms would optimally exit.
While the competitive effects of a merger on newly entered and non-overlapping
markets are unambiguously good, consumer surplus can increase or decrease in overlap-
ping markets. This will depend on the magnitude of synergies in these markets versus
increased concentration and the associated reduction in competition.
It is helpful to sometimes consider a special case of our model in which firms can
only (effectively) compete in a market once they have all the attributes associated with
that market. Under this full cover assumption, for a market j, firm i’s marginal cost is
ci j =

c j < α j if Mj ⊂ Fi;
∞ if Mj 1 Fi .
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Thus a firm enters a market only if it has all the capabilities required by that market.
The full cover assumption considerably simplifies the analysis. First, all firms entering
a given market must make the same profits. Second, the effects of a merger are simpler.
There can be no synergies in overlapping markets or non-overlapping markets so all
synergies are confined to newly entered markets. Another implication is that a merger
reduces consumer surplus in overlapping markets.
Proposition 8. Under the full cover assumption, following a merger the equilibrium
market price increases and consumer surplus decreases in all overlapping markets.
Mergers can improve competition in some markets while reducing it in others.
However, in combination Proposition 8 and Proposition 7 show that consumer surplus
benefits are likely to accrue disproportionately in non-overlapping and newly entered
markets. Merger policy typically focuses only on overlapping markets, placing little
weight on the competitive benefits that might accrue in other markets. This can lead to
the prohibition of mergers that are overall beneficial for society. Moreover, as our next
result shows, the losses from such a policy can be arbitrarily large in terms of consumer
surplus.
Proposition 9. A merger policy focusing only on consumer surplus in overlapping
markets can lead to unbounded losses of consumer surplus in comparison to a holistic
approach that considers all markets.
Wenow provide an example to demonstrate that amerger policy aiming tomaximize
overall consumer surplus should consider all markets when evaluating the effects of a
merger.
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Example 1. Suppose that there are attributes A = {a1, . . . , a6}, Let the market and firm
hypergraphs be
HM = {M1 = {a1, a2},M2 = {a3, a4},M3 = {a4, a5},M4 = {a5, a6},
M5 = {a1, a3, a5},M6 = {a2, a4, a6}}
HF = {F1 = {a1, a2, a3, a5}, F2 = {a3, a4}, F3 = {a4, a5}, F4 = {a5, a6}, F5 = {a1, a2, a4, a6}}
See Figure 3.2. We make the full cover assumption. If a merger between F1 and F5
occurs, then the number of firms in each market changes as below:
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Before merger: 2 1 1 1 1 1
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
After merger: 1 2 2 2 1 1

.
It is easy to see that after the merger marketM1 gets more concentrated whileM2,M3,M4
get less concentrated. Assuming that the inverse demand function in all markets is given
by Pj = α − Q j and that the marginal cost of producing is the same in all markets,
overall consumers benefit considerably from the merger between F1 and F5.
Regulators in the US, EU, and UK, when deciding whether to approve a merger,
focus on anticompetitive effects in overlapping markets on a market by market basis.
Based only on an analysis of overlapping markets, and with an objective of maximizing
consumer surplus, the merger of F1 and F5 would be blocked. An intermediate action a
regulatory authority might take in the above case is to approve the merger subject to a
remedy requiring that a firm with attributes a1 and a2 be spun off prior to the merger
to compete in market M1. Although this would increase consumer surplus further
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conditional on the merger going through, it would also reduce the profitability of the
merger and could make it unprofitable.
a6
a1 a2
a3 a4
a5
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5 M6
(a) The market hypergraph
a6
a1 a2
a3 a4
a5
F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
(b) The firm hypergraph
Figure 3.2: A MERGER OF F1 AND F5 INCREASES THE NUMBER OF COMPETITORS IN MARKETS
M2,M3,M4, WHILE DECREASING IT IN MARKET M1.
3.4 Joint ventures
In this section we present a very simple and stylized model of joint ventures as
a means for firms to share their capabilities other than merging. Nevertheless, our
model is able to capture a key feature of joint ventures: their ability to better utilize the
combined capabilities of multiple firms to compete in a given market.
“(A) virtue of joint ventures is that often they make use of a resource which
hitherto has been left dormant because it was not coupled with the necessary
handmaiden.”
(Harrigan and Newman, 1990.)
For simplicity we restrict attention to joint ventures formed by two (parent) firms
i and k, suppose i and k restrict the joint venture to operate in a single predetermined
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market, give i and k equity stakes in the joint venture, and endow the joint venture with
some of i and k’s capabilities (which we assume does not diminish the parent firms’
capabilities). As in the previous section, we turn off the equilibrium response of other
firms to a joint venture, and only look at the effects of a joint venture in isolation.
Section 3.5 analyzes stable industry structures.
Definition 3. A joint venture is a tuple J = ({i, k}, FJ, j, λi) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2 × 2Fi∪Fk ×
{1, . . . ,m} × (0, 1) specifying the pair of firms forming the joint venture, the capabilities
of the joint venture, the market it will operate in and the parent firms’ respective profits
shares.
The profit shares (λi, λk) of a joint venture J, its capabilities and the market it
operates are fixed upon its formation. The joint venture then chooses qJ j to maximize
its profits in the market j it operates in, while the parent firms i and k choose their
outputs qi j and qk j to maximize their profits and their share of J’s profits in this market.
Thus firm i chooses
q∗i j = argmax
qi j
pii j(q1 j, . . . , qnj, qJ j) + λipiJ j(q1 j, . . . , qnj, qJ j).
We refer to pii j + λipiJ j as i’s profits in market j following the creation of J.
We assume a joint venture J operates independently from its parent firms as its
parent firms would typically want to choose different output levels for it. By being more
or less aggressive profits can be transferred between the joint venture and the parent
firms, potentially to the benefit of one parent and the cost of the other. Suppose, for
example, that only one of the parent firms operates in market j. If the joint venture
competes less aggressively the profits accruing to it will decrease but the profits of
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the competing parent firm will increase. To avoid incentivizing the parent firms to
manipulate the decisions of the joint venture, we make the simplifying assumption that
a joint venture operates independently and maximizes its own profits only. Moreover,
committing to producemore aggressively bymaking the joint venture independent might
sometimes increase the combined profits of the parents firms and joint venture.
As before, once joint ventures are formed, there is a unique equilibrium market
outcome.7
Lemma 4. For any set of firms, including joint ventures, there is a unique Nash equi-
librium output of each firm in each market.
Without loss of generality we will restrict attention to joint ventures J which
operate in equilibrium in their designated markets (i.e., joint ventures that once created
will produce a strictly positive output in the unique Nash equilibrium).8 Like the
previous section, we differentiate the markets according to firm i’s and k’s pre joint
venture market participation: (i) overlapping markets, (ii) non-overlapping markets,
and (iii) new markets. With this differentiation in hand the conditions for a joint venture
to be profitable can be analyzed.
Proposition 10. There exist profit shares (λi, λk) such that a joint ventureJ = ({i, k}, FJ, j, λi)
strictly increases i’s profit and k’s profit in:
(i) A new market j.
(ii) A non-overlapping market j that i enters if and only if cJ j < ci j .
7 This is more tricky to establish than before because the optimal output decisions of the parent firms depend on the market
share of the joint venture and their profit shares in it.
8 This just requires that the joint venture has a marginal cost in market j less than the equilibrium market price prior to its
creation.
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(iii) An overlapping market that both i and k enter only if cJ j < max{ci j, ck j}.
Proposition 10 considers the additional profits that accrue to the parent firms in
a given market following the creation of a joint venture. For the joint venture to be
profitable overall, additional market profits needs to be traded off against the fixed costs
incurred by the joint venture in maintaining its capabilities. In this sense, Proposition
10 identifies necessary, but not sufficient conditions for a joint venture to be profitable
for both parent firms for some equity shares. For joint ventures that operate in distinct
markets from the parent firms, all that matters are the net profits of J. For joint ventures
that operate in a non-overlapping market, the joint venture must be more capable than
both parent firms, while for joint ventures that operate in overlapping markets the joint
venture must be more capable than at least one of the parent firms.
A crucial difference between a merger and joint venture is that a joint venture
will compete with its parent firms in overlapping markets. This changes the welfare
implications of forming joint ventures as opposed to mergers. While mergers can have
ambiguous welfare effects, joint ventures always weakly increase welfare.
Proposition 11. The creation of any joint venture J = ({i, k}, FJ, j, λi) weakly de-
creases the equilibrium price in all markets and weakly increases consumer surplus in
all markets.
Proposition 11 shows that adding a joint venture to a market (weakly) increases
competition even though the parent firms compete less aggressively in that market and
might both exit.
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3.5 Stable industry structures and consolidation
We now endogenize the industry structure by allowing firms’ to merge and demerge
with each other. We do so by considering a two stage game. In stage 1 firms endoge-
nously develop their capabilities through merging with each other and spinning off new
companies. In stage 2 firms compete as perviously described.
First we define a demerger. A demerger of a firm l into firms i and k is equivalent
to the bi-partition of its set of capabilities so that Fl = Fi ∪ Fk and Fi ∩ Fk = ∅. On the
hypergraph, it is equivalent to the bi-partition of the edge representing the initial firm.
We treat mergers and demergers asymmetrically. If two firms merge with over-
lapping capabilities, duplicate capabilities are, in effect, lost. Suppose, for example,
that two firms both have good marketing departments before they merge and that these
marketing teams constitute a key source of competitive advantage. After the merger
only one marketing department is required and so the two departments are consolidated
and some workers leave. If, after this consolidation has been completed, this firm then
demerges to create two new firms, only one inherits the strong marketing department.
While in practice some attributes may be inherited by both companies following a de-
merger, we rule this out for simplicity while noting that if we were to assume that all
capabilities could be inherited by both companies following a demerger there would
exist a sequence of mergers and demergers that would result in all firms acquiring all
capabilities. As capabilities are intended to represent sources of competitive advantage
they need to be scarce and this modeling choice would be inconsistent with that.
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3.5.1 Stable industry structures and their existence
We wish to analyze the set of stable industry structures in which there are no
further pairwise profitable mergers or demergers. As a benchmark, and except where
otherwise stated, we assume that firms can merge or demerge freely without regulation.
We define an industry structure to be unstable if there exists a merger that is jointly
profitable or a demerger that is jointly profitable holding fixed the capabilities of other
firms. This is similar to concepts used when studying stable networks (see, for example,
Jackson, 2008). One notable difference is that in our setting the set of decision makers
changes following a merger or demerger. We also view each capability as a vertex of
a hypergraph and each firm is represented by an edge. So in our model, each decision
maker is an edge, instead of a node as is typical in network models.
Now we formally define the stability of a firm hypergraph, which by Proposition 6
uniquely pins down entry decisions into all markets and so also defines a stable industry
structure.
Definition 4. A firm hypergraph (distribution of firms over the set of capabilities A)
HF ∈ H(A) is stable if and only if
1. [merger] For all firms i and k with capabilities Fi, Fk ∈ HF , a merger that generates
Fl = Fi ∪ Fk is strictly unprofitable:
pil(H′F) < pii(HF) + pik(HF),
where H′F is the firm hypergraph following the merger.
2. [demerger] For any Fl ∈ HF with |Fl | > 1, any demerger generating firms Fi ⊂ Fl
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and Fk = Fl \ Fi is strictly unprofitable:
pii(H′F) + pik(H′F) < pil(HF),
where H′F is the firm hypergraph following the demerger.
So an industry structure is stable if and only if (i) there is no pair of firms which can
earn higher profits after a merger than their combined profits before it, and (ii) there is
no firm which can be demerged into two smaller firms thereby increasing overall profits.
To simplify our analysis, we maintain the full cover assumption that a firm must
have all the relevant capabilities for a market to be able to compete effectively in it.
To prove the existence of stable equilibria (at which there is no profitable merger or
demerger), we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5. If there exists a sequence of profitable mergers/demergers generating firm
hypergraphs H(1)F ,H
(2)
F , . . . that only ends when there is no profitable merger/demerger,
and a function f : H(A) → < that is weakly increasing such that f (H(t)F ) ≤ f (H(t+1)F ),
then either there exists a stable hypergraph or else there exists a sequence of profitable
mergers and demergers that cycles and holds the function f constant.
The proof is in Appendix C.1. It extends a similar and widely utilized result for
networks in Jackson and Watts [2001]. Next we use Lemma 5 to show that a stable firm
hypergraph/industry structure exists.
Proposition 12. Under the full cover assumption there exists a stable industry structure.
The proof is in Appendix C.1. The key statistic we use to apply Lemma 5 is the
sum over all firms of all their attributes. We show that in all sequences of profitable
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mergers / demergers this statistic weakly decreases, and that no cycle exists holding this
statistic constant, allowing us to apply Lemma 5 and conclude that a stable hypergraph
exists. It is not straightforward to show that there does not exist a cycle of profitable
mergers and demergers. Business stealing effects mean that negative externalities can
be imposed on others by merging and demerging firms, so there could in principle exist
cycles of mergers and demergers that strictly increase the profits of the firms merging
or demerging at each step. The proof shows that this is impossible by proving that the
total profits induced by all the mergers and demergers over a cycle have to be zero when
holding the total number of attributes in the economy fixed.
We now consider which industry structures will be stable. First we show that if
there are no lost synergies, demergers are profitable. We formalize this below.
Proposition 13. If a firm l’s set of capabilities can be partitioned into two non-empty
sets S1, S2 such that (i) Fl = S1 ∪ S2, (ii) S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, and (iii) either Fl ∩ Mj = S1 ∩ Mj
or Fl ∩ Mj = S2 ∩ Mj for all markets j such that ql j > 0, then the demerger of l into
firms i and k such that Fi = S1 and Fk = S2 is profitable.
The proof is in Appendix C.1. It follows from the convexity of κ which captures
diseconomies of scope. Proposition 13 implies that if a firm can be split into two firms
without reducing its competitiveness in any market it operates in, then such a demerger
is profitable. By the convexity of the capability maintenance cost κ, demerged firms will
be better able to focus their efforts on the markets they operate in than the conglomerate
was able to do before the demerger and as no synergies are lost in any relevant market,
there is no downside to the demerger.
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3.5.2 Stability and Efficiency
We now turn to the questions of whether our stable industry structures will be
efficient, and if not why not, by considering an example. We start with the following
definition.
Definition 5. We say an industry structure is efficient if it maximizes the social surplus,
i.e. the unweighted sum of firms’ profits and consumer surplus.
Example 2. Suppose there are 6 attributes {a1, . . . , a6}. Let the market hypergraph be
HM = {M1 = {a1, a2},M2 = {a2, a3},M3 = {a3, a4},M4 = {a4, a5},
M5 = {a5, a1},M6 = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}},
and consider the following three firm hypergraphs:
H1 = {F11 = {a1, a2}, F12 = {a2, a3}, F13 = {a3, a4}, F14 = {a4, a5}, F15 = {a5, a1}};
H2 = {F21 = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}};
H3 = {F31 = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5}, F32 = {a1, a2, a4, a5}}.
See Figure 3.3. We make the full cover assumption, and also assume that all markets
have equivalent demand curves (Pj = α−Q j) and the marginal costs of production is the
same in all markets. Then a firm’s profits in a given market depend only on the number
of firms entering. Abusing notation, we let pi(k) be the profits a firm makes in a market
with k firms. We assume that pi(1) > κ(2) so that a monopolist can cover their fixed
cost when serving a market Mk , for k = 1, . . . , 5. Consider first the firm hypergraph
H1 (corresponding to Panel (B) of Figure 3.3). Any demergers would prevent the firms
in question from competing in any market and are unprofitable as pi(1) > κ(2), so this
industry structure is stable if and only if no two adjacent firms want to merge and no
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two other firms want to merge. This requires that
κ(3) > 2κ(2) (3.2)
pi(2) < κ(4) − 2κ(2). (3.3)
Consider now the second firm hypergraph H2 (corresponding to Panel (C) of Figure
3.3). No mergers are possible as there is a single firm, so this hypergraph is stable if and
only if it is not profitable for F21 to demerge: (i) into two firms with attributes (a1, a2, a3)
and (a4, a5); (ii) into two firms with attributes (a1, a2, a3, a4) and (a5); (iii) into three
firms with attributes (a1, a2), (a3, a4), and (a5); or (iv) into three firms with attributes
(a1, a2, a3), (a4), and (a5). Although there are many other possible demergers they are
all weakly less profitable than one of these four demergers. Thus industry structure H2
is stable if and only if
3pi(1) > max{κ(5) − κ(2) − κ(3), κ(5) − κ(4) − κ(1)} (3.4)
4pi(1) > max{κ(5) − 2κ(2) − κ(1), κ(5) − κ(3) − 2κ(1)}. (3.5)
Firm hypergraph H3 (corresponding to Panel (D) of Figure 3.3) is not stable. A merger
between firms F32 and F31 reduces capability maintenance costs by κ(4)while increasing
profits in markets M1, M4 and M5.
Consumer surplus in a market with k firms is k22 pi(k). Thus, summing consumer and
producer surplus across all markets, the industry structure represented by H3 is more
efficient than H1 and H2 respectively if
12pi(2) − 3pi(1) > κ(5) + κ(4) − 5κ(2). (3.6)
12pi(2) − 9
2
pi(1) > κ(4). (3.7)
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We now identify parameter values for which the industry structures H1 and H2
are simultaneously stable, while industry structure H3 is more efficient than both but
unstable. This requires satisfying inequalities (3.2–3.7). Let κ(q) = φ(q − 1)2 where
φ > 0 and q ≥ 1. In the above hypergraphs, κ(1) = 0 implies that a firm with a single
capability, who is therefore unable to enter any market is able to freely dispose their
capability and make a net profit of 0. We also let pi(1) = 12φ. Since there is Cournot
competition in the second stage of our game with linear demand, pi(2) = (4/9)pi(1),
and so pi(2) = (16/3)φ. It is straightforward to verify that for these parameter values
inequalities 3.2–3.7 are satisfied.
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(a) Market hypergraph HM
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F15
(b) Firm hypergraph H1
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F21
(c) Firm hypergraph H2
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F31
F32
(d) Firm hypergraph H3
Figure 3.3: STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY.
Example 2 shows that for the same parameter values there can be stable industry
structures that are too concentrated and not concentrated enough while a more efficient
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intermediate industry structure is unstable. There could be too many small firms or too
few big firms in equilibrium from a social planner’s perspective. This motivates regu-
lations that restrict mergers, as is currently practiced, but also potentially intervention
to encourage mergers when the industry structure is fragmented.
3.5.3 Industry Consolidation
Example 2 demonstrates that industry structures can be both too fragmented or
too concentrated. Mergers are sometimes complementary and sometimes substitutes.
Mergers are more profitable in more concentrated markets, but as we have seen, mergers
can both increase and decrease competition in markets. A merger might, for example,
increase competition in a newly entered market while simultaneously reducing compe-
tition in an overlapping market.
When there is a single relevant market, mergers reduce the number of competitors
and are complements. This goes some way to explaining how there can be multiple
stable market structures that have very different levels of concentration. Moreover, one
of these market structures may be considerably more efficient than the others. We show
this in the simple example below. In this example a very fragmented market structure
is stable, in which no firms are especially strong or capable competitors, and a much
more concentrated market structure with strong and more capable competitors is also
stable. The less concentrated market structure generates lower aggregate profits and
lower consumer surplus. Moreover, starting form this fragmented industry structure,
rapid consolidation can occur if there is a change in beliefs about whether other firms
are going to merge.
Example 3. Suppose there are u attributes {a1, . . . , au} and for simplicity we suppose
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there is a single market with inverse demand curve P = α −Q. The market hypergraph
is
HM = {M1 = {a1, . . . , au}}.
Consider now the following two firm hypergraphs:
H1 =
(
Fsi = {ai}
)
s=1,...,k, i=1,...,u;
H2 =
(
Fs = {a1, . . . , au}
)
s=1,...,k .
The firm hypergraph H1 consists of ku small firms each with a single capability and the
firm hypergraph H2 consists of k firms each with u capabilities. Firms’ marginal costs
for the unique market M1 are decreasing in their capabilities. For simplicity let Fi’s
marginal cost be ci = α/(|Fi | + u) and let the fixed cost of maintaining q capabilities be
κ(q) = (q − 1)e for q ≥ 1 and some e > 1.
We assume that merger regulations prevent any further mergers when the firm
hypergraph is H2. Then for e close to 1 and k ≥ 3u, the following can be established:
(i) H1 is stable;
(ii) H2 is stable;
(iii) H2 generates higher consumer surplus than H1.
The calculations are in Appendix C.2 but some intuition follows. Consider first
the fragmented hypergraph. Suppose two firms with the same capabilities merge. As
production costs remain unchanged, the combined profits of the firms after the merger
will be the same as their combined profits were one of them to exit the market. If one
exits the other’s profits increase a little, but not much because there are still many firms
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present, and the exiting firm loses the profits they would otherwise have received. When
the market is sufficiently fragmented the net effect is negative. Mergers between firms
with different capabilities induce some additional profits through lowering marginal
cost, but also require maintaining additional capabilities which is costly. Overall these
mergers are not profitable either.
Consider now hypergraph H2. By assumption additional mergers are prohibited.
So the hypergraph will be stable as long as demergers are unprofitable. This is the
case because demerged firms are weaker competitors (have higher marginal costs) in
the market than the other firms, and collectively extract lower profits. The demerger
will reduce combined fixed costs, but when e is close to 1 these effects are small and
the former effect will dominate making demergers unprofitable. Finally, the consumer
surplus generated by the two hypergraphs is
CS(H1) = 12
(
ku
ku + 1
)2 (
1 − 1
1 + u
)2
α2,
CS(H2) = 12
(
k
k + 1
)2 (
1 − 1
2u
)2
α2.
As u > 1, when k is sufficiently large CS(H1) < CS(H2) and H2 generates more
consumer surplus than H1. Total profits are also higher for H2 than H1.
As both H1 and H2 are stable, sudden transitions are possible. Starting form H2, if
firms anticipate that the industry will consolidate through a sequence of mergers these
beliefs are self fulfilling and the mergers anticipated will be profitable. In this way,
through rapid industry consolidation we can move from hypergraph H1 to hypergraph
H2. Much empirical evidence documents waves of industry consolidation. Viewing
firms as sets of capabilities provides a simple and natural formal explanation for this.
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Example 3 illustrates that viewing firms as sets of capabilities might help explain
waves of industry consolidation as the transition between multiple equilibria in which
firms become more capable competitors through their acquisitions. This is closely
related to the work of Sutton (1991, 2001). The main difference is that we do not require
exogenous changes in technology or demand to precipitate the changes in industry
structure and that additional entry is limited by the scarcity of capabilities rather than
through the accumulation of sunk costs as a barrier to entry. Further, in our model,
mergers lower marginal costs incentivizing further mergers, while in Sutton’s work sunk
cost accumulation lowers marginal cost and incentivizes mergers.
3.5.4 Conglomeratization
There is a literature that documents a sharp change of the form of industrial firm
in the United States over the course of the twentieth century (Davis and Diekmann,
1994). Following the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s and 1970s, Flig-
stein [1991] reports that by 1980 growth through diversification had become the most
widely used corporate strategy among large firms. Fewer than 25 percent of Fortune
500 companies made all their sales within a single broadly-defined (2-digit SIC) indus-
try. However, during the 1980s, a wave of “deconglomeration” restructured American
industry, resulting in the largest US firms becoming considerably less diversified by
1990. Many papers seek to explain this transition in industry structure (see Amihud and
Lev [1981], Fligstein [1991], Bhagat et al. [1990], Davis and Stout [1992], LeBaron
and Speidell [1987], Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1990]). Almost all suggest that an
enormous “collective error” was made in the conglomeration period and represent the
subsequent breaking up of these firms as a correction. Our model suggests an alternative
explanation.
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In our model, mergers that are followed by demergers can be efficiency enhancing
if they redistribute capabilities in a way that creates stronger competitors. Consider
the markets shown below in Figure 3.4. There are two markets which are unrelated in
the sense that they require disjoint capabilities. There are also initially two firms who
are both weak competitors in both markets (Panel (A), Figure 3.5). A merger between
these two firms creates a new conglomerate firm that competes strongly in both markets
(Panel (B), Figure 3.5), but has to maintain an inefficiently large number of capabilities.
A subsequent demerger generates two firms that are both strong competitors in their
respective markets (Panel (C), Figure 3.5).
a1 a2
a3a4
M1
M2
Figure 3.4: MARKET HYPERGRAPH
a1 a2
a3a4
F11F12
(a) Initial firms
a1 a2
a3a4
F21
(b) The merged firm
a1 a2
a3a4
F31
F32
(c) The demerged firms
Figure 3.5: EFFICIENT CONGLOMERIZATION AND DEMERGERS
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper we provide formal foundations for one of the main theories of competi-
tive advantage from themanagement literature. We do so bymodeling firms andmarkets
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as sets of capabilities where a firm’s marginal cost in a given market is decreasing in
the intersection of its capabilities with those that would be useful in the market. Given
these heterogeneous marginal costs firms decide which markets to enter and how much
to produce in each market. The equilibrium is unique, pinning down market prices and
firm profits. This representation of firms andmarkets as hypergraphs helps formalize the
notion of synergies obtained through mergers. By linking firms’ marginal costs in each
market to their relevant capabilities we also model natural entry barriers: Firms need
to acquire a suitable set of capabilities before they can compete effectively in a given
market. Our approach to merger analysis emphasizes the potential efficiency gains that
can be obtained in non-overlapping markets and calls for a more holistic analysis than
is currently set out in the US merger guidelines and widely practiced. Joint ventures
provide an alternative way in which firms might combine their capabilities. Although
the parent firms of a joint venture will compete less aggressively in a market if they
create a joint venture that enters that market, we show that consumer surplus increases
in all markets whenever a joint venture is profitable. Finally, by defining what it means
for an industry structure to be stable, we explain industry consolidation as the transition
from a less profitable but stable market structure to a more profitable (and possibly
higher consumer surplus) market structure with fewer but more capable firms.
Our model is simple and intended as a first step. On the theoretical side there is
much that can be generalized. Firms’ competitiveness can more generally be defined by
the set of relevant capabilities they have for a market rather than the number. Such an
approach would lead to a partial ordering (in set inclusion with respect to capabilities)
of the competitiveness of firms in each market. A more dynamic approach than has
been taken in this paper is also called for. Markets evolve over time in terms of the
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capabilities they value and in terms of their size. Explicitly modeling this would further
emphasize the role of management in terms of acquiring and developing the capabilities
of firms. On the empirical side there is also much to do. Are mergers that generate more
complementary sets of capabilities more profitable in the long run? Do newly merged
firms use their new found capabilities to enter new markets? Do firms become stronger
competitors after mergers in non-overlapping markets?
The model can also be applied to study many problems we have not mentioned.
For example, government procurement contracts can be viewed as demanding a set of
capabilities. In some cases no one firm has all the required capabilities and bidding
for the contract occurs through endogenously formed consortia of firms. An interesting
theoretical and empirical question is then “what can be said about the competitiveness
of these bidding processes?” Viewing firms as sets of capabilities might help address
questions like this.
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Variable and term definitions
A.2 Data integration
This section details the integration of the form D and VC data with business registration.
Form D filings and business registration
I rely on a standard company name merge to combine form D filings and business
registration records. To my advantage, full legal name of companies is required to
be unique within a single state’s border, so this largely guarantees the accuracy of
company name merge. To further improve the matching outcomes, I use additional
information available in the two datasets including company address, incorporation year
and incorporation state to clean the matching. In particular, I drop a matching either (1)
if the two datasets indicate different county location of the matched company,1 or (2) if
the two datasets indicate different incorporation state.
The merge of form D filings and business registration is useful in several aspects.
First, business registration records provide more detailed company-level information
for the startups which have raised private money in CA. Second, the merge allows to
filter out some startups which raised money and filed form D in CA but do not actually
operate in CA, and thus creates a cleaner sample of CA startups that base their operation
activity in CA. Third, the merge assigns each form D filer a unique company identifier
1Young companies are mobile, so I match companies at the county level by taking into account the possibility that
companies may re-locate within county.
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Table A.1: VARIABLE AND TERM DEFINITIONS
Panel A: Variable definitions
Variables Definition
CA/DE Incorporated dummy variable whether a startup is incorporated in Califor-
nia/Delaware
Year/Age first Angel year/age at initial angel financing
Biotech/Computers dummy variable whether a startup is in biotech/computer sector
# of Corporations p.c. number of new corporations per capita (normalized by multi-
plying by 100 in regressions)
# of Corporations number of new corporations (normalized by dividing by 1000
in regressions)
Population number of exemptions in tax returns, which approximates pop-
ulation according to the IRS (normalized by dividing by 10,000
in regressions)
Size Quartile quartiles of the financing size distribution
Capital Raised financing size of angel investments (normalized by dividing by
10 million in regressions)
Panel B: Term definitions
Terms Definition
angel-backed startup a startup receiving its initial financing from angels
initial angel financing startups’ initial financing where angels are the only outside
investors
VC-backed startup a startup receiving its initial financing from VCs
initial VC financing startups’ initial financing where (at least one) VCs are the out-
side investors
first VC financing a financing that is backed by (at least one) VCs for the first time
over a startup’s financing history
VC funded/financed startup a startup which ever receives a financing from VCs
Rich households households with annual income greater than $100,000
from the business registration records, which facilitates further data integration with the
VC data.
VC data and business registration
133
Similarly, I also rely on a company name merge to combine VC data (both PCRI
and Pitchbook) and business registration records. Specifically, for the PCRI data, I got
valuable help from PCRI on the matching process, and they manually checked all the
name merge outcomes using additional information such as specific company address,
incorporation date, and so on. For Pitchbook data, I also performed a similar matching
process. Specifically, to clean the name matching outcomes, I drop a matching from the
name merge outcomes if Pitchbook and business registration indicate a different county
location of the matched company.
The merge between VC data and business registration is useful in the sense that (1)
it only keeps the VC funded startups which actually operate in CA,2 (2) it assigns each
VC funded startup a unique company identifier from business registration records.
Have merged form D and VC data with business registrations, it is an easy process
to use the common registration identifiers of the two matching outcomes and integrate
the two datasets at the company level.
A.3 Additional tables
2Many VC funded startups have company address in CA, but do not actually operate in CA.
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Table C.1: SUMMARY OF SECURITY EXEMPTION RULES
Notes: The table presents an exhaustive list of security exemption rules available for private firms in the United States [73].
Exemption Rules Type of Investors Number of
investors
Advertising Re-
quirements
Geography Capital
Traditional Rule
506 (federal)
Accredited and so-
phisticated, answers
by investors can be
relied upon unless
information to the
contrary
Unlimited
accredited,
up to 35 so-
phisticated
No public adver-
tising but informa-
tional advertising
OK Targeted con-
tacts with investors
reasonably believed
to qualify OK
Anywhere in the
U.S.
Unlimited
Advertised Rule
506 (federal)
Accredited only;
status must be
verified
Unlimited Public advertising
allowed
Anywhere in the
U.S.
Unlimited
Crowdfunding
(federal)
Investor with less
than $100K in net
assets or $100K
income limited to
greater of $2,000 or
5% of income. Oth-
ers can invest up to
10% of annual in-
come or net worth,
up to $100K
Unlimited Public advertising
but only through an
intermediary regis-
tered with the SEC
Anywhere in the
U.S. when allowed
$1,000,000 max-
imum including
amounts in the
prior 12 months;
financials must
be audited
Model Accredited
Investor Exemp-
tion, aka MAIE
(approx. 35
states)
Accredited in-
vestors only
Unlimited Only brief “tomb-
stone” ad allowed
Only in states that
have adopted the
MAIE
Unlimited if re-
stricted to one
state. otherwise
$5 million (and
CA 25102(n) re-
quired)
CA 25102(f)
(California’s
variation on Rule
506)
1)Accredited, 2) so-
phisticated and 3)
friends, family and
colleagues. Lim-
ited to California in-
vestors
Unlimited
accredited,
up to 35 on
the others
No public adver-
tising but informa-
tional advertising
OK Targeted con-
tacts with investors
reasonably believed
to qualify OK
California investors
only can be used
by non-California
companies if com-
bined with federal
Rule 505 and
friends, family and
colleagues category
removed
Unlimited
CA 25102(n)
(California’s
version of the
MAIE)
Accredited only
except CA corpo-
rations may have
“half accredited”
investors. Lim-
ited to California
investors unless
combined with
MAIE offering
in about 35 other
states.
Unlimited No public adver-
tising but informa-
tional advertising
OK. Targeted con-
tacts with investors
reasonably believed
to qualify OK
California investors
only. Can be used
by a non-California
entity if more than
50% of the average
of its property, pay-
roll and sales of tan-
gible personal prop-
erty (if any) are in
California.
Unlimited if Cal-
ifornia only. $5
million limit if
other states in-
volved
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Table C.2: T-TEST OF VC COMPLIANCE
Notes: The table reports the T-test for VCs’ compliance of security exemption rules using Pitchbook data.
No Form D Filed Form D Diff/s.e.
Year firm founded 2008.7 2007.9 0.872∗∗∗
0.167
Year first VC 2010.5 2009.3 1.217∗∗∗
0.135
First capital raised (m) 4.998 5.638 -0.640
0.352
Total capital raised (m) 135.0 202.4 -67.33
48.73
Total rounds 2.428 3.133 -0.705∗∗∗
0.0893
First syndicate size 2.667 2.608 0.0584
0.0724
Has unknown investors 0.233 0.298 -0.0646∗∗∗
0.0194
Information Tech. 0.572 0.524 0.0477∗
0.0215
Healthcare 0.0990 0.183 -0.0835∗∗∗
0.0159
Table C.3: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF PITCHBOOK DATA
Notes: The table summarizes the sample of first VC financings of CA startups using Pitchbook data.
mean sd min p25 p50 p90 p95 p99 max count
Age first financing 1.07 0.79 0 0.40 0.90 2.30 2.70 3 3 5434
First capital raised (m) 4.55 8.58 0.010 1 2 10 15 38.3 217 5434
Investor not angel or VC 0.12 0.32 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5434
Has VC investor 0.71 0.45 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5434
Has angel investor 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5434
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Table C.4: KEY PHRASES AND SECTOR ASSIGNED
Notes: The table reports the top two key phrases in each sector used to identify that sector.
Sector Key Phrase Frequency
Agriculture farming 124
Agriculture agriculture 24
Banking holding company 151
Banking investment business 117
Biotechnology biotechnology 98
Biotechnology medical device 51
Business Services management service 115
Business Services service 114
Computers software development 683
Computers software 308
Construction & Residential construction 646
Construction & Residential property management 134
Energy electrical contractor 66
Energy renewable energy 28
Financial Services financial service 153
Financial Services equipment leasing 31
Fund & Real Estate real estate 2019
Fund & Real Estate investment 193
General Business consulting 333
General Business consulting service 198
General Technology technology 141
General Technology social media 64
Health Care medical device 299
Health Care health care 82
Insurance insurance agency 55
Insurance physical therapy 54
Local Service food service 224
Local Service trucking service 112
Manufacturing manufacturing 181
Manufacturing manufacturer 37
Natural Resources & Utilities gas exploration 12
Natural Resources & Utilities aviation 8
Pharmaceuticals pharmacy 79
Pharmaceuticals pharmaceutical 32
Restaurants restaurant 1025
Restaurants fast food 139
Retailing retail sale 231
Retailing general merchandise 203
Telecommunications telecommunication 30
Telecommunications online video 27
Travel transportation 118
Travel travel service 32
137
A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 directly follows from Proposition 4. Proposition 4
suggests that when the first two conditions of the crowdfunding market equilibrium are
satisfied, the third one cannot be satisfied.
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Because EI(Y |F, S) = P(H |F, S) − p (F = G, B), it suffices to prove that
P(H |G, S) > P(H |B, S). By Bayes’ rule and the common prior P(H) = P(L) = 1/2,
P(H |G, S) = P(G, S |H)
P(G, S |H) + P(G, S |L) .
Now fix one insider, and assume that this insider invests. Then the event S is deter-
mined by all other insiders’ private information realization and other investors’ investing
strategies. Let S′ denote the event that the other investors buy all but one shares (n out
of total n + 1 shares) offered in the crowdfunding campaign. Then we can write
P(F, S |H) = P(F, S′|H) and P(F, S |L) = P(F, S′|L) for F = G, B. So,
P(H |G, S) = P(G, S
′|H)
P(G, S′|H) + P(G, S′|L) .
Then by the independence of insiders’ information,
P(H |G, S) = P(G |H)P(S
′|H)
P(G |H)P(S′|H) + P(G |L)P(S′|L)
=
P(S′|H)
P(S′|H) + P(G |L)P(G |H)P(S′|L)
.
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Since P(G |L)P(G |H) <
P(B|L)
P(B |H) for α > 1/2, we have
P(H |G, S) > P(S
′|H)
P(S′|H) + P(B |L)P(B|H)P(S′|L)
= P(H |B, S).
This completes the proof.
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. I prove that the outsiders play cutoff strategy for each possibility of insiders’
strategy profile. Since Cases I and IV can be considered special cases of Cases II and
IV, and Case III is an intermediate case, I just need to prove the proposition for Cases II
and IV.
Case II: in Case II, G-signal insiders use mixed strategy (with mixed probability
rG), and B-signal insiders do not invest. Let m denote the number of insiders that
outsiders observe. Then the outsiders’ posterior is
P(H |m) = P(m|H)P(H)
P(m|H)P(H) + P(m|L)P(L) =
1
1 + P(m|L)P(m|H)
.
To prove that outsiders play cutoff strategies, it suffices to prove that P(H |m) is mono-
tonically increasing in m. To do so, I am going to prove that P(m|L)P(m|H) is decreasing in m.
It is also equivalent to prove that P(m|L)P(m+ 1|H) − P(m|H)P(m+ 1|L) > 0. Because
P(m|L) =
∑
k≥m
(
n
k
)
(1 − α)kαn−k
(
k
m
)
rmG (1 − rG)k−m
and
P(m|H) =
∑
k≥m
(
n
k
)
αk(1 − α)n−k
(
k
m
)
rmG (1 − rG)k−m,
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I denote pk =
(n
k
)(1 − α)kαn−k , qk = (nk)αk(1 − α)n−k and xk(m) = ( km)rmG (1 − rG)k−m.
Then
P(m|L)P(m + 1|H) − P(m|H)P(m + 1|L)
=
[∑
k≥m
pk xk(m)
]
·
[ ∑
k≥m+1
qk xk(m + 1)
]
−
[∑
k≥m
qk xk(m)
]
·
[ ∑
k≥m+1
pk xk(m + 1)
]
=
∑
i≥m, j≥m+1
piq j xi(m)x j(m + 1) −
∑
i≥m, j≥m+1
qip j xi(m)x j(m + 1)
=
∑
i≥m, j≥m+1
(
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1)
=
∑
i≥m+1, j≥m+1
(
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1)︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
(1)
+
∑
i=m, j≥m+1
(
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1)︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
(2)
.
Then it suffices to prove that both (1) and (2) are positive. To prove that (1) is positive,
fix a pair i, j with i < j. Observe that
xi(m)x j(m + 1) =
(
i
m
)
rmG (1 − rG)i−m
(
j
m + 1
)
rm+1G (1 − rG) j−m−1
>
(
j
m
)
rmG (1 − rG) j−m
(
i
m + 1
)
rm+1G (1 − rG)i−m−1
= x j(m)xi(m + 1).
Also note that piq j − qip j > 0 for i < j. Thus,(
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1) >
(
piq j − qip j
)
x j(m)xi(m + 1).
So (
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1) +
(
p jqi − q jpi
)
x j(m)xi(m + 1)
>
(
piq j − qip j
)
x j(m)xi(m + 1) +
(
p jqi − q jpi
)
x j(m)xi(m + 1) = 0.
= 0.
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Then by the symmetry of pairs of summands in (1), (1) is positive. Since piq j −qip j > 0
for i < j, (2) is also positive. Thus, P(m|L)P(m + 1|H) − P(m|H)P(m + 1|L) > 0. This
proves Case II.
Case IV: in Case IV, G-signal insiders invest, and B-signal insiders use mixed
strategy (with mixed probability rB). Similarly, I just need to prove that P(m|L)P(m +
1|H) − P(m|H)P(m + 1|L) > 0. Because
P(m|L) =
∑
k≤m
(
n
k
)
(1 − α)kαn−k
(
n − k
m − k
)
rm−kB (1 − rB)n−m
and
P(m|H) =
∑
k≤m
(
n
k
)
αk(1 − α)n−k
(
n − k
m − k
)
rm−kB (1 − rB)n−m,
I denote pk =
(n
k
)(1−α)kαn−k , qk = (nk)αk(1−α)n−k and xk(m) = (n−km−k)rm−kB (1−rB)n−m.
Then
P(m|L)P(m + 1|H) − P(m|H)P(m + 1|L)
=
[∑
k≤m
pk xk(m)
]
·
[ ∑
k≤m+1
qk xk(m + 1)
]
−
[∑
k≤m
qk xk(m)
]
·
[ ∑
k≤m+1
pk xk(m + 1)
]
=
∑
i≤m, j≤m+1
piq j xi(m)x j(m + 1) −
∑
i≤m, j≤m+1
qip j xi(m)x j(m + 1)
=
∑
i≤m, j≤m+1
(
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1)
=
∑
i≤m, j≤m
(
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1)︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
(1)
+
∑
i≤m, j=m+1
(
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1)︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
(2)
.
It suffices to prove that both (1) and (2) are positive. To prove (1) is positive, fix a pair
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i, j with i < j. Observe that
xi(m)x j(m + 1) =
(
n − i
m − i
)
rm−iB (1 − rB)n−m
(
n − j
m + 1 − j
)
rm+1− jB (1 − rB)n−m−1
>
(
n − j
m − j
)
rm− jB (1 − rB)n−m
(
n − i
m + 1 − i
)
rm+1−iB (1 − rB)n−m−1
= x j(m)xi(m + 1).
Also note that piq j − qip j > 0 for i < j. Thus,(
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1) >
(
piq j − qip j
)
x j(m)xi(m + 1).
So (
piq j − qip j
)
xi(m)x j(m + 1) +
(
p jqi − q jpi
)
x j(m)xi(m + 1)
>
(
piq j − qip j
)
x j(m)xi(m + 1) +
(
p jqi − q jpi
)
x j(m)xi(m + 1) = 0.
This implies that (1) is positive. Since piq j − qip j > 0 for i < j, (2) is positive. Thus,
P(m|L)P(m + 1|H) − P(m|H)P(m + 1|L) > 0. This proves Case IV.
B.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that if there exists an insiders’ equilibrium, it must be one
of the five possible forms stated in Proposition 2. I just need to focus on Equilibrium
II and IV. At Equilibrium II, since the G-signal insiders play mixed strategy, they
should be indifferent between investing and not investing. This gives the equilibrium
condition that a G-signal insider receives zero expected payoff from investing, i.e.
EI(Y |G, S) = P(H |G, S) − p = 0. Thus, the share price p is simply equal to a G-signal
insider’s gross payoff P(H |G, S). Similarly, at Equilibrium IV, p is equal to a B-signal
insider’s gross payoff P(H |B, S).
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By Lemma 2 below, P(H |G, S) and P(H |B, S) are decreasing in rG and rB, respec-
tively. So there is a one-to-one correspondence between the share price p and the
insiders’ equilibrium strategy. This particularly implies that there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium strategy for the insiders. Now, to prove Proposition 2, it suffices to find the
ranges of P(H |G, S) and P(H |B, S), which identify the price p such that there exists a
corresponding insiders’ equilibrium strategy. The rest of this proof is to find the ranges
of P(H |G, S) and P(H |B, S).
(1) The proof of Part I trivially follows from Part II.
(2) Notice that P(H |G, S) is not continuous at rG = 0. Now, to prove Part II, it suffices
to prove that
lim
rG→0+
P(H |G, S) = 1
1 +
(
1−α
α
)n0+1 .
By Lemma 2 below, this holds because
lim
rG→0+
ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) =
(
1 − α
α
)n0
.
(3) I just need to prove P(H |B, S)|rB=0 < P(H |G, S)|rG=1. Notice that rG = 1 corre-
sponds to the insiders’ equilibrium strategy that G-signal insiders invest with mixed
probability rG = 1 and B-signal insiders do not invest, and rB = 0 corresponds to
the insiders’ equilibrium strategy that G-signal insiders invest and B-signal insiders
invest with mixed probability rB = 0. In both cases, only G-signal investors invest,
and thus the two quantities P(ni ≥ n0 |L) and P(ni ≥ n0 |H) are the same. So to prove
P(H |B, S)|rB=0 < P(H |G, S)|rG=1, it suffices to prove α1−α > 1−αα . This clearly holds
for any α > 1/2.
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(4) Since P(H |B, S) is continuous in rB ∈ [0, 1], it is straightforward to identify the
range of P(H |B, S), which then proves Part IV.
(5) The proof of Part E trivially follows from Part IV.
B.1.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Part (1): I first calculate P(H |G, S), a G-signal insider’s gross payoff from
investing when all other insiders play equilibrium strategies of Equilibrium II. By
Bayes’ rule and the common prior P(H) = P(L) = 1/2,
P(H |G, S) = P(G, S |H)
P(G, S |H) + P(G, S |L) .
Since the outsiders are playing equilibrium strategy n0 + 1, the event S is equivalent to
that at least n0 + 1 insiders invest. For one insider, let ni denote the number of other
insiders who invest. Then for one insider, conditioning on her own investing decision,
ni = nI − 1, and S is also equivalent to the event that there are at least n0 other insiders
who invest, i.e. ni ≥ n0. So,
P(H |G, S) = P(G, ni ≥ n0 |H)
P(G, ni ≥ n0 |H) + P(G, ni ≥ n0 |L) .
By the independence of insiders’ private information, I can rewrite the above equation
as follows:
P(H |G, S) = 1
1 + P(G |L)P(G |H) · P(ni≥n0 |L)P(ni≥n0 |H)
.
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At Equilibrium II,
P(ni ≥ n0 |H) =
∑
k≥n0
P(ni ≥ n0 |k)P(k G signals |H)
=
∑
k≥n0
( ∑
ni≥n0
(
k
ni
)
rniG (1 − rG)k−ni
) (
n
k
)
αk(1 − α)n−k,
and
P(ni ≥ n0 |L) =
∑
k≥n0
( ∑
ni≥n0
(
k
ni
)
rniG (1 − rG)k−ni
) (
n
k
)
(1 − α)kαn−k .
so P(H |G, S) can be expressed a function of parameters n, n0, α, rG:
P(H |G, S) = 1
1 + 1−αα ·
∑
k≥n0
(∑
ni ≥n0 ( kni)rniG (1−rG)k−ni
)
(nk)(1−α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0
(∑
ni ≥n0 ( kni)rniG (1−rG)k−ni
)
(nk)αk(1−α)n−k
. (B.1)
For fixed parameters n, n0, α, P(H |G, S) is a function of rG, which reflects how the gross
payoff of a G-signal insider varies with his equilibrium strategy. Let
ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) = P(ni ≥ n0 |L)
P(ni ≥ n0 |H) =
∑
k≥n0
(∑
ni≥n0
( k
ni
)
rniG (1 − rG)k−ni
) (n
k
)(1 − α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0
(∑
ni≥n0
( k
ni
)
rniG (1 − rG)k−ni
) (n
k
)
αk(1 − α)n−k
.
To prove the first part of Lemma 2, it suffices to prove that for any fixed n, n0, α,
ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) is strictly increasing in rG. I will prove that ∂ξI I (rG,n,n0,α)∂rG > 0.
Rewrite ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) as
ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) =
∑
k≥n0
[
n0
( k
n0
) ∫ rG
0 t
n0−1(1 − t)k−n0dt
] (n
k
)(1 − α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0
[
n0
( k
n0
) ∫ rG
0 t
n0−1(1 − t)k−n0dt
] (n
k
)
αk(1 − α)n−k
.
Let ak = n0
( k
n0
) ∫ rG
0 t
n0−1(1 − t)k−n0dt. Then ak’s derivative with respect to rG is
a′k = n0
( k
n0
)
rGn0−1(1 − rG)k−n0. Take partial derivative of ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) with respect to
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rG:
∂ξI I(rG, n, n0, α)
∂rG
=
[∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)
a′k(1 − α)kαn−k
] [∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)
akαk(1 − α)n−k
][∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)
akαk(1 − α)n−k
]2
−
[∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)
a′kα
k(1 − α)n−k ] [∑k≥n0 (nk)ak(1 − α)kαn−k ][∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)
akαk(1 − α)n−k
]2
=
∑
i, j≥n0,i, j
(n
i
) (n
j
)
aia′j
[
αi(1 − α)n−i(1 − α) jαn− j − (1 − α)iαn−iα j(1 − α)n− j ][∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)
akαk(1 − α)n−k
]2
=
∑
i, j≥n0,i, j
(n
i
) (n
j
)
aia′jα
n(1 − α)n [αi− j(1 − α) j−i − α j−i(1 − α)i− j ][∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)
akαk(1 − α)n−k
]2 . (B.2)
To prove (B.2) is positive, I just need to prove that the nominator is positive. Fix a pair
i, j with i < j. Observe that
aia′j = n0
(
i
n0
) ∫ rG
0
tn0−1(1 − t)i−n0dt · n0
(
j
n0
)
rGn0−1(1 − rG) j−n0
= n0
(
i
n0
) ∫ rG
0
tn0−1(1 − t)i−n0(1 − rG) j−idt · n0
(
j
n0
)
rGn0−1(1 − rG)i−n0
< n0
(
i
n0
) ∫ rG
0
tn0−1(1 − t) j−n0dt · n0
(
j
n0
)
rGn0−1(1 − rG)i−n0
= a ja′i .
Then for any fixed pair i, j with i < j, the inequality holds
aia′jα
n(1 − α)n [αi− j(1 − α) j−i − α j−i(1 − α)i− j ]
+a ja′iα
n(1 − α)n [α j−i(1 − α)i− j − αi− j(1 − α) j−i]
> a ja′iα
n(1 − α)n [αi− j(1 − α) j−i − α j−i(1 − α)i− j ]
+a ja′iα
n(1 − α)n [α j−i(1 − α)i− j − αi− j(1 − α) j−i]
= 0.
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So the nominator of (B.2) is positive. This proves ∂ξI I (rG,n,n0,α)∂rG > 0, and thus part (1)
of Lemma 2. Since ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) is monotone, we can easily calculate its limits with
respect to rG:
lim
rG→0+
ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) = lim
rG→0+
∑
k≥n0
[
n0
( k
n0
)
rn0−1G (1 − rG)k−n0
] (n
k
)(1 − α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0
[
n0
( k
n0
)
rn0−1G (1 − rG)k−n0
] (n
k
)
αk(1 − α)n−k
=
∑
k≥n0
[
n0
( k
n0
) ] (n
k
)(1 − α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0
[
n0
( k
n0
) ] (n
k
)
αk(1 − α)n−k
=
∑
k≥n0
(n−n0
k−n0
)(1 − α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0
(n−n0
k−n0
)
αk(1 − α)n−k =
(
1 − α
α
)n0
,
and
lim
rG→1−
ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) =
∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)(1 − α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0
(n
k
)
αk(1 − α)n−k .
Part (2): Similarly as before, I can express P(H |B, S) as a function of parameters
n, n0, α, rB:
P(H |B, S) = 1
1 + α1−α · P(ni≥n0 |L)P(ni≥n0 |H)
. (B.3)
For fixed parameters n, n0, α, P(H |B, S) as a function of rB, reflects how the gross payoff
of a B-signal insider varieswith his equilibrium strategy. Similarly, let ξIV (rB, n, n0, α) :=
P(ni≥n0 |L)
P(ni≥n0 |H) be a function of n, n0, α, rB. Then to prove Part (2) of Lemma 2, it suffices to
prove that for any fixed n, n0, α, ξIV (rB, n, n0, α) is strictly increasing in rB. I will prove
that ∂ξIV (rB,n,n0,α)∂rB > 0.
Let bk = P(ni ≥ n0 |k B signals), and b′k be its derivative with respect to rB. Notice
that bk = 1 for k ≤ n − n0 at Equilibrium IV. So b′k = 0 for k ≤ n − n0. Taking partial
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derivative of ξIV (rB, n, n0, α) with respect to rB, I have
∂ξIV (rB, n, n0, α)
∂rB
=
[∑
k≥0
(n
k
)
b′kα
k(1 − α)n−k ] [∑k≥0 (nk)bk(1 − α)kαn−k ][∑
k≥0
(n
k
)
bk(1 − α)kαn−k
]2
−
[∑
k≥0
(n
k
)
b′k(1 − α)kαn−k
] [∑
k≥0
(n
k
)
bkαk(1 − α)n−k
][∑
k≥0
(n
k
)
bk(1 − α)kαn−k
]2
=
∑
i, j≥0,i, j
(n
i
) (n
j
)
bib′j
[(1 − α)iαn−iα j(1 − α)n− j − αi(1 − α)n−i(1 − α) jαn− j ][∑
k≥0
(n
k
)
bk(1 − α)kαn−k
]2
=
∑
i≥0, j≥n−n0+1,i, j
(n
i
) (n
j
)
bib′jα
n(1 − α)n [(1 − α)i− jα j−i − (1 − α) j−iαi− j ][∑
k≥0
(n
k
)
bk(1 − α)kαn−k
]2 .
(B.4)
It suffices to prove that the nominator of (B.4) is positive.
Let n1 = n−n0. For k ≥ n−n0+1, write bk = (n0−(n−k))
( k
n0−(n−k)
) ∫ rB
0 t
n0−(n−k)−1(1−
t)k−n0+(n−k)dt = (k−n1)
( k
k−n1
) ∫ rB
0 t
k−n1−1(1−t)n1dt. Then b′k = (k−n1)
( k
k−n1
)
rBk−n1−1(1−
rB)n1. Fix a pair of i, j with n − n0 + 1 ≤ i < j. Then,
bib′j = (i − n1)
(
i
i − n1
) ∫ rB
0
ti−n1−1(1 − t)n1dt · ( j − n1)
(
j
j − n1
)
rB j−n1−1(1 − rB)n1
= (i − n1)
(
i
i − n1
) ∫ rB
0
ti−n1−1rB j−i(1 − t)n1dt · ( j − n1)
(
j
j − n1
)
rBi−n1−1(1 − rB)n1
> (i − n1)
(
i
i − n1
) ∫ rB
0
t j−n1−1(1 − t)n1dt · ( j − n1)
(
j
j − n1
)
rBi−n1−1(1 − rB)n1
= b jb′i .
Then for any fixed pair i, j with n− n0 + 1 ≤ i < j, the sum of the two terms indexed by
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(i, j) and ( j, i) in the nominator of (B.4) is positive:
Summand(i, j) + Summand( j,i)
=
(
n
i
) (
n
j
)
bib′jα
n(1 − α)n [(1 − α)i− jα j−i − (1 − α) j−iαi− j ]
+
(
n
j
) (
n
i
)
b jb′iα
n(1 − α)n [(1 − α) j−iαi− j − (1 − α)i− jα j−i]
>
(
n
i
) (
n
j
)
b jb′iα
n(1 − α)n [(1 − α)i− jα j−i − (1 − α) j−iαi− j ]
+
(
n
j
) (
n
i
)
b jb′iα
n(1 − α)n [(1 − α) j−iαi− j − (1 − α)i− jα j−i]
= 0.
For i < n − n0 + 1 and j ≥ n − n0 + 1, it also holds that(
n
i
) (
n
j
)
bib′jα
n(1 − α)n [(1 − α)i− jα j−i − (1 − α) j−iαi− j ] > 0.
So the nominator of (B.4) is positive, and ∂ξIV (rB,n,n0,α)∂rB > 0. This proves part (2) of
Lemma 2.
B.1.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Write
I A =
P(S |H)
P(S |L) =
P(ni ≥ n0 |H)
P(ni ≥ n0 |L) .
Then at Equilibrium II, I A = 1ξI I (rG,n,n0,α) . As proved in the proof of Lemma 2,
ξI I(rG, n, n0, α) is strictly increasing in rG, so I A is strictly decreasing in rG at in-
siders’ Equilibrium II. Similarly, at Equilibrium IV, I A = 1ξIV (rB,n,n0,α) , and I A is strictly
decreasing in rB.
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B.1.7 Proof of Propositions 3
Proof. Let Rγ(rG) denote the entrepreneur’s expected utility. So for γ ∈ (0, 1],
Rγ(rG) := P(ni ≥ n0 |H) + P(ni ≥ n0 |L)2 · p
γ(rG).
To prove Propositions 3, it suffices to prove that Rγ(rG) is increasing in rG. I will prove
that ∂Rγ(rG)∂rG > 0. Calculate the partial derivative of Rγ(rG) with respect to rG:
∂Rγ(rG)
∂rG
=
P′(ni ≥ n0 |H) + P′(ni ≥ n0 |L)
2
· pγ(rG)
+
P(ni ≥ n0 |H) + P(ni ≥ n0 |L)
2
· γpγ−1(rG) · p′(rG)
=
P′(ni ≥ n0 |H) + P′(ni ≥ n0 |L)
2
· pγ(rG)
+
P(ni ≥ n0 |H) + P(ni ≥ n0 |L)
2
· γpγ−1(rG) ·
(
−p2(rG)1 − α
α
· ξ′I I(rG, n, n0, α)
)
.
Let t = P
′(ni≥n0 |L)
P′(ni≥n0 |H) . Observe that t > 0. Then
∂Rγ(rG)
∂rG
=
pγ+1(rG)P′(ni ≥ n0 |H)
2
·
[
1 + t
p(rG) − (1 + ξI I(rG, n, n0, α)) · γ ·
(
1 − α
α
· P(ni ≥ n0 |H)ξ
′
I I(rG, n, n0, α)
P′(ni ≥ n0 |H)
)]
.
By the equation P(ni≥n0 |H)ξ
′
I I (rG,n,n0,α)
P′(ni≥n0 |H) = t − ξI I(rG, n, n0, α),
∂Rγ(rG)
∂rG
=
pγ+1(rG)P′(ni ≥ n0 |H)
2
·
[
1 + t
p(rG) − (1 + ξI I(rG, n, n0, α)) · γ ·
(
1 − α
α
· (t − ξI I(rG, n, n0, α))
)]
.
Then by the insiders’ equilibrium condition at Equilibrium II,
p(rG) = 1
1 + P(G |L)P(G |H) · P(ni≥n0 |L)P(ni≥n0 |H)
=
1
1 + 1−αα · ξI I(rG, n, n0, α)
.
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Replace p(rG) in the expression of ∂Rγ(rG)∂rG :
∂Rγ(rG)
∂rG
=
pγ+1(rG)P′(ni ≥ n0 |H)
2
·
[
(1 + t)
(
1 +
1 − α
α
ξI I
)
− (1 + ξI I) · γ ·
(
1 − α
α
· (t − ξI I)
)]
=
pγ+1(rG)P′(ni ≥ n0 |H)
2
·
[
1 + (1 + γ)1 − α
α
ξI I + γ
1 − α
α
ξ2I I +
(
1 − γ1 − α
α
)
t + (1 − γ)1 − α
α
ξI It
]
> 0.
So this completes the proof.
B.1.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. After observing the number of insiders who invest (denoted by nI), the outsiders
update their beliefs about the quality of the startup:
P(H |nI) = P(nI |H)P(H)
P(nI |H)P(H) + P(nI |L)P(L) =
P(nI |H)
P(nI |H) + P(nI |L)
=
(n+1
nI
)
αnI (1 − α)n+1−nI(n+1
nI
)
αnI (1 − α)n+1−nI + (n+1nI )(1 − α)nIαn+1−nI
=
αnI (1 − α)n+1−nI
αnI (1 − α)n+1−nI + (1 − α)nIαn+1−nI .
Then if investing, the outsiders’ expected gross payoff is
P(H |nI) = 1
1 +
(
α
1−α
)n+1−2nI .
First notice that P(H |nI) is monotone increasing in nI . Moreover, since α > 1/2, the
following holds:
P(H |nI) = 1
1 +
(
α
1−α
)n+1−2nI ≈

0 if nI < n+12 ;
1 if nI > n+12 .
151
Then clearly, when n0 ≤ n+12 , P(H |n0 + 1) − p < 0. So it suffices to prove that when
n0 > n+12 , P(H |n0 + 1) < p. At Equilibrium II, when the entrepreneur chooses the
optimal price, at the threshold nI = n0 + 1 the outsiders will have expected payoff
P(H |n0 + 1) − p = 1
1 +
(
α
1−α
)n+1−2(n0+1) − 11 + 1−αα · e(n, n0, α) . (B.5)
To prove P(H |n0 + 1) < p, it suffices to prove e(n, n0, α) =
∑
k≥n0 (nk)(1−α)kαn−k∑
k≥n0 (nk)αk(1−α)n−k <(
1−α
α
)2n0−n
. Indeed, this inequality holds because (
n
k)(1−α)kαn−k
(nk)αk(1−α)n−k =
(
1−α
α
)2n0−n
for k = n0
and (
n
k)(1−α)kαn−k
(nk)αk(1−α)n−k =
(
1−α
α
)2k−n
is strictly decreasing in k for k ≥ n0.
B.1.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Fix any n0 such that n0 > n+12 . Then there exists a crowdfunding market
equilibrium in which (1) the entrepreneur sets the share price p∗ = 11+ 1−αα ·e(n,n0,α)
for the
insiders, and p′(nI) = 11+( α1−α)n+1−2nI
for the outsiders, (2) the insiders with good signal
invest and with bad signal do not invest, and (3) the outsider play equilibrium strategy
n0 + 1. The completes the proof.
152
A p p e n d i x C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Omitted proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Firm i’s total profits are given by
pii(qi) =
m∑
j=1
pii j(qi j) − κ(|Fi |).
As Fi is fixed, there is nothing that links firm i’s decisions across markets and for
all markets j,
dpii(qi)
dqi j
=
dpii j(qi j)
dqi j
.
Thus i’s profit maximizing output decision in market j is independent of i’s output
decisions in other markets. This implies that i’s output decision in each market can be
considered in isolation and it is sufficient to show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium
in a given market. Although this result is standard, we prove it below for completeness.
As we are considering a fixed market we suppress the market index j. Without loss
of generality, we order the marginal cost of all firms: c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn. Now we will
show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (q∗i )1≤i≤n such that
1. if α < c1, then q∗i = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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2. if α > c1, then
q∗i =

P − ci
β
, if i ≤ i∗;
0, if i > i∗,
(C.1)
where i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n} is uniquely identified by the marginal costs1, and P is the
market equilibrium price:
P =
α + c1 + . . . + ci∗
i∗ + 1
. (C.2)
As the inverse demand function is linear, each firm has a quadratic (and concave)
profit function.
pii = (α − βQ − ci)qi = −βq2i + (α − βQ−i − ci)qi,
and a marginal profit function
dpii
dqi
= −βqi + α − βQ − ci .
If (q∗i )1≤i≤n is a Nash equilibrium, then q∗i > 0 if and only if pii(q∗) > 0. Moreover, at
(q∗i )1≤i≤n, it follows from the first order conditions that
q∗i > 0 implies
dpii
dqi

qi=q∗i
= 0, (C.3)
q∗i > 0 if and only if
dpii
dqi

qi=0
> 0, (C.4)
and
q∗i = 0 if and only if
dpii
dqi

qi=0
≤ 0. (C.5)
1Let P(i) = α+c1+...+cii+1 . It is easy to prove: (1) if P(i) > ci , then P(k) > ck for any k < i; (2) if P(i) ≤ ci , then P(k) ≤ ck
for any k > i. Then this implies that there exists a unique i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that either i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n−1} satisfies P(i∗) > ci∗
and P(i∗ + 1) ≤ ci∗+1, or i∗ = n satisfies P(i∗) > ci∗ .
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If α ≤ c1, then dpiidqi

qi=0
≤ α − ci ≤ 0. By (C.5), q∗i = 0 for any i. This is then the unique
Nash equilibrium.
Let us now consider the case α > c1. First it is easy to check that outputs satisfying
equation (C.1) constitute a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, for i ≤ i∗, (C.4) holds, and hence
q∗i = (P − ci)/β is a best response; for i ≥ i∗, (C.5) holds, and hence q∗i = 0 is a best
response. Next we need to prove that (C.1) is the unique Nash equilibrium. By (C.3),
we can write any Nash equilibrium as qi = max{0, (P− ci)/β}. It is easy to see that for a
given P, there exists a unique (qi)1≤i≤n. Now suppose there are two equilibria (q1i )1≤i≤n
and (q2i )1≤i≤n corresponding to P1 and P2 respectively. Without loss of generality, we
can assume P1 > P2. Then
q1i = max
{
0,
P1 − ci
β
}
≥ max
{
0,
P2 − ci
β
}
= q2i , ∀i.
Therefore, Q1 =
∑n
i=1 q
1
i ≥
∑n
i=1 q
2
i = Q
2. This implies P1 ≤ P2, which is a contradic-
tion.
C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. We first prove a key lemma. For a given market j consider what happens when
the relevant capabilities of some firms improve. Recall that θi j = |Fi∩Mj |. We say there
is an improvement in the capabilities of the firms in market j if θi j weakly increases for
all i.
Lemma 6. For market j, if there is an improvement in the capabilities of the firms in it,
then the market price weakly decreases.
Proof. As ci j is a decreasing function of θi j , firm i’s marginal cost decreases when θi j
increases. Let ci j be i’s marginal cost before the improvement in i’s capabilities and let
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c′i j be i’s marginal cost afterwards. Since we consider a fixed market, we can suppress
the market index j. Then holding entry fixed at a set of firms {1, . . . , i∗}, the newmarket
price is
P˜ :=
α + c′1 + . . . + c
′
i + . . . + c
′
i∗
i∗ + 1
.
Thus holding entry fixed the market price decreases:
α + c′1 + . . . + c
′
i∗
i∗ + 1
− α + c1 + . . . + ci∗
i∗ + 1
=
∑i∗
i=1 c
′
i − ci
i∗ + 1
< 0.
However, entry may not remain fixed in equilibrium. Then there are two cases to
consider. First there may exist a firm who entered the market before the change and
chooses not to enter after the change. Let i′ be such a firm. By definition, before the
improvement in capabilities, we have that P > ci′. If i′ no longer finds it profitable to
enter then we must have P > ci′ ≥ c′i′ > P′ and so the market price decreases, increasing
consumer surplus.
The second case is the one in which entry increases in the strong set order, so that
new firms participate in the market as well as all those that previously participated. Let
iˆ > i∗ be the new marginal firm. We then have that
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P′ =
α + c′1 + . . . + c
′
iˆ
iˆ + 1
=
α + c′1 + . . . + c
′
i∗
i∗ + 1
(
i∗ + 1
iˆ + 1
)
+
c′i∗+1 + . . . + c
′
iˆ
iˆ + 1
= P˜
(
i∗ + 1
iˆ + 1
)
+
c′i∗+1 + . . . + c
′
iˆ
iˆ + 1
= P˜
(
i∗ + 1
iˆ + 1
)
+
c′i∗+1 + . . . + c
′
iˆ
iˆ − i∗
(
iˆ − i∗
iˆ + 1
)
.
Thus P′ is a weighted average of the market price P˜ that would obtain if entry was
held fixed and the average marginal cost of the new firms that enter. As all of these
firms must have marginal costs below P′ (for entry to be profitable), if follows that
P˜ > P′. Thus as P > P˜ we conclude that P > P′ and the market price must decrease.
Thus, regardless of whether entry changes the market price decreases following an
improvement in the capabilities of firms. This also increases consumer surplus.
The proof of Proposition 7 follows almost immediately from Lemma 6. A merger
weakly improves the merged firm’s set of capabilities in both a newly entered and
non-overlapping market. Then by Lemma 6 the market price will weakly decrease and
consumer surplus weakly increases regardless of whether there is exit.
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Suppose firms i and k merge to firm l. Consider an overlapping market j.
Under the full cover assumption for any firm x competing in market j, Fx ∩ Mj = Mj .
Moreover, in equilibrium all firms x with capabilities Fx ⊇ Mj will enter market j.
Thus, if pre-merger there are y firms competing in market j and these y firms have the
same marginal cost, post merger there will be y − 1 firms competing in market j with
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the same marginal cost as before. Thus the market price will increase and consumer
surplus will be reduced.
C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. We will prove the proposition by constructing an example.
Fix a positive integer m, and suppose there are 2m attributes {a1, . . . , a2m}. We
consider a market hypergraph with m markets: HM = (Mj = {a2 j−1, a2i}){ j=1,...,m}, and
a firm hypergraph with two firms: HF = {F1 = {a1, a2, a3, . . . , a2m−1, . . . , a2m−1}, F2 =
{a1, a2, a4, . . . , a2i, . . . , a2m}}.
We assume that for some fixed c > 0, the marginal cost of production in all markets
is
ci j =

2c if |Fi ∩ Mj | = 1;
c if |Fi ∩ Mj | = 2,
and that all markets have equivalent demand curves (Pj = α −Q j) with c < α < 2c.
We now consider a merger between firm 1 and 2. Let ∆ j denote the change
of consumer surplus following a merger between firm 1 and 2 in market j. Since
c < α < 2c, both firm 1 and 2 only operate in market 1 pre-merger, and the merged firm
will operate in all markets post merger. Then the total consumer surplus change is
m∑
j=1
∆ j =
m∑
j=1
1
2
(
α − α + c
2
)2
− 1
2
(
α − α + c + c
3
)2
=
(α − c)2
8
· m − 2(α + c)
2
9
.
Thus, as m → ∞, ∑mj=1 ∆ j → ∞. This implies that a merger between firm 1 and 2 can
increase the overall consumer surplus by an arbitrarily large amount. However, note that
the price in market 1 would increase following the merger. Therefore, a merger policy
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only focusing on overlapping markets (market 1) would block the merger, thus leading
to unbounded loss of consumer surplus.
C.1.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The proof is similar to Proposition 6. We also just consider one market, and thus
can suppress the market index j. Suppose firm i and firm k are going to form a joint
venture J. Let cJ be the marginal cost of J. We first prove the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
Notice that with a joint venture competing in the market, the same equlibrium
output conditions (C.3) (C.4) (C.5) still hold for all firms including J. In particular,
this implies that for the firms with the same profit function pis = (P − cs)qs as before,
they enter the market with q∗s > 0 if and only if P > cs. Thus, the minimum entry price
for them is their marginal cost cs. Things are a bit different for firm i and k, since they
have different profit functions. Now they have marginal profit functions
dpi f
dq f
= −βq f + α − βQ − c f − λ f βqJ, f = i, k . (C.6)
By the first order conditions, firm i and k’s minimum entry price depends on whether
their joint venture J enters the market, i.e. q∗J > 0. If q∗J = 0, the minimum entry
price is their marginal cost. If q∗J > 0, then
q∗f > 0 ⇔
dpi f
dq f

qf=0
> 0 ⇔ P > c f − λ f cJ
1 − λ f .
Thus when q∗J > 0, the minimum entry price for firm i and k is a modified version of
their marginal cost
cˆ f =
c f − λ f cJ
1 − λ f , f = i, k .
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Notice that c f > cJ if and only if cˆ f > cJ . In particular, this implies that when c f < cJ ,
if J enters the market, then its parent firm f also enters the market.
Having found the minimum entry prices for all firms, we would like to order
them. Then for any fixed price (or firm) threshold, we will be able to compute the
market equilibrium price resulting from the competition of the firms with minimum
entry prices lower than or equal to that threshold. However, such an order depends on
whether J enters the market, since firm i and k’s minimum entry price does so. Thus,
the relative magnitude of cJ, ci, ck matters. To deal with this difficulty, we will proceed
our argument in different cases. Without loss of generality, we also assume that cˆi ≤ cˆk .
Let the minimum entry price of firm s be es, and let P(s) be the market equilibrium
price resulting from the competition from firm s and the firms with minimum entry
price lower than or equal to es. Then depending on whether J and its parent firms
simultaneously compete in the market, P(s) can take the following three forms:
P(s) =

P1(s) := α+
∑
t:ct ≤es ct
|{t:ct≤ce}|+1 if q
∗
J = 0 or q
∗
i = q
∗
k = 0;
P2(s) := α+
∑
t,i:ct ≤es ct+ci−λicJ
|{t,i:ct≤es}|+2−λi if q
∗
J > 0, q
∗
i > 0, q
∗
k = 0;
P3(s) := α+
∑
t,i,k,J:ct ≤es ct+ci+ck
|{t,i,k:ct≤es}|+2 if q
∗
J > 0, q
∗
i > 0, q
∗
k > 0.
(C.7)
Now according to the relative magnitude of cJ, ci, ck , we can specify which form P(s)
takes as a function of minimum entry price es of the marginal firm (i.e. the firm that
enters with the highest minimum entry price):
1. cJ ≤ min{ci, ck}. If the firm with the highest minimum entry price to enter
has a minimum entry price es < cˆi, then all the firms possibly including J with
marginal cost ct ≤ es also compete in the market but no firms with marginal cost
ct > es, including i and k, compete. Thus, P(s) = P1(s). If the marginal firm s
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has es ∈ [cˆi, cˆk), then all the firms with marginal cost ct ≤ es, including J and i,
also compete in the market while all firms with marginal cost ct > es, including k,
don’t. Thus, P(s) = P2(s), if the marginal firm s has es ≥ cˆk then all the firms with
ct ≤ es, including i,J and k, also compete in the market. Thus, P(s) = P3(s).
2. min{ci, ck} ≤ cJ ≤ max{ci, ck}. If the marginal firm s has es < cJ then q∗J = 0
and P(s) = P1(s). If the marginal firm s has es ∈ [cJ, cˆk) competes in the market,
then all the firms with ct ≤ es, including i and J, also compete while all firms
with ct > es, including k, do not. Thus, P(s) = P2(s); If the marginal firm s has
es ≥ cˆk , then all the firms with ct ≤ es, including i,J, and k, also compete in the
market and P(s) = P3(s).
3. cJ ≥ max{ci, ck}. If themarginal firm s has es < cJ then q∗J = 0 and P(s) = P1(s).
If the marginal firm s has es ≥ cJ then all the firms with ct ≤ es, including i,J
and k, also compete in the market. Thus, P(s) = P3(s).
To prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, in each of the above three cases, we
solve the following problem:
max
s∈{1,...,n}∪{J}
es · 1P(s)>es (C.8)
and argue that the solution to (C.8) identifies a unique Nash equilibrium.
By definition, (C.8) has a unique solution since the total number of firms is finite.
Let x∗ be the solution and let s∗ be a marginal firm such that es∗ = x∗. Then for any
firm t with minimum entry price et ≤ es∗, et ≤ es∗ < P(s∗) and so q∗t > 0. For the
firms with et > es∗, without loss of generality, we can assume that et ′ = mint:et>es∗ et .
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Then by the definition of (C.8), P(t′) ≤ et ′. Using equation (C.7) and reorganizing the
inequality P(t′) ≤ et ′, we have P(s∗) ≤ et ′. Thus, it is not profitable for firm t′ to enter
the market when the market price is P(s∗). Therefore, it is also not profitable for any
firm with et ≥ et ′ to enter the market. So for any firm t with et > es∗, et ≥ P(s∗),
thus q∗t = 0. Now we have pinned down the entry decisions of all firms. Given these
entry choices, output decisions are uniquely determined by the first order conditions of
firms’ profit maximization problems. Thus we have a Nash equilibrium with market
equilibrium price P(s∗).
C.1.6 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. First we introduce some notation. Let q′i j , q
′
k j , Q
′
j and P
′
j denote the equilibrium
output of i, output of k, total output and market price respectively, in market j before
the creation of J. Let qi j , qk j , qJ j , Q j , and Pj denote the equilibrium output of i,
output of k, output of J, total output, and market price respectively, in market j after
the creation of J.
Part (i)By assumptionJ enters market j after created and so qJ j > 0. This implies
that in equilibrium Pj > cJ and piJ j > 0. Since before J is created, pi′i j = pi′k j = 0. So
the creation of J strictly increases both i and k’s profits in market j for all γi ∈ (0, 1).
Part (ii). As i but not k is present in market j prior to J’s creation q′i j > q′k j = 0.
Setting λi = 1, i chooses qi j tomaximize pii j+piJ j whileJ chooses qJ j tomaximize piJ j .
As shown in the proof of Lemma4, i optimally chooses output qi j = max{Pj−ci jβ −qJ j, 0}.
We consider two cases.
Case 1: Suppose that ci j < cJ j . Then
Pj−ci j
β ≥ qJ j =
Pj−cJ j
β and qi j ≥ 0. It is
straightforward to then verify that there is an equilibrium in which the market price does
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not change (Pj = P′j), qi j = q
′
i j − qJ j and ql j = q′l j for all l , i,J. By Lemma 4 this
equilibrium is unique. The change in i’s profits in market j is thus
(Pj − ci j)qi j + (Pj − cJ j)qJ j − (P′j − ci j)q′i j
= (Pj − ci j)qi j + (Pj − cJ j)qJ j − (Pj − ci j)(q′i j)
= Pj(qi j + qJ j − q′i j) − ci j(qi j − q′i j) − cJ jqJ j
= (ci j − cJ j)qJ j .
As by assumption ci j < cJ j and qJ j > 0 by assumption, the above expression is
negative.
Case 2: Suppose that ci j ≥ cJ j . Then Pj−ci jβ ≤ qJ j and qi j = 0. The market
outcome is identical to the case in which J was not created, but i’s marginal cost
changed from ci j to cJ j . By Lemma 6, reducing i’s marginal cost in market j strictly
increases i’s profits in market j if ci j > cJ j . Moreover, if ci j = cJ j then i’s profits in
market j remain constant.
The above two cases together show that while k’s profits remain zero, i’s profits
strictly increase from the creation of J if and only if ci j > cJ j . By the continuity of
payoffs in λi and λk it follows that there exist λi < 1 and λk = 1 − λi such that both i
and k do strictly better in market j after the creation of J if and only if ci j > cJ j .
Part (iii)We will show the following, which is logically equivalent to the statement
made: If max{ci j, ck j} ≤ cJ j then there does not exist a λi such that both i and k’s
profits weakly increase following the creation of J. Fix any λi. We showed in the proof
of Lemma 4 that i and k optimally enter the market after the creation of J if: (i) J
optimally enters and (ii)max{ci j, ck j} ≤ cJ j . As by assumption J optimally enters and
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asmax{ci j, ck j} ≤ cJ j , i and k both enter after the creation of J. Thus, as shown in the
proof of Lemma 4, we must have Pj−ci jβ ≥ λiqJ j and
Pj−ck j
β ≥ (1 − λi)qJ j . In such case
there exists an equilibrium in which the market price does not change Pj = P′j . To see
this, note that if Pj = P′j , then qi j = q
′
i j −λiqJ j , qk j = q′k j −(1−λi)qJ j and ql j = q′l j for
all l , i, k,J. Thus Q j = Q′j and so Pj = P′j . Moreover, by Lemma 4 this equilibrium
is unique.
The change in i’s profits in market j is therefore
pii j + λipiJ j − pi′i j = (Pj − ci j)qi j + λi(Pj − cJ j)qJ j − (P′j − ci j)q′i j
= (ci j − cJ j)λiqJ j ≤ 0.
Thus the creation of the joint venture strictly reduces i’s profits in market j if λi > 0.
An equivalent argument shows that the creation of the joint venture also strictly reduces
k’s profits in market j if 1 − λi > 0. Thus there are no profit shares that make the joint
venture weakly profitable in market j for both i and k.
C.1.7 Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Consider any market j. As we are considering just this market, we suppress the
market index in what follows. Suppose firm i and firm k are going to form a joint venture
J. Let P′ and P be the market prices before and after the creation of J, respectively.
We will prove P′ ≥ P by contradiction.
First suppose P > P′. By Proposition 6, we can write any firm’s equilibrium output
before the formation of J as q′s = max{0, (P′ − cs)/β} for s ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let qs be the
equilibrium output of firm s after the formation of J. Then by Lemma 4, for any firm
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s , i, k, we can write qs = max{0, (P − cs)/β}. For firm s = i, k, we can write their
equilibrium output as
qs = max
{
P − cs
β
− λsqJ, 0
}
.
Note that qJ = 0 if the market being considered does not correspond to the one J is
created to enter and otherwise qJ = (P − cJ)/β > 0.
Then P > P′ implies that
qs = max
{
P − cs
β
, 0
}
≥ max
{
P′ − cs
β
, 0
}
= q′s, ∀s , i, k .
By an elementary inequality2, we also have
qi + qk + qJ = max
{
P − ci
β
− λiqJ, 0
}
+max
{
P − ck
β
− λkqJ, 0
}
+ qJ
≥ max
{
P − ci
β
, 0
}
+max
{
P − ck
β
, 0
}
≥ max
{
P′ − ci
β
, 0
}
+max
{
P′ − ck
β
, 0
}
= q′i + q
′
k .
Therefore, Q =
∑n
s=1 qs + qJ ≥
∑n
s=1 q
′
s = Q
′, which implies that P ≤ P′. This is a
contradiction.
C.1.8 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We use an idea similar to the energy function in physics. As there is a finite set of
attributes, there is also a finite set of possible hypergraphs. Since f is weakly increasing
along the sequence of hypergraphs, f (H(t)F ) must converge to a constant in finite steps.
When the convergence happens, there are two possibilities. Either the sequence ends or
it cycles. Suppose it ends at step τ. Then there can be no profitable merger or demerger
and the hypergraph H(τ)F is stable. Alternatively the sequence includes a cycle. There
2For b ≥ 0, max{a, 0} + b ≥ max{a + b, 0}.
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exists a sequence of profitable mergers and demergers that cycles. Moreover, as f is
weakly increasing each step of the cycle must hold f constant.
C.1.9 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Our proof consists of two steps:
1. Step 1: we identify a function that is weakly increasing at each step in any sequence
of profitable mergers and demergers and applying Lemma 5 argue that either a
stable hypergraph exists or else a cycle of profitable mergers/demergers exists.
2. Step 2: we show that such a cycle cannot exist.
Define a function
Φt =
∑
Fi∈H(1)F
|Fi | −
∑
Fi∈H(t)F
|Fi |. (C.9)
Thus Φt is the total number of capabilities summed over all firms in period 1 less the
total number of capabilities summed over all firms in period t. Notice that Φt weakly
increases for any sequence of mergers or demergers. If a merger between two firms
with overlapping capabilities occurs,Φt strictly decreases and, by definition, a demerger
doesn’t change Φt . We can therefore apply Lemma 5 to conclude that either there exists
a stable hypergraph or else there exists a sequence of profitable mergers and demergers
that cycles such that Φt = Φt+1 for all t. Moreover, in this case
(i) there must be both mergers and demergers in the cycle.
(ii) in any merger in this cycle, the merging firms must have disjoint set of capabilities.
We now prove Step 2 by contradiction. Suppose that the set of firms reaches a cycle
with length c by step t such that H(c+t)F = H
(t)
F . We denote by N
(τ)
j the number of firms
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in market j at step τ. Let N (τ) = (N (τ)1 , . . . , N (τ)m ). Observe that N (τ) has the following
properties for τ ≥ t:
1. if it is amerger that causes the transition from step τ to step τ+1, thenN (τ+1)j −N (τ)j =
1 if and only if the new merged firm enters market j;
2. if it is a demerger that causes the transition from step τ to step τ + 1, then
N (τ+1)j − N (τ)j = −1 if and only if neither of the demerged firms continue to
participate in market j.
Let ∆Cτ be the set of coordinates (markets) over which N (τ) is different from N (τ+1),
i.e. ∆Cτ = { j |N (τ)j , N (τ+1)j }. Let ∆κτ be the fixed cost change of either a merger or
demerger from period τ to τ + 1. As Φτ = Φτ+1 and κ is convex, ∆κτ is positive for a
merger and negative for a demerger. Let TM ⊂ {t, . . . , t + c} be the set of steps τ such
that there is a merger from τ to τ + 1, and TD ⊂ {t, . . . , t + c} be the set of steps τ such
that there is a demerger from τ to τ + 1.
As in the cycle all mergers are between firms with disjoint capabilities, a merger is
profitable if and only if the profits obtained from entering new markets is greater than
the increase in fixed costs. That is,
∆κτ <
∑
j∈∆Cτ
pi j(N (τ+1)j ), for all τ ∈ TM, (C.10)
where pi j(Nτ+1j ) is the profit each firm earned in market j when there are N (τ+1)j firms
in that market. Notice that in (C.10), we have suppressed the index of the firms since
under the full cover assumption the profit of a firm only depends on the total number of
firms in a market.
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Similarly, for a demerger, the decreased fixed cost is greater than profit loss of exit.
That is,
− ∆κτ >
∑
j∈∆Cτ
pi j(N (τ)j ), for all τ ∈ TD. (C.11)
Summing up (C.10) over all mergers and (C.11) over all demergers in a cycle, we
have that total change of (increased) fixed cost following mergers is less than total profits
of entry: ∑
τ∈TM
∆κτ <
∑
τ∈TM
∑
j∈∆Cτ
pi j(N (τ+1)j ) (C.12)
and total change of (decreased) fixed cost following demergers is greater than total profit
loss of exit:
−
∑
τ∈TD
∆κτ >
∑
τ∈TD
∑
j∈∆Cτ
pi j(N (τ)j ). (C.13)
Since the total change of fixed cost following mergers on a cycle is equal to the total
change of fixed cost following demergers:∑
τ∈TM
∆κτ +
∑
τ∈TD
∆κτ = 0,
by (C.12) and (C.13), the total profit loss of exit is less than total profits of entry:
Ψ ≡
∑
τ∈TM
∑
j∈∆Cτ
pi j(N (t+1)j ) −
∑
τ∈TD
∑
j∈∆Cτ
pi j(Nτj ) > 0. (C.14)
Next, we will prove that total profit loss of exit is actually equal to total profits of
entry, and then this gives us a desired contradiction.
To prove that total profit loss of exit is equal to total profits of entry, we compute
their difference:
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Ψ =
m∑
j=1

∑
τ:N (τ+1)j −Nτj =1
pi j(N (τ+1)j ) −
∑
τ:N (τ+1)j −N (τ)j =−1
pi j(N (τ)j )
 = 0. (C.15)
The second equality is because, for a fixed market k, N (c+t)j = N
(t)
j and the values
of N (τ+1)j − N (τ)j are taken from a set {−1, 0, 1}. For each firm that realizes a profit from
entering the market k with N firms following a merger, there is some firm that realizes
an equal loss through a demerger that reduces the number of firms in market k from
N + 1 to N . Equation (C.15) contradicts equation (C.14). We thus conclude that there
cannot exist a cycle of profitable mergers and demergers. Lemma 5 therefore implies
that there exists a stable hypergraph.
C.1.10 Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. First consider the effect of the demerger on market prices. For a given market j
consider the set of capabilities {θh j}h such that θh j > 0. By Proposition 6 this uniquely
determines the market price in market j. This set of capabilities is the same before
and after the demerger of firm l into i and k for all markets j. Hence, the demerger
does not change the market equilibrium in any market. Therefore, without counting
changes in fixed costs, firm l’s profits are equal to the combined profits of firms i and
k. However, by the convexity of κ the total fixed costs following the demerger decrease:
κ(|Fl |) > κ(|Fi |) + κ(|Fk |) and the demerger of l into firms i and k increases profits,
taking fixed costs into account.
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C.2 Calculations supporting example 3
Any two firms Fsi, Fti ∈ H1 do not merge because they lose revenue (profits without
counting fixed cost) when ku is large (the business stealing effect is large), and do not
save fixed cost (κ(|Fsi |) = κ(|Fti | = 0). Any two firms Fsi, Ft j ∈ H1 (i , j) do not merge
because the merger loses profits for large u (the business stealing effect is large, the
synergy is small and the increased fixed costs from merger is large). So H1 is stable.
To prove H2 is stable, we just need to check that any firm does not want to demerge.
Suppose that a firm of H2 demerges to two smaller firms with u1 and u2 = u−u1 number
of attributes respectively. Then the profit of the two demerged firms without counting
fixed costs (denoted by R) can be calculated:
R
α2
=
(
1 + (k − 1) 12u + 1u1+u + 1u2+u
k + 2
− 1
u1 + u
)2
+
(
1 + (k − 1) 12u + 1u1+u + 1u2+u
k + 2
− 1
u2 + u
)2
.
Then we can estimate:
R
α2
≤ ©­­«
2 + (k − 1)1u − k
[
1
u1+u
+ 1u2+u
]
k + 2
ª®®¬
2
≤
(
2 − ( k3 + 1)1u
k + 2
)2
.
Further, for k ≥ 3u,
R ≤
(
2 − ( k3 + 1)1u
k + 2
)2
a2 <
(
1 − 12u
k + 1
)2
α2.
This implies that without counting fixed costs, the aggregated profit of demerged firms
is less than the firm’s profit pre demerger. When e is close to 1, the demerger cannot
save much fixed cost. Therefore, the net effect of the demerger is negative and it is not
profitable for the firm to demerge. This proves that H2 is stable.
